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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I examine questions of strategic political control through
institutional design, government responsiveness to economic insecurity in social con-
text, and opportunistic political control of bureaucratic performance in social insur-
ance programs. I theorize how political divergence and economic forces influence
institutional design, and how social and economic factors constrain social insurance
generosity. I first offer a formal model of institutional choice— how and why policy-
makers choose to decentralize social insurance programs. I argue that ideological
divergence leads to greater decentralization, and that institutional feedback through
the establishment of vested interests encourages greater centralization. A study of the
1935 U.S. Social Security Act illustrates and supports this argument. In the second
component of this project, I distinguish between civic and charitable forms of social
capital, and I offer a theory of their respective effects on social policy responsiveness
to macroeconomic dynamics. With novel data, I find support for my explanation,
which challenges the fundamental arguments that Putnam and others have made.
Lastly, I reexamine the political economy literature on political budget cycles by
more closely considering the administrative mechanisms through which elected offi-
cials manipulate the provision of public goods and services. I extend research that
points to an electoral cycle in government spending on social transfer programs by
incorporating theory from the study of administrative political control. Politicians
will be more successful in exerting pressure on bureaucrats to perform better, to be
more generous, and more timely in processing unemployment insurance payments
in the context of greater electoral competition and macroeconomic insecurity. By
approaching unemployment policy institutions from these multiple perspectives, I
ii
further an understanding of the social, political, and economic influences on policies
designed to alleviate economic insecurity.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Economic risk is a part of everyday life, and an array of policy instruments have
evolved to protect citizens from the insecurities inherent in market economies. Insti-
tutions of insurance against the risk of health, retirement, injury, or unemployment
are found in every developed democratic country, but these programs vary cross-
nationally in their structure, organization, generosity, and coverage. The study of
social welfare state development, retrenchment, and popular support is of funda-
mental importance to modern societies facing increasing levels and disparities in the
distribution of economic insecurity and risk. In a contribution to the scholarly un-
derstanding of government policies aimed to buffer citizens from modern economic
insecurity, in this dissertation, I advance theories of the political economy of social
insurance.
In the following chapters, I theorize on the process of government policy responses
to macro-economic insecurity. I specifically focus on unemployment insurance, as
one of the most immediate government responses to economic insecurity. In the
first substantive chapter, I model the administrative delegation of social insurance
policy through decentralization. I argue that it is the degree of political divergence
and political uncertainty that interact to determine how governments institutionalize
their policy responses to economic insecurity. In the second chapter, I model policy
responses to macroeconomic insecurity as a function of informal social institutions,
or in other words, social capital. Lastly, in the third chapter, I theorize on electoral
cycles in political control and the effect of opportunistic policy manipulation on
bureaucratic performance. By examining policy and administrative through these
perspectives, I illuminate the contributions of multiple theoretical traditions in the
1
current political science understanding of social insurance programs.
In answering three distinct research questions in this dissertation, I argue that the
outcomes from policies aimed to alleviate economic insecurity cannot be explained
without attention to the political and economic context at every stage of the policy
making process. This includes both the design and initial development of public
policy, as well as the ongoing functioning of social insurance programs. The choice of
policy institution is deliberate, and is decided by economic and political motivations.
Once implemented, the responsiveness or the scope of possible change of public
programs is constrained by decisions made in early stages of public policy process—
when the public program is designed. I further argue that informal social institutions
condition the elasticity of public policy to common needs, and I investigate whether
policy outputs are responsive to political motivations. Policy making process is a
rational process, and only by modeling the process from initial design choices through
to the day-to-day political influences on bureaucratic performance can the outputs
and real effects of governance be understood.
The intellectual traditions motivating my theoretical arguments cross-cut sub-
fields in political science and draw heavily on theory from economics. My explana-
tion of the development, functional generosity, and cyclical administration of unem-
ployment insurance employs methods and theory from comparative politics, as well
as critical insight from the study of public administration. My political economy
approach in applying economic principles and theory to the study of political phe-
nomenon is deeply rooted in public choice, historical institutionalism, and collective
action theory more generally. Building on the fundamental assumptions of rational
choice and rational expectations that shape individual behavior and strategic inter-
action, I explain government responsiveness to economic insecurity in a way that
joins together previously disjointed theories to bring greater clarity and nuance to
2
the understanding of social policy in political science. I do this by offering three
theories of the political economy of public policy.
1.1 The Political Economy of Policy Design
The design and implementation of public policy programs requires the assent and
cooperation of multiple political interests. In democratic systems of government,
public policy outcomes are often theorized as the outcome of strategic interactions
between executives and legislators. These political actors negotiate while exploiting
informational advantages to pursue their own self-interest, be it policy or electorally
motivated. In political systems with decentralized administration or federal institu-
tions, the negotiation over the design of public programs only grows in complexity.
Because principal policy-makers have limited time and resources to specify rules
or execute oversight, they choose administrative agents. Often, lateral delegation is
made to an executive agency with the authority to refine details and complete the
implementation. Sometimes, however, policy authority is delegated to lower levels
of government; it is decentralized. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I draw on
theory of political control, institutional choice, the economics of public goods, and
comparative theory of political decentralization to explain political principals’ choice
of agent in delegating authority.
All policy decisions involve trade-offs. In choosing whether to delegate a task,
one such trade-off is the balance of cost and uncertainty. Theory of principal-agent
interactions demonstrate this (Niskanen 1971). In choosing whether to decentralize
administration, trade-offs between efficiency and flexibility also arise (Tiebout 1956).
These considerations are further shaped by preexisting and persistent policy insti-
tutions, which alter the costs of future policy reversals or alterations (Pierson 1995;
Skocpol 1992). When introducing a new policy, then, decision makers confront each
3
of these (three) trade-offs in choosing how and by whom a policy will be administered.
How these considerations are incorporated into a single decision-making process is
theoretically unclear, and an explanation requires the integration of these previously
distinct theories. In the first chapter of this dissertation, I propose a game theoretic
explanation of delegation via decentralization using the U.S. Social Security Act as
an illustrative case to arrive at a series of testable empirical hypotheses to motivate
future research.
1.2 The Political Economy of Policy Substitution
Where private markets fail to cover risk, social insurance programs step in to
offer citizens greater security and welfare. These programs largely arose in the 20th
century among advanced democracies to address the uncertainties inherent in life
from labor markets, health, and old-age. Extant political economy theory on the
development and contemporary generosity of social welfare states rely on rational
explanations of economic interests, political institutions, and strategic interaction.
In contributing to this literature, I theorize on the informal social institutions that
shape coordination within formal institutional arrangements to generate variation in
the generosity of social insurance programs.
A burgeoning literature on the study of social capital and public policy outcomes
has successfully identified intriguing empirical relationships, but has fallen short
in articulating mechanisms or maintaining consistent conceptual definitions. After
clarifying my novel definition and general conceptualization of social capital as a set
of informal institutions for cooperation, I advance a comparative political economy
theory of social insurance coordinated by social capital mechanisms.
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I articulate this theory and I provide
support for my argument that social capital serves more than one function in society,
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having multidimensional influences on public policy. A “voluntary and charitable”
dimension may rival government insurance while a “civic and political” mechanism
serves a benevolent push to increase the coverage and responsiveness of social in-
surance programs. This offers a new perspective on the study of social capital and
public policy, suggesting that theories of their relationship should be attentive to
the multiple forms this capital may take. This piece of the puzzle also contributes
to comparative social welfare policy theory by adding nuance to explanations of
generosity within pluralist or liberal market economies.
1.3 The Political Economy of Policy Implementation
Traditional public choice theory has been applied to the study of opportunistic
policy cycles for almost as long as political science has existed as a discipline. The
same underlying concepts have also been used to explain the application or suc-
cess of political pressure on bureaucratic behavior— political control. The study
of political budget cycles and the study of political control rely on similar funda-
mental assumptions of rational expectations and political self-interest, and each has
produced separately venerable and productive literatures for decades. Indeed, in
standard public choice texts these two questions occupy parallel chapters (for exam-
ple, see Mueller 2003), and yet a theory of electorally motivated cycles of control
over public administration has eluded political science to date.
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I develop a theory of electoral cycles in
political control of bureaucratic outputs. Politicians should optimize their exploita-
tion of policy tools to maximize their reelection odds, and I argue that in addition
to “budgetary goods,” elected officials may also lean on public agencies to improve
service quality as an “administrative good” to satisfy voters. By theorizing on both
generosity and service quality in the administration of unemployment insurance, I
5
am able to distinguish between the political and economic conditions making oppor-
tunistic control of either budgetary or bureaucratic public goods more advantageous
to elected officials.
To test my novel theoretical expectations, I offer novel data source: performance
management reports on unemployment insurance claims across the US states. Al-
though the results I find are suggestive, the opportunities for future extension or
adaptation of this theory and empirical exploration are many. I conclude the third
chapter by discussing the most promising of these future opportunities.
1.4 The Empirical Case of Unemployment Insurance
In the following three chapters, I explore theoretically the political economy of
unemployment insurance and I examine empirically the case of the U.S. states. Ap-
plying my empirical investigations to the single policy of unemployment insurance
offers a number of advantages. First, this form of social insurance is unique in the
challenges it poses to actuarially solvent program design. Problems of moral hazard,
adverse selection, and non-independence of risk exclude unemployment insurance
from efficient public markets, relegating the protection of workers and citizens from
the risk of unemployment exclusively to informal or compulsory state institutions.
These characteristics simplify the empirical reality by limiting the universe of feasible
providers of insurance. In other words, theories of the influence of social, economic,
or political factors in coordinating insurance can be more parsimoniously articulated
and simply tested empirically, precisely because there is no private market option
available. Second, I restrict my investigation to unemployment insurance in the US
states, in a most-similar systems research design. This limits the potential for con-
founding institutional or political variables in my empirical tests. For additional
details on the history of unemployment insurance administration in the US, refer to
6
Appendix 1.
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2. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A HARD PLACE: A THEORY OF POLICY
DELEGATION BY DECENTRALIZATION
Policy decisions of varying importance are made at every level of government,
and each of these decisions carries important political implications, for efficiency
or distribution. Because executive or legislative policymakers have limited time and
resources to specify rules or execute oversight, they delegate to administrative agents.
This delegation choice can have real consequences in democratic systems representing
a spectrum of ideological positions, because administrators will use their allotted
discretion to move policy output in their preferred direction. Often, lateral delegation
is made to an executive agency with the authority to refine details and complete
the implementation process. Sometimes, however, policy authority is delegated to
lower levels of government; it is decentralized. How and why do policymakers choose
administrative agents, and why is decentralization sometimes the choice?
Existing theory has little to say on this question of delegation via decentralization,
despite this institutional choice having important implications for democratic repre-
sentation and accountability. An extensive literature on political control is directly
concerned with whether or how bureaucracy can be controlled by elected political
representatives. These works point to key design features of administrative insti-
tutions that facilitate political control or defend against policy change. Policy is a
function of institutional design, yet certain institutional design choices have not been
theorized on in the extant literature. I argue that national agencies and sub-national
governments are substitute administrative agents, and policymakers at the national
level may delegate to either institution to effectively implement policy, or to both.
Either of these institutional designs will present advantages or disadvantages for po-
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litical accountability and policy outcomes. A rational policymaker concerned with
implementing their preferred policy will be aware of the multiple trade-offs involved
in this decision. The study of delegation and public administration has generated
a wealth of knowledge on these questions, but it falls short in conceptualizing this
variety of delegation.
Theories of comparative decentralization and federalism also have much to con-
tribute to this explanation. Previous theoretical approaches to delegation have not
recognized this growing literature in comparative politics on the study of decentral-
ization. In this chapter, I bring together these distinct literatures to articulate a
more integrated explanation. Policymakers everywhere are faced with choosing ad-
ministrative agents, though the available choices and incentives vary cross-nationally.
In turning to the comparative politics literature, I identify important insights about
the trade-offs in decentralization gained from the study of delegation decisions in
variegated cross-national institutions and contexts.
In making my argument, I focus my empirical discussion on the administration
of social insurance policy. Social insurance, including unemployment insurance, is
often funded by a tax on employers or employees’ wages in developed democracies
(U.S. Social Security Administration 2011). This funding structure offers a unique
set of incentives to policymakers wishing to satisfy constituents while facing fiscal
constraints. Decentralization may be politically efficient, but can pose challenges
to principal policymakers desiring future flexibility or political control. Centralized
social insurance policy may be economically efficient, but politically unpopular, de-
pending on the degree of regional preference heterogeneity. To explain the decision
to delegate authority via decentralization, it is useful to examine this case in which
a single government delegated otherwise similar policies to different agents.
An empirical example is useful in illustrating this theory, and an example of
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deliberate and selective decentralization is seen in the U.S. Social Security Act. Sev-
eral social programs were introduced in this 1935 act, including old-age insurance
(social security) and unemployment insurance. Both policies are forms of social in-
surance, and benefit payments under both programs are tied to past employment.
Social Security is funded by a payroll tax and insures against permanent departure
from the labor force. Unemployment Insurance is a social insurance program that
is not altogether different from social security, and yet it was designed to delegate
broad authority to state governments. Unemployment Insurance is funded by a tax
on employers and is intended to insure workers against involuntary temporary job
loss. These two programs were instituted in the same act, within the same political
and economic context, and the choice of their institutional design was made by the
same coalition of interests, legislators, and executive representatives. Social Security
remains a centralized program administered by a national executive agency, first un-
der the direction of the Social Security Board and now under the independent Social
Security Administration. Unemployment Insurance, however, is designed to delegate
broad authority to state governments, with limited oversight by the national Depart-
ment of Labor. The choice to decentralize Unemployment Insurance by delegating
authority to the states was deliberate and subject to extensive debate in the drafting
of the Social Security Act (Witte 1945, Skocpol 1995). In considering the decision by
the New Deal Democratic supermajority to decentralize Unemployment Insurance
and centralize Social Security, a number of important trade-offs are made evident.
In this chapter, I propose a game theoretic explanation of delegation via decen-
tralization. Drawing from theory in both public administration and comparative
politics, I integrate existing expectations into a more unified theory with a sin-
gle model. The actors in this game include a principal-policy maker (a legislative
majority, a government or coalition, or some other national-level decision-maker),
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a centralized administrative agency, and two sub-national governments, with each
actor having a preferred policy position. The principal’s delegation decision (a con-
tinuous distribution of discretion between two agents, 0 ≥ 𝐷 ≥ 1) is a function of the
difference in two policy proposals, political uncertainty, the oversight costs of decen-
tralization, the efficiency loss from the implementation of heterogeneous policies, and
uncertainty of veto player preferences. From this formal expression, I derive a series
of theoretical propositions. To summarize, the choice between a centralized and de-
centralized administrative agent is context dependent; increased political divergence
may incentivize either more or less decentralization of policy authority, conditional
on other political factors and institutional features.
In the following sections, I review theory of comparative decentralization and
theory of bureaucratic delegation and political control. This review highlights the
importance of uncertainty about policy outcomes and path-dependency in explaining
the choice of administrative agent. In the second section, I unify these multiple the-
oretical arguments into a single formal expression of the decision to delegate through
decentralization. In the last section, I discuss the 1935 U.S. Social Security Act as
an illustrative case to provide a substantive example. I conclude this chapter with
a number of theoretical propositions that may be adapted to empirical implications,
which will be tested in subsequent work.
2.1 Delegation, Political Control, and Path-Dependency
Delegation should be identified in two dimensions, to include the intensity and
the direction of delegation. First, it is a straightforward argument that a policy-
maker can choose how much power to distribute to administrative agents. This is
not a dichotomous decision, it is a continuum. Very few or very many constraints
can be stipulated by the principal policymaker to the agent. Second, control of
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policy implementation can be handed to a centralized national agency, or it may
be diffused through decentralization. I define “decentralization” as the granting of
discretion and authority to sub-national or lower-level governments over a specified
policy domain. Sub-national governments as agents are bound to the central gov-
ernment by a formal legislative contract with some degree of specificity, delineating
circumscribed discretion over policy implementation and administration. This sec-
ond step is an important question, because agents offer differing advantages or risks.
By conceptualizing decentralization as an instrumental choice in the process of pol-
icy implementation, additional explanatory factors become relevant that have not
previously been integrated into a theory of delegation.
All policy decisions involve trade-offs. In choosing whether to delegate a task,
one such trade-off is the balance of cost and uncertainty. Theory of principal-agent
interactions demonstrate this (Niskanen 1971). In choosing whether to decentralize
administration, trade-offs between efficiency and flexibility also arise (Tiebout 1956).
These considerations are further shaped by preexisting and persistent policy insti-
tutions, which alter the costs of future policy reversals or alterations (Pierson 1995;
Skocpol 1992). When introducing a new policy, then, decision makers confront each
of these (three) trade-offs in choosing how and by whom a policy will be administered.
How these considerations are incorporated into a single decision-making process is
theoretically unclear, and an explanation requires the integration of these previously
distinct theories. The following section discusses each of these three trade-offs.
2.1.1 1: The Exploitation of Agency
Principal policymakers face the fundamental problem of balancing cost and con-
trol when delegating decision-making powers, because administrative agents have
an informational advantage in their respective policy domains. Bureaucrats in ad-
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ministrative agencies cultivate expertise in the policy implementation process, the
interests of stakeholders or partners, development of new issues, and technical as-
pects of their issue area. Having more information and specialization allows these
agents to make policy decisions more efficiently and more consistently (Kiewiet and
McCubbins 1991). This implies that legislators and executives are rationally igno-
rant and strategically uninvolved, in other words, they may rationally “abdicate”
responsibility (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991). This delegation can reduce uncer-
tainty and improve the quality of information available (Epstein and O’Halloran
1999a). Because bureaucrats have more information about their policy domain and
their behavior (effort) is imperfectly observed, they are able to withhold or obscure
the true costs of production or their true effort levels. This gives rise to classic
principal-agent information problems (Niskanen 1971). Bureaucrats exploit this in-
formational advantage as far as it benefits their utility. This is the problem of
bureaucratic drift, whereby discretion allows agents to effect outcomes that diverge
from those preferred by principal politicians. This phenomenon, also called “agency
drift,” implies that an agency pursues its own agenda, thereby running “out of con-
trol” (McNollgast 1999). The risk of bureaucratic agents moving policy output away
from the principal’s preference is substantial, and extensive theoretical and empirical
work has been devoted to identifying effective and efficient mechanisms to control
bureaucratic output.1 Bawn (1995) explicitly models this trade-off between expertise
or technical competence and control.
Similar information asymmetries arise from decentralization. Where policy au-
thority is more decentralized, administration may benefit from the expertise of local
administrators. Sub-national heterogeneity of preferences or implementation con-
1For example, see Bawn (1995, 1997); McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1987, 1989); Moe (1989,
1990); Rosenbloom (2000); Wood and Waterman (1994).
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straints may present a challenge for centralized policy administration, and local ac-
tors may have access to better information. However, the influence of local interests,
elites, and preferences may compete with the preferences of the enacting principal
policymaker. This conflict will increase the transaction costs of ex post control when
agents are multiple and decentralized. On the other hand, sub-national governments
as decentralized agents can have an informational advantages over a centralized
agency because they are better informed of localities’ preferences and can more effi-
ciently optimize policy outputs (this expectation calls upon the arguments made by
Tiebout 1956). These advantages may vary across policy areas of different degrees
of popular salience or technical complexity (Ringquist, Worsham, and Eisner 2003).
The additional flexibility in adapting policy outputs to local needs has been consid-
ered an advantage of decentralized administrative structures (Lipsky 1980), but will
come at the cost of a principal’s loss of control.
Any degree of delegation will generate problems inherent in principal-agent rela-
tionships. When principal policymakers face a choice in administrative agent, they
will evaluate the available options in terms of control costs and likelihood of “agency
drift.” One factor in this evaluation will be the similarity in policy preferences be-
tween an agent and the principal policymaker, though this is theoretically assumed
to be an unknown quantity. In other words, principals will consider the expected
bias in an agent’s output. A second factor will be the expertise of an agent, or the
ability of an agent to deliver a policy output close to expectation, or the consistency
of output. Lastly, the cost of oversight will be considered. A consistent agent with
very little expected drift is desirable, but only if the cost of oversight is sufficiently
low. There is a trade-off to be made between cost of oversight and quality of output,
with quality defined by the preferences of the principal. If these are the factors that
are considered in this first fundamental trade-off, then how do decentralized agents
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compare to centralized agents?
Beginning with a comparison of oversight costs associated with different agents,
the monitoring and coordination of multiple agents will be more costly simply because
there exists more than one agent. The resources required to collect information on the
outputs of a single agent will multiply when more than one agent is involved. Further,
the complexity of coordinating with multiple agents will increase if preferences and
motivations among these agents are heterogeneous. Agency drift remains a concern
when delegation is made to multiple agents, but the direction of drift is unlikely to be
in one direction across all agents, and additional resources may be required to identify
(and correct) the direction of such drift. The problem of identifying and correcting
bias in outputs will be greater. Lastly, decentralized administrative agents may be
more responsive to local interests. External local social and political influences shape
policy outputs by decentralized administrative agents (Liu et al. 2010; Scholz and
Wang 2006; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991; Soss et al. 2001). This is especially
relevant if such influences have a direct electoral connection to the agent, as is the
case when delegation is made to lower level or local governments. Where policy is
decentralized to lower level governments having electoral legitimacy, ex post policy
control by the principal should be even more difficult (costly).
Governments with more vertical distribution of political power, including federal
systems, face a greater cost of control and coordination among multiple decentralized
agents. Regional governments with protected rights and delineated spheres of policy
autonomy will make any re-centralization of authority or change in oversight more
costly. In countries with federal structures, the potential cost of control in the case
of agency drift should be greater, because once “drift” has occurred, it will be more
costly to return output to the principal’s preference. To clarify some terminology, I
take a liberal definition of “federalism.” This concept is prone to definitional flexi-
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bility or ambiguity (see Rodden, 2004, for a discussion of operationalized definitions
of federalism in comparison to decentralization definitions, or see Elazar, 1994). I
choose to take an inclusive view of federalism, the defining characteristics being that
(a) citizens elect officials of their choice to each level of government, and (b) each
level of government has some authority to collect and spend taxes.2 Crucially, these
characteristics must be formally institutionalized and the interactions between levels
of government must represent the rights of each; frequently this is formalized in a
constitution.
The trade-off between costly control and uncertain quality is inherent in policy
delegation of all types, because bureaucrats and local governments hold an informa-
tional advantage over principal policymakers. In choosing an agent, a policymaker
must evaluate the relative advantages of different administrative alternatives. Dele-
gation to experts may provide “better” policy, but can limit a policymaker’s influ-
ence over outcomes. When decentralization is considered as an option, delegation to
lower-levels of government poses the political advantage of tailoring policy to local
preferences, but principals must consider the risk that policy outcomes may differ
from their preferences.
2.1.2 2: Political Efficiency and Economic Efficiency
In addition to information problems, principal policymakers face a trade-off be-
tween economic and political efficiency when deciding between a centralized and
decentralized administrative agent. Decentralized policy control has the advantage
of being flexible to meet the preferences of local polities, but this presents the risk of
imposing suboptimal cross-jurisdictional externalities. In the case of social insurance,
local policymakers may tend to implement overly austere policy to avoid attracting
2This definition is adapted from Peterson (1995).
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beneficiaries from other regions, or they may deliver overly generous benefits if not
held fiscally accountable. In other words, there is a trade-off between economic ef-
ficiency and the efficiency of policy allocation according to local preferences. The
relative severity of these problems, however, will depend on several political factors,
including the desire for blame avoidance, the degree of cross-regional heterogeneity
in policy preferences, and the role of veto players. Most importantly, there must
be some degree of heterogeneity in policy preferences across sub-national regions for
this threat of “political inefficiency” to exist. If principal policymakers do not fear
electoral retribution, they will care little whether policy design represents local policy
preferences.
Kaufman (1969) and Tommasi and Weinschelbaum (2007) discuss this concern
as a trade-off between the internalization of externalities through centralized policy
and the increased accountability of decentralized policy. In the presence of spillovers,
or “interstate pathologies,” centralization may “enhance democracy” by overcoming
coordination problems to provide a more optimal level of policy (Rogers 2012). In
the absence of such spillovers, however, decentralization of decision making enables
regional governments to “reflect heterogeneous preferences in heterogeneous policy
outcomes...[meaning that]...welfare will be maximized in those policy areas relative
to the gains that would stem from a single homogeneous national policy” (Rogers
2012, 85). Supporting this expectation, Spina’s (2012) study of decentralization in
OECD parliamentary governments suggests that position divergence is significantly
increases decentralization, although the average party position is not a significant
factor. This is an important point worth emphasizing: political ideology is not
found to be significant to decentralization, but divergence is important, in Spina’s
(2012) sample.
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Tiebout (1956) argued that decentralization can provide leaner, more efficient,
and more effective provision of public goods as sub-national jurisdictions compete for
residents. But the assumptions necessary for this outcome rarely (if ever) hold, and
decentralization leads to sub-optimal outcomes if competition or coordination prob-
lems exist.3 This point is clarified by Oates’ Decentralization Theorem, which states
that in the absence of spillover effects and economies of scale, decentralized finance
and administration of policy is optimal (Besley and Coate 2003; Oates 1971). Social
policies that impose taxes on employers and/or employees violate these assumptions
and generate a competitive incentive and a “race to the bottom” in program contri-
butions and generosity. Choices by one set of policymakers with respect to program
tax-rates or generosity affect the welfare of neighboring jurisdictions if employers
or benefit recipients can easily relocate to a more advantageous policy system. De-
centralized welfare policy can thus lead to sub-optimal levels of redistribution as
sub-national regions avoid becoming “welfare magnets” (Peterson 1990, 1995). Cen-
tralized control can require uniformity of program rules and greater efficiency in the
presence of policy spillovers or externalities (Besley and Coate 2003; Brown, Oates,
and Brown Charles 1987; Oates 1971).
An alternative perspective found in the comparative politics literature expects
decentralization to foster suboptimally generous spending as sub-national govern-
ments exploit the common pool of resources in the absence of fiscal decentralization.
Indeed, in a cross-national sample, Rodden (2003) found that a larger portion of
expenditures funded by intergovernmental transfers is associated with larger growth
in the size of government. Local governments face an incentive to over-spend when
deciding spending (benefit) levels without accountability for collecting the requisite
3Triesman (2007) specifically discusses the divergence between the assumptions made by Tiebout
(1956) and reality.
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revenue. Cross-national empirical investigations into the existence of a “race to the
bottom” have not provided a clear answer. There is some empirical evidence in the
domain of welfare policy that decentralization may entail spillover effects (Baicker
2005; Brueckner 2000; Dahlberg and Edmark 2008; Wheaton 2000), yet other evi-
dence fails to support the welfare competition expectation (Fiva and Rattsø 2006;
Shroder 1995). These arguments, however, apply to fiscal decentralization, which is
not strictly necessary for the delegation of administrative authority. When adminis-
trative and fiscal authority are both decentralized, there is greater incentive for fiscal
accountability but little incentive to internalize externalities. Principal policymakers
may be aware of this, and can incorporate this trade-off into their decision making.
Whether decentralization of policy authority leads to inefficient policy, being either
too austere or too generous, will depend on the political context.
As noted above, principal policymakers electorally accountable to sub-national
regions will be more concerned about meeting local preferences and expectations for
policy. If constituencies have heterogeneous preferences, decentralization to regional
governments can have political benefits for the principal policymaker. Any uniform
policy applied to all constituencies will be allocatively inefficient when constituent
preferences are geographically sorted and heterogeneous. Some constituencies will
receive “more” policy than they prefer and some will receive “less.” Regional-level
decision making to tailor policy to local constituency preferences could achieve a
pareto improving policy allocation relative to centralized policy. Therefore, decen-
tralization can resolve “political inefficiencies,” in the absence of policy externalities.
This reiterates the trade-off described by Rogers (2012), that local policy respon-
siveness is at odds with efficiency. Greater preference divergence across sub-national
regions may thus incentivize decentralization.
Policy administrators offer different informational advantages and ease of control,
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which are taken into account by principal policymakers in choosing an agent. The
second trade-off considered by policymakers is the balance of policy specificity and
containment of externalities. Decentralized administration invites local governments
to pass policies that fail to account for fiscal constraints or for externalities, but it
offers the advantage of providing regions with their more preferred policy. Where
there is greater preference heterogeneity, the advantage of decentralizing will increase.
Principal policymakers will carefully weigh these considerations in deciding whether
to delegate via decentralization.
2.1.3 3: Political Uncertainty and Path-Dependence
The third trade-off in delegation concerns political uncertainty and path depen-
dence. On the one hand, a principal policymaker may wish to defensively design
administrative institutions to protect their preferences from future change. On the
other hand, when deciding delegation, principals are constrained by the institutions
already in place.
If principals are uncertain of the policy outcomes they will prefer in the future
or if the durability of the government is uncertain, control over future policy can
be effected through ex ante design of structure and procedures (McCubbins, Noll,
and Weingast 1987, 1989; Moe 1990). Elected political officials (the executive and
legislature) seek to “enhance the durability of the bargain struck” in policy-making
at a given point in time through institutional design (McCubbins, Noll, and Wein-
gast 1987). Agency structures and procedures serve purposes that are politically
advantageous to the elected officials by biasing policies in the future to (1) favor cer-
tain constituencies (“deck-stacking”), (2) mirror the political coalitions at the time
of drafting, (3) avoid undesirable rulings, or more generally (4) to allow principals
preferences to be included in the process. By directly addressing issues of political
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uncertainty, McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast (1989) argue that ex ante control over
agency structure and procedure can be more effective than ex post control by over-
sight and monitoring. For example, when an executive is of a different political party
or ideology than a legislative majority, this uncertainty could be great. Even in the
case that a principal expects to remain in power in the future, a legislative or exec-
utive actor with a different policy preference may influence outcomes produced by
the centralized agency. This uncertainty will also be greater where the policymaker
anticipates a declining level of political power in the future (i.e. where an electoral
loss is anticipated). Finally, there is a role for veto players in this decision. A greater
number of veto players is expected to increase the stability of policy by increasing
the difficulty of changing the status quo (Tsebelis 1999, 2002). Veto players include
an independent judiciary, coalition governments, bicameral political systems, pres-
idents with veto, or a strong legislative review process. Greater uncertainty about
the preferences of a veto player with respect to the institutional choice can influence
delegation choices.
The implication of this argument is that administrative structure will be designed
to reflect the interests of the principal political actors. In other words, the choice
of administrative body will be rational and deliberate. Delegating to lower levels
of government can reinforce attempts to influence policy outputs through ex ante
design. If policy interests vary and are geographically sorted, the decentralization
of policy authority reinforces the influence of these interests where they are already
influential. Electoral incentives in decentralization are relevant to this discussion,
and O’Neill has offered the most extensive discussion of these incentives to date.
With evidence from Latin America, O’Neill (2005) argues that national politicians
will only support decentralization if doing so generates sufficient political gain to the
political party (or coalition). This may be the case if a political party is stronger in
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some areas of the country than others, or if the national policymakers anticipate that
they will have greater influence in these sub-national contexts than at the national
level in the future. This argument relates primarily to political decentralization, but
the rationale can extend to administrative decentralization.
In the choice to delegate to sub-national agents there is also a blame avoidance
incentive. Delegating policy authority to agents may diffuse the blame otherwise
directed at the principal policymakers (Escobar-Lemmon 2006; Fiorina 1982; Peter-
son 1995; Rodden 2004). Blame avoidance may be easier when administration and
implementation are delegated not only to other agencies, but to other governments.
Political responsibility should be more closely associated with national politicians if
policy is centralized, and thereby more clearly visible (Powell and Whitten 1993).
If state governments are chosen as agents, blame for local policy outputs should be
rather more focused on the local sovereign governments. In this way, the choice of
agent may have implications for the insulation of the principal from future political
blame. Uncertainty about policy outcomes or the political costs of those outcomes
will affect the advantage of avoiding blame. If a policy is risky or otherwise uncer-
tain, the principal may have greater incentive to avoid blame. The “political cost”
of a centralized policy will increase as the degree of policy inefficiency increases and
will be less where a blame avoidance incentive exists. This political cost (or benefit)
will factor into the valuation of delegation to either agent.
If a policymaker expects that they can more effectively achieve a desired outcome
by delegating authority to agents with more similar, more certain, or less volatile
preferences, it may rational to do so. This is the third component of my theory, that
a policymaker will be aware of the uncertainty of their future influence or preference
representation across different agent choices, and they will incorporate this informa-
tion into their decision making. The structuring of policy administration through a
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single centralized agency or decentralized through lower-level governments will dif-
ferently impact the ability of a principal at the national-level to effect control over
policy in the future. To bring these multiple theories into a single explanation of
delegation, in the next section I express these arguments more formally.
2.2 A Model of Policy Delegation
I now represent these multiple tradeoffs in a formal game. A formal expression
of this theory is useful, because it allows for integration of multiple arguments into
a single explanation of policy delegation. Beginning with a classic principal-agent
model, I assume that a principal policymaker must select an administrative agents
to implement a policy. This principal may be a legislative majority, a governing
coalition, an executive, or, more generally, a government in power. This principal
will delegate policy responsibility between two agents, a centralized agency and sub-
national governments.4 These alternative agents are substitutes, either is capable of
implementing the policy. This decision by the principal is a function of five factors:
the resource costs of controlling a decentralized set of agents, the political costs of
inefficient policy allocation, divergence between policy proposals, the threat of veto
player block or overturn, and the likelihood that the agency will share the preference
of the principal.
Viewing delegation as a consumption choice, the proportion of authority delegated
to the sub-national governments is noted 𝐷 in this game. I assume there are two
policy proposals, 𝑤𝑃 and 𝑤∼𝑃 , and the principal prefers 𝑤𝑃 . The convergence of
political preferences is measured as the absolute value of the difference between policy
4The delegation of fiscal authority is exogenous to this game. I assume that administrative
authority may be delegated with or without fiscal authority over the same policy, and that this
decision is made separately. The coincidence of fiscal and administrative decentralization will affect
the magnitude of some parameters in this game. Also exogenous to this model is the choice of how
much discretion to grant in total. The classic “make-or-buy” decision is presumed by this game,
and the principal in this game is simply selecting an agent.
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proposals, 𝛼 = |𝑤𝑃 − 𝑤∼𝑃 |. The alpha term, 𝛼, represents relative convergence,
with 1 − 𝛼 representing divergence. Thus, the 𝛼 term represents policy convergence,
with complete convergence when equal to one.5 For simplicity, these two proposals
are noted 𝑤 and 𝛼𝑤, with 0 ≤ 𝑤 ≤ 1. Larger values of 𝛼 indicate more similar
proposals and smaller values of 𝛼 represent more divergent proposals. These two
policy proposals can be positioned along a unidimensional spectrum. This can be
thought of in the context of social policy as benefit generosity or coverage, or may
be generalized as positions along an ideological scale. These two policy options are
two competing proposals for the same policy program.
To implement this policy, the principal policymaker must select an administrative
agent. This model assumes that the principal delegates administrative authority to
two agents: a single national agency or sub-national governments. The proportion of
total authority delegated to sub-national governments is noted𝐷, and the proportion
of authority delegated to the national government is equal to 1−𝐷, with 0 ≥ 𝐷 ≥ 1.
This means that the principal may delegate all policy authority solely to one agent
or the other, or may distribute authority between them.
I further assume that the principal is uncertain about the preferences of the na-
tional agency under consideration, which may be either convergent (𝐶) or divergent
(∼ 𝐶). If the national agency is convergent, it prefers the same policy as the princi-
pal, either 𝑤 when the principal prefers 𝑤, or 𝛼𝑤 when the principal prefers 𝛼𝑤. If
the central agency is divergent, it most prefers the policy that is least preferred by
the principal. If convergent, the agency’s payoff will equal the policy implemented,
either 𝑤 or 𝛼𝑤. If divergent, the agency will receive a payoff equal to 𝛼𝑤 if it im-
plements 𝑤, and it will receive 𝑤 if it implements 𝛼𝑤. The nature of the agency is
unknown to the principal, but the probability (0 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 1) of the agency having con-
5Let 𝑤𝑃 = 1 and 0 ≤ 𝑤∼𝑃 ≤ 2, such that 𝛼𝑤∼𝑃 = 𝑤𝑃
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vergent preferences is known. This uncertainty comes from information asymmetries
inherent in principal-agent relationships, as well as political uncertainty about other
influences on the agency, including an executive influence or a change in principal
preferences in the future.
The alternative institutional choice is to delegate policy discretion to sub-national
governments. When a principal policymaker represents regional constituencies, it is
a plausible assumption that it will know the preferences of sub-national regions. I
assume there exist two levels of government, and there exist two jurisdictions of
different type at the lower level. Region one prefers the high policy (𝑤), ceteris
paribus, and region two prefers the lower policy 𝛼𝑤. Because there is a risk of
spillover effects associated with heterogeneous policy implementations across sub-
national regions, each region experiences a disutility (efficiency loss), 0 < 𝜋 < 𝛼 if
different policies are implemented.
The principal is aware of these preferences and I assume that this policymaker
will be held electorally accountable for implementing a policy that is less-preferred
by one of the regions. This is a democratic phenomenon I refer to as the cost of
inefficient policy allocation. If policy is centralized and administered by a single
agency, all regions will be subjected to the same policy implementation. If regional
preferences are heterogeneous and a single uniform policy is applied to all states,
“political inefficiency” will exist. Lowry (1992) discuses this “promise” of federal
(and decentralized) systems that allow sub-national variation in policy to provide
efficiency, innovation, and, crucially, flexibility by allowing “policymakers who are
close to the scene to tailor policy efforts to local policy needs.” Any uniform policy
implementation (𝑤 or 𝛼𝑤) will deliver to one of the two states their less preferred
level of policy.
Recall that the choice of policy to be implemented by the central agency is un-
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certain. I assume that a region receiving their less preferred policy will hold their
representative principal accountable in the next election. This (expected) political
cost is noted as 𝑐𝑝 in the model, with 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑤, and it represents the electoral cost
or loss of support suffered by the principal policymaker for implementing a policy
that is less preferred by a region. This cost is only realized if policy authority is
delegated to the central agency, when 𝐷 < 1. If authority is distributed between the
agency and sub-national governments (i.e., 𝛿 ≠ 0), this cost diminishes in the propor-
tion of authority given to the lower governments. In the case that policy authority
is distributed between both agents, the “clarity of responsibility” should diminish as
voters become less able to accurately attribute blame associated with any national
policy (Powell and Whitten 1993), and political or electoral penalties are therefore
discounted. The principal will pay a cost of 12𝑐𝑝 if the first policy proposal, 𝑤, is
implemented in Region 2, or if the second proposal, 𝛼𝑤 is implemented in Region 1.
If, however, the principal decides to delegate (some) administrative authority to
sub-national governments, this policymaker will realize a cost associated with the
effort required to control the decentralized set of agents. Horn (1995) discusses what
he terms “agency costs,” which are the “costs incurred to induce administrators to
implement faithfully what was intended in the legislation and the losses legislators
and constituents sustain by being unable to do so perfectly” (19). These costs are
noted as 𝑐𝑐 in the model, with 0 ≤ 𝑐𝑐 ≤ 𝑤, and are defined as an additive function of
multiple factors. I assume that delegation to either agent alternative will incur some
control costs, but I further assume that the net sum of these costs will be greater
for the decentralized agent and this term is therefore defined in the model as the
additional control costs associated with delegating to the states in comparison to a
single central agent. This cost is a function of the increased resource requirements
of monitoring multiple agents and the additional transaction costs associated with
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adjusting or otherwise controlling policy outputs ex post across multiple agents rel-
ative to a single central agency. As with the policy inefficiency costs, this cost of
control declines in the portion of discretion granted to the central agency.
The transaction costs of altering policy outputs among a set of decentralized
agents will be increased if the agents are governments with electoral legitimacy,
rather than bureaucratic agents. If the “agents” derive direct democratic legiti-
macy through electoral accountability, these costs of control will be greater because
the principal policymaker, at the national-level, could be countered by local-level
elected officials holding different preferences.This implies that federal systems, in
which lower-level governments may have better protected spheres of authority, will
pose greater transaction costs on future policy change imposed by the principal pol-
icymaker at the national level. If the sub-national governments are of heterogeneous
administrative capacity, this cost may be increased because the principal must ex-
pend additional resources on oversight. The principal must monitor both the policy
outputs and the quality of any information reported to the principal. If administra-
tive capacity and expertise is expected to be higher for one agent over the other, the
relative control cost will be represented within the 𝑐𝑐 term.
However, this cost of control will be less if the characteristics of the policy provide
a comparative advantage to the regional governments in collecting and interpreting
information relevant to the policy implementation process. If regions have a com-
parative advantage over a centralized agency in reducing the uncertainty associated
with policy outputs, then this cost of control may be reduced. Lastly, this cost of
control may be further reduced if the principal perceives a benefit from the increased
cost of controlling the set of agents. The principal policymaker may be uncertain
about its duration of power, its own future preferences, or the range of probable
policy outcomes from a national agency. If there is more uncertainty about these
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factors than the policy preferences or outcomes of a decentralized set of agents, the
expected “costs” associated with the increased difficulties of controlling policy out-
comes across the states may be lessened. Uncertainty of future political alignments
or interests incentivizes limits on future principal actors’ influence on agents (Huber
and Shipan 2000). This reflects the potential benefit of insulating policy from future
legislative influences. Both the cost of control, 𝑐𝑐, and cost of policy inefficiency, 𝑐𝑝,
will have diminishing marginal effects.
The last factor in the decision function accounts for the influence of institutional
veto players. I assume that the principal is uncertain of such policy reversal or
overturn. The principal knows there is a threat that a veto player will block either
a centralized or decentralized policy but knows only the probability of either event.
Thus, the principal’s payoff from a uniform centralized policy is discounted by 𝛽,
the probability that a veto player will block or overturn a nationalized policy. Their
payoff from a decentralized policy is similarly discounted by 𝛾, the probability that
a veto player will block this institutional choice. The probability of either block,
𝛽 or 𝛾, will increase as the number of institutional veto points increases. A veto
player could be a second legislative chamber, an independent judiciary, an executive
with veto authority, a coalition member, or legislative review (Jensen, Proksch, and
Slapin 2013; Martin and Vanberg 2004, 2005; Tsebelis 1999). The probability of no
veto is noted 𝜙 = 1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾, with 0 ≤ 𝛽 + 𝛾 ≤ 1. If a veto player blocks a policy
proposal, I assume that the principal receives a payoff equal to zero, and that no
policy will be implemented by either an agency or the regions. This assumption is
based on the expectation that sub-national governments will be unable to overcome
the collective action problems inherent in regional competition in the absence of a
national mandate. This is a reasonable assumption to make in the context of policies
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that entail competitive incentives in the absence of a national mandate.6
2.2.1 Sequence of the Game
Having defined terms and discussed their meaning, I now move to a discussion of
the sequence of this game. In the first stage of the game, nature chooses the central
(national) agency type as either convergent or divergent, and this state of the world
is unknown to all players in the game except the agency itself. The principal policy-
maker then chooses the proportion of authority it will delegate to the sub-national
governments, this is the decided level of delegation through decentralization, noted
as 𝐷. The relative discretion delegated to the sub-national regions (indexed by 𝑅1
and 𝑅2) is noted 𝐷. This choice is made under the condition of uncertainty about
agency type, the principal knows only the probability that the central agency is con-
vergent in its preferences. Third, the agent sets a policy level, either the principal’s
preferred policy 𝑤 or the alternative policy 𝛼𝑤. The sub-national governments move
last, choosing their policies respectively.
In this game, I define the payoffs realized by each actor as a utility function. Each
actor receives some utility from policy implementation, and their payoffs will depend
on the policy choices of policy agents and the proportion of authority delegated to
either agent. Turning now to the principal policymaker’s utility function (noted 𝑈𝑃 ),
if a uniform policy is implemented by a centralized agency equal to the “higher” policy
proposal (𝑤), the principal receives a payoff equal to the higher policy proposal 𝑤
minus the costs of policy inefficiency, 𝑐𝑝. If a homogeneous low policy is implemented
in all states, the principal receives a payoff equal to the lower policy proposal (𝛼𝑤)
minus the cost of inefficient policy allocation, 𝑐𝑝. If the sub-national governments
6In this model, the role of veto players does not affect the optimal level of decentralization, but
will affect the expected utility of the entire policy, thus affecting the decision to pass the policy or
not. This decision is implicit in this model.
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each pursue their equilibrium strategies such that the policies enacted across the
states are heterogeneous, the principal will receive a payoff equal to the average
policy level minus the costs of control, 𝑐𝑐. The contribution of these two sets of factors
are weighted by 𝐷, the distribution of authority between agents. The threat of a
veto player blocking centralization (𝛽) or blocking decentralization (𝛾) will further
discounting these payoff to the principal. Therefore, the principal will choose a level
of decentralization, 𝐷, to maximize its expected utility.
When the central agency is convergent (of type 𝐶), the principal’s utility from
complete delegation to the agency is equal to: 𝑈𝐿(𝐷|𝐶) = 𝛾(𝑤− (1−𝐷)𝑐𝑝). When
the central agency is convergent (of type ∼ 𝐶), the principal’s utility from complete
delegation to the agency is equal to: 𝑈𝐿(𝐷| ∼ 𝐶) = 𝛾(𝛼𝑤 − (1 − 𝐷)𝑐𝑝). With
the assumption of uncertainty about the agency’s type, the expected utility to the
principal from complete centralization will be weighted by the probability that the
agent is convergent, noted 𝑝 in this model. Thus, with uncertainty of agent type,
the principal’s payoff from complete delegation to a central agency is equal to:
𝑈𝑃 (𝐷) = 𝑝 ⋅ 𝑈𝑃 (𝐷|𝐶) + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝑈𝑃 (𝐷| ∼ 𝐶)
= 𝑝 ⋅ 𝛾(𝑤 − (1 − 𝐷)𝑐𝑝) + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝛾(𝛼𝑤 − (1 − 𝐷)𝑐𝑝)
= 𝛾 [𝑤(𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝛼) + (1 − 𝐷) ⋅ 𝑐𝑝]
(2.1)
However, the principal may choose to delegate authority to the sub-national gov-
ernments. If delegation is made solely to lower-level governments, meaning complete
decentralization, the principal’s payoff will be equal to the weighted average of the
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implemented policy, minus the cost of decentralized control:
𝑈𝑃 (𝐷) = 𝛽 ⋅
1
𝑛𝑠
𝑛𝑠
∑
𝑖=1
𝑤𝑖 −𝐷 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐
where 𝑤𝑖 ∈{𝑤, 𝛼𝑤}, and 𝑛𝑟 = 2
= 𝛽 ⋅ [𝑤(1 − 𝛼)2 − 𝐷 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐]
(2.2)
When delegation is distributed between the central agency and lower-level govern-
ments (i.e. when 0 < 𝛿 < 1), the principal’s payoff will be equal to the average of
the utility from the policies implemented by either agent weighted by the proportion
of authority granted to each. This is shown below in Equation 2.3.
𝑈𝑃 (𝐷) = 𝛾 ⋅ (1 − 𝐷) ⋅ [𝑝 ⋅ (𝑈𝑃 ⋅ |𝐶) + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ (𝑈𝑃 (⋅| ∼ 𝐶))] + 𝛽 ⋅ 𝐷 ⋅ (𝑈𝑃 (𝑑𝑆))
(2.3)
and with substitution this equals
𝑈𝑃 (𝐷) =𝛾 ⋅ [(1 − 𝐷) ⋅ (𝑤(𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝛼) − (1 − 𝐷) ⋅ 𝑐𝑝)]
+ 𝛽 ⋅ [𝐷 ⋅ (𝑤2 (1 + 𝛼) − 𝐷 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐)]
+ (1 − 𝛽 − 𝛾) ⋅ [𝐷 ⋅ (𝑤2 (1 + 𝛼) − 𝐷 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐)
+ (1 − 𝐷) ⋅ (𝑤(𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝) ⋅ 𝛼) − (1 − 𝐷) ⋅ 𝑐𝑝)]
(2.4)
The payoffs realized by other actors in this game are far simpler than those of the
principal policymaker. Each central agency type has a pure preference, conditional
on type the high policy if convergent and the low policy if divergent, if the principal
prefers the high policy. As a player in this game, the central agency has a pure
equilibrium strategy: {𝑤 ∣ 𝐶, 𝛼𝑤 ∣ 𝐷}.7 The strategy set for each region 𝑖 ∈ {1, 2} is
7The central agency’s complete strategy set is {(𝑤 ∣ 𝐶,𝑤 ∣∼ 𝐶)(𝑤 ∣ 𝐶,𝛼𝑤 ∣∼ 𝐶)(𝛼𝑤 ∣ 𝐶,𝑤 ∣∼
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{𝑤, 𝛼𝑤}. Region 1 prefers the high policy and thus prefers any outcome in which it
receives the high policy to any outcome in which it receives the low policy. Region 2,
preferring the low policy, will prefer any outcome in which it receives the low policy
to any outcome in which it receives the high policy. Given their own strategy, both
regions prefer to implement the same policy to minimize spillover effects. Region 1
and Region 2 have pure equilibrium strategies in this basic model of the game, and
will always choose {𝑤} and {𝛼𝑤}, respectively. If different policies are implemented
among the agents, the payoff is reduced by 𝜋, where 0 < 𝜋 < 𝛼.
2.2.2 Decentralization in Equilibrium
Bringing all of these assumptions together, Figure 2.1 represents each of the five
steps in the game, with the payoffs to each actor shown. Solved using backwards
induction, the game has one equilibria with uncertainty of agency type and uncer-
tainty of veto player preferences. In equilibrium, Region 1 will always choose to
implement 𝑤, and Region 2 will always choose to implement 𝛼𝑤. The central agency
will choose 𝑤 if convergent and 𝛼𝑤 if divergent. The principal policymaker’s equi-
librium strategy will be to maximize it’s utility as a function of decentralization, 𝐷,
given the other actors’ strategies. The equilibrium level of decentralization chosen
by the principal policymaker (noted 𝐷∗) is shown in Equation 2.5.
𝐷∗ =
𝑤
2 ⋅ (1 + 𝛼)(1 − 𝛾) − 𝑤(𝑝 + (1 − 𝑝)𝛼)(1 − 𝛽) + 2 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐(2 − 𝛾 − 𝛽)
2 ⋅ (𝑐𝑝(2 − 𝛾 − 𝛽) + 2 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝛾 − 𝛽2 ))
(2.5)
𝐶)(𝛼𝑤 ∣ 𝐶,𝛼𝑤 ∣∼ 𝐶)}.
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Figure 2.1: Extensive Form Model of Delegation and Decentralization
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2.2.3 Trade-offs in Equilibrium
This equilibrium strategy represents the three trade-offs discussed above, which I
argue determine the decision to delegate through decentralization. The first trade-off
between cost and control is represented by the cost of policy control, noted 𝑐𝑐. The
second trade-off between policy accountability and economic efficiency is accounted
for by the cost of inefficient policy allocation, noted 𝑐𝑝 in the model. Lastly, the
trade-off between flexibility and uncertain control driven by political uncertainty
and path-dependence is represented by the probability of a central agency with di-
vergent preferences, noted 𝑝 in the model, as well as the probability of veto player
interference, 𝛾 and 𝛽 in the model. Each of these trade-offs are incorporated in this
single model of the institutional choice of a policy delegate. The following sections
explore in greater depth how these different considerations influence the principal
policymaker’s decision.
2.2.4 Policy Convergence and Empirical Implications
Critical to this model is the assumption that more than one policy proposal, or
preference, exists. If all actors share the same policy preferences, the relative advan-
tage of different administrative agents will be irrelevant– all agents would implement
very similar policies. The importance of this choice of agent is increased by preference
divergence between the political and administrative actors in the game. To examine
the effect of political convergence on the decision by principal policymakers to de-
centralize, I derive from the principal’s equilibrium strategy (Equation 2.5 above)
the marginal effect (partial derivative) of policy convergence (𝛼) on decentralization
in equilibrium (𝐷∗). Equation 2.6 shows this effect.
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𝜕𝐷∗
𝜕𝛼 =
𝑤
2 ⋅ (1 − 𝛾) − 𝑤(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝛽)
2 ⋅ (𝑐𝑝(2 − 𝛾 − 𝛽) + 2 ⋅ 𝑐𝑐(1 − 𝛾 − 𝛿2))
(2.6)
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Figure 2.2: Predicted Decentralization in Equilibrium and Political Convergence
Because it is difficult to elicit clear theoretical propositions from the statement
in Equation 2.6, I turn to a graphical representation of the predictions made by this
model. In Figure 2.2, I graphically represent the predicted level of decentralization
chosen by the principal policymaker in equilibrium in multiple scenarios. The hori-
zontal axis represents the theoretical range of policy convergence (0 ≤ 𝛼 ≤ 1), with
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increasing convergence represented by movement right along the axis. Each line in
this figure represents a different level of uncertainty about the centralized agency’s
type, from very low (𝑝 = .1) to very high (𝑝 = .9). This figure makes clear an im-
portant theoretical propositions from this model. Increasing convergence in policy
positions may result in a higher or lower optimal level of decentralization (𝐷∗). The
level of uncertainty about the central agency’s type will determine whether increas-
ing convergence incentivizes greater (de)centralization. When the probability of an
agreeable agency is very high (at 𝑝 = .1, the topmost line in the figure), an increase
in policy convergence motivates less decentralization. This demonstrates that the
risk of a divergent centralized agency reduces the relative advantage of decentral-
izing delegation. This illustrates my argument that policymakers will trade-off the
relative advantages offered by different administrative agents in deciding delegation
and decentralization.
Although numerous propositions may be derived from this model (see the ap-
pendix and subsequent chapters for further discussion), I focus here on the propo-
sition that increased policy convergence may incentivize either more or less decen-
tralization of policy authority conditional on other political factors. Figures 2.3 and
2.5 examine this theoretical proposition more closely by representing the predicted
partial effect of political convergence on decentralization in equilibrium at varying
levels of uncertainty about the central agency’s type or veto player preferences. The
shaded areas of these figures indicate the area in which the partial derivative of
equilibrium decentralization with respect to policy convergence is greater than zero,
this can be understood as a positive predicted marginal effect of policy convergence.
A predicted marginal effect of greater than zero represents the model’s prediction
that greater policy convergence will increase decentralization. Similarly, a predicted
marginal effect of less than zero represents the model’s prediction that greater policy
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convergence will decrease decentralization (i.e. foster centralization).
This examination of the implications from this model offers at least one clear
proposition that can be easily adapted to empirical testing. In more substantive
terms, greater convergence (less polarization) between political actors will motivate
increased decentralization where there is a greater probability of a veto player oppos-
ing the policy. Where a veto player is less likely to oppose decentralization, greater
convergence will motivate decreased decentralization if a centralized administrative
agent is less likely to represent the decision-maker’s preference.
2.3 Return to the Empirical Puzzle
Returning to the empirical puzzle motivating this theory, I now consider how
well these theoretical prediction(s) fit an observed case. In the following sections, I
introduce the specific case of the U.S. Social Security Act. This does not constitute
a test of this theory, because it was instrumental in theory building, but it is useful
in substantively illuminating key arguments of the model.
American state and local governments have increasingly absorbed fiscal and policy
responsibility over past decades, particularly in the areas of education, health, and
social welfare (Baicker, Clemens, and Singhal 2012). Historically, the U.S. Congress
has delegated substantial authority to the states more in some policy areas than
others. Education policy, community development, and some social welfare pro-
grams involve considerable decentralization of discretion, yet not all programs are
decentralized to the same degree. Social welfare policies including SNAP, TANF,
and Medicaid are largely decentralized, while administration of Social Security and
Medicare rests with a centralized agency. There are certain policy areas for which
decentralization of authority is expected or required by the Constitution, but these
rules can be ambiguous, subject to interpretation, and also subject to change. In
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regard to social welfare policy, the Constitution is ambiguous in allocating responsi-
bility to either the states or the national level. Article 1 Section 8 of the Constitu-
tion states simply that the Congress has taxation power to “provide for the...general
Welfare” of the country. This allows federal, state, and local governments to share
responsibility in these policy areas. Given this ambiguity in the assignment of policy
authority, policymakers in Congress and the executive can decide delegation and
decentralization.
Deliberate and selective decentralization is evident in the U.S. Social Security
Act. Old-age insurance (Social Security) and Unemployment Insurance were both
introduced in this 1935 act, both with similar funding structures with eligibility
tied to past employment. The administration of Social Security is centralized, first
under the direction of the Social Security Board and now under the independent
Social Security Administration. The administration of Unemployment Insurance,
however, is designed to delegate broad authority to state governments– it is more
decentralized. These two programs were instituted in the same piece of legislation in
1935, under the same political and economic circumstances, and the choice of their
administration was made by the same coalition of interests, legislators, and executive
representatives.
When the Social Security Act was drafted, disagreement prevailed over the de-
sign and generosity of social insurance programs, both between political parties and
within. At the time, the Democratic party held a supermajority in the national leg-
islature, severely reducing the ability of the opposition Republican party to influence
the legislative process. The industrialized and unionized northern Democratic states
explicitly preferred a more inclusive or generous set of social policies than the more
agricultural southern Democratic states. With respect to unemployment insurance,
a “Wisconsin plan” was favored by a brain-trust of labor economists at the Univer-
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sity of Wisconsin as well as by President Roosevelt, the Secretary of Labor Frances
Perkins, and other party leaders in the Democratic party (Blaustein 1993; Rubin
1983; Witte 1945). The alternative Ohio plan was less tied to actuarial principles,
and had only minority support within the Democratic coalition (Skocpol 1995). Note
that the opposing Republicans were generally against any sort of mandated tax or
contribution for unemployment insurance.8 These preferences are evident in voting
records (Social Security Administration 2012) as well as historical accounts of Con-
gressional debates and legislative procedures (Derthick 1979; Skocpol 1995). The
Congressional majority, as the principal policymaker, was in favor of some level of
policy greater than the status quo, but there existed two competing policy proposals.
The failure of U.S. states to implement more extensive social welfare programs
prior to passage of the Social Security Act was due to cross-state competitive pres-
sures and the associated influence held by business interests (Hacker and Pierson
2002). The Committee on Economic Security charged with drafting the original text
of the Social Security Act in the early 1930s explicitly recognized that competitive
pressures existed in the provision of unemployment insurance by state governments,
and specifically that un-mandated unemployment insurance would be difficult or im-
possible (Witte 1945), or would be inefficient (Douglas 1931). A similar sentiment
was written about old-age insurance (Rubinow 1916). Therefore, in order to ensure a
preferred level of insurance provision, the delegating policymaker (Congress, in this
case) mandated provision. At the time, in the absence of a nationally mandated
policy, the states were unlikely to independently or unilaterally implement similarly
comprehensive social policies.
At the time of drafting, labor interests were stronger in the northern states than
in the south. Southern states were also subject to stronger interests in excluding
8For specific arguments, see Derthick (1979) or Sargent (1933).
41
non-white racial groups from social policies (Lieberman 1998; Skocpol 1995; Witte
1962). By decentralizing policy and administrative authority in this case, north-
ern states were able to institutionalize the influence of labor representatives in their
state-level policies (Blaustein 1993) and southern states could implement their pref-
erence for exclusionary policy design (Lieberman 1998). The institutionalization of
these state-level policies was effective, with long-lasting implications for policy out-
comes (Lieberman 1998; O’Leary and Wandner 1997; Soss, Fording, and Schram
2008). It is unlikely that these interests could have shaped national policy as effec-
tively as they did at the state-level. Decentralizing administrative authority thus
allowed northern Democrats to retain the electoral support of the northern states
and labor representatives while southern Democrats retained the electoral support
of the southern states. This example illustrates how different interests or favored
constituencies may be differently enfranchised or represented in policy making by
delegating policy administration to lower levels of government.
Lastly, policymakers at the time were aware of the Supreme Court as a veto
player, potentially capable of reversing any delegation decision. This threat was ex-
plicitly recognized in the drafting of the Social Security Act. For example, Atkinson
(1941) writes that “At the time it was established, [the federal-state system] seemed
the only plan that would be upheld by the Supreme Court” (181). This sentiment
is echoed by Whitte (1945, 1962). At the time of passage, there was no Constitu-
tionally upheld precedent for a nationalized unemployment insurance program that
pooled risk across industries or states.9 In fact, the Railroad Retirement Act’s un-
employment insurance provisions were struck down in 1935 for exceeding Congress’
9Indeed, several cases have been brought to the Supreme Court concerning various aspects of
unemployment insurance the the legitimate role of the federal government in setting standards and
rules, see Rubin (1983) for a review, though perhaps out of date.
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power to regulate commerce.10 While there was doubt about the constitutionality
of centralized unemployment insurance, there was more certainty about Social Se-
curity. A form of nationalized social security had been in existence since the Civil
War in the form of veterans’ pensions. The precedent for national management of a
pension program for veterans, their dependents, and some federal employees, com-
bined with the design of social security to be based on individual contributions made
a Supreme Court veto of the old age insurance component an insignificant threat to
the policymakers.
This case illustrates the three trade-offs that I argue are key to delegation. First,
there is the trade-off between cost of control and ensuring that principals’ policy
preferences are reflected. Being such similar policies, the anticipated costs of con-
trolling agents in administration might have been similar for both Social Security and
Unemployment Insurance. However, because Unemployment Insurance may take a
more prominent role in affecting the behavior of labor markets through it’s influence
on employers, who would pay the supporting taxes, there might have been an ad-
vantage perceived in decentralization. Local governments would be better able to
tailor policy to suit local economic needs. Second, there is the trade-off between eco-
nomic efficiency and the efficient allocation of policy according to local preferences.
Both Social Security and Unemployment Insurance, being social programs with ben-
efits tied to employment, present a challenge in decentralization. However, because
Southern and Northern democrats differed in their preferences for Unemployment
Insurance, the political cost of centralizing administration was great. Because it was
structured differently and had a precedent, Social Security was less divisive. Lastly,
there is the trade-off between political uncertainty and path-dependence. Policy pro-
10Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330, 55 S. Ct. 758, 79 L. Ed. 1468
[1935]
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grams preceded social security that served a similar function for veterans and widows,
so centralized institutions with experience in administration already existed. Pre-
sumably, this institution had already acquired some expertise in the administration
of policy, and it would incur some transaction cost to transfer administration else-
where. Unemployment Insurance, however, was new to national politics, without
any successful precedent for administration. Further, because preferences diverged
greatly even within the Democratic party on unemployment insurance, politicians
saw a great political advantage in delegating policy to the local level, where it would
better reflect the diversity of preferences. Re-centralization or further alteration of
unemployment insurance by the national-level would also be more difficult after del-
egation was made to the states. Thus, decentralization protected the preferences of
policymakers and their constituents, and insulated this policy against future influ-
ence at the national-level, where political power changed hands more often.
To conclude this discussion, I return to the proposition derived from my model
above, that the conditional influence of political divergence on the decision to decen-
tralize. Convergence between political actors will motivate decentralization where
there is a greater probability of a veto player opposing the policy. Where a veto player
is less likely to oppose decentralization, greater convergence will motivate central-
ization, if a centralized administrative agent is less likely to represent the decision-
maker’s preference. In this empirical example, the probability of a convergent agency
was likely very similar (and possibly low) for both policies. Because both social se-
curity and unemployment insurance were contentious policies, over which there was
strong disagreement between political parties, it was probable that the future would
bring a change of government, and with it a strong influence on nationalized admin-
istration. There was, however, an important difference in the anticipated risk of a
Supreme Court veto. Social Security, having an institutionalized national precedent,
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was less at risk of having centralization overturned. Unemployment Insurance, hav-
ing no precedent and being tied to employers, rather than individual contributions,
was at greater risk of having centralization overturned. To illustrate this comparison,
I turn to a graphical representation of both the theoretical prediction from my model
and this empirical example.
Figure 2.5: Predicted Effect of Political Convergence in Equilibrium
In Figure 2.5, I use simulated predictions to represent the combinations of model
parameters for which political convergence will have either a positive or negative
influence on decentralization. The vertical axis represents the probability of a veto
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player blocking centralization, and the horizontal axis represents the probability of a
convergent central agency. In the lower left corner of this figure, where the probabil-
ity of a veto player blocking centralization is low and the probability of a convergent
agency is also low, greater political convergence will incentivize greater centralization.
In the darker areas in the upper right of this figure, and the top and right most sides
of this figure, greater political convergence will incentive greater decentralization. As
discussed above, both policy examples were comparable in the probability of having
a convergent agency, but they differed in their probability of having a veto player
block centralization. Approximating the location of both Unemployment Insurance
(UI) and Social Security (SS) in this figure, these two policies fall in different ar-
eas. The Social Security example falls in an area where convergence is predicted
to incentivize centralization, and the Unemployment Insurance example falls in an
area where convergence is predicted to incentivize decentralization. Following the
proposition of my theory, the trade-offs between various political concerns differed
between these policies, with the effect that political convergence might motivate dif-
ferent institutional choices. This offers some insight into a possible explanation of
why Social Security was centralized and Unemployment Insurance was not.
2.4 Discussion and Conclusions
In this chapter, I have joined literature from the study of comparative politics on
decentralization and federalism with literature from the study of policy delegation
to provide a more integrated explanation of delegation choices. This explanation
highlights three important trade-offs in the choice to delegate and decentralize. First,
there is a critical trade-off between cost of control and oversight, and the advantages
gained by delegating to experts. Second, there is a trade-off between economic
efficiency and the flexibility of policy to represent diverse interests. Lastly, these
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considerations are further shaped by preexisting and persistent policy institutions,
which make policy reversals or alterations more difficult. When introducing a new
policy, then, decision makers confront these dilemmas in choosing how and by whom
a policy will be implemented.
My formalization allows a precise and concise articulation of the multi-dimensional
trade-offs in the policy-making process that have already been identified by theories
across these two sub-fields of political science. Bringing together these multiple ar-
guments under a single set of assumptions entails notable complexity. This complex-
ity, however, is necessary to faithfully represent each factor relevant to institutional
choice that has been identified by non-formal theory. The crucial advantage of such
a formal expression is the opportunity to examine inter-dependencies in motivations
driving policy makers’ decisions. Doing so brings to light compelling expectations.
Beginning with the assumption that a policymaker chooses a level of decentral-
ization that is utility maximizing. By integrating multiple perspectives, I offer a
new logic of decentralization. This novel lens through which to understand rational
decisions to decentralize offers new avenues for future theoretical advancement and
testing. The literature on political control has under-theorized how policymakers
choose between alternative administrative agents by truncating the range of possi-
ble “agents” that are available. In deciding to implement a new policy, there are
multiple potential agents from which to choose, including sub-national governments
or a centralized agency. These delegation choices deserve attention, because they
influence democratic representation and responsiveness.
Further, in the literature studying the political and economic effects of decen-
tralization, it is often not considered whether decentralization, or its consequences,
is context-dependent. Formal theory from economics on the inefficiency of decen-
tralization often stops short of endogenizing decentralization as a political outcome
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(for example, Oates and Schwab 1988; Wheaton 2000). Political-economy work also
frequently assumes exogenously determined institutions (for example, Baicker 2005;
Dahlberg and Edmark 2008; Fiva and Rattsø 2006; Rodgers 2005; Shroder 1995;
Wallner 2009). Such assumptions are difficult to justify given the implications of
institutional choice theory (e.g. Kingston and Caballero 2009; Sellers and Lindström
2007) and historical institutionalism (e.g. Skocpol 1995). Relaxing this assumption
may affect the implications drawn from these works, because the decision to de-
centralize biases the sample of decentralized cases. Decentralization will only occur
in those cases where political actors have deemed the political and economic ben-
efits to be greater than the costs, if rational behavior on the part of policymakers
is assumed. These preferences may be represented in a number of different policy
outcomes. Considering the specific case of social welfare policy, decentralization of
administration will have differing effects on the generosity of benefits conditional on
the preferences of the principal actor choosing to decentralize. I have argued that
delegation and decentralization are a function of political and administrative factors,
and I further argue that consideration of the effects of decentralization would be well
served by considering the incentives driving the original decision to delegate through
decentralization.
From my theoretical model, I have focused on one implication, which can be
adapted for empirical testing. Increased policy convergence may incentivize delega-
tion of policy authority through either more or less decentralized agents, conditional
on other political factors. The decision to delegate and decentralize is context de-
pendent, and should not be explained without accounting for the institutional and
political factors that define expected payoffs from different choices. Although I have
focused exclusively on one proposition in this chapter, many other theoretical expec-
tations can be derived. In future work I will focus on the implications of this model
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with respect to the effects of veto player behavior.
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3. BENEVOLENT AND/OR RIVAL COORDINATION? A THEORY OF
SOCIAL CAPITAL AND INSURANCE AGAINST ECONOMIC
INSECURITY
An understanding of how societies organize to address common risks is at the root
of political science inquiry. Risk and uncertainty are inherent in life, and governments
respond to these insecurities with a variety of institutions. Where private markets
fail to provide insurance against the risks stemming from labor markets, health, and
old age, it has become the role of public policy to do so. Governments invest in
social insurance and spend on temporary assistance to buffer citizens from these
economic perils. Publicly provided social insurance is the compulsory pooling of risk
within society to provide a public good– the provision of insurance. Extant work
has demonstrated the multiple political and economic factors that shape demand
and supply of these programs to produce variation in the structure and generosity of
programs. In this chapter, I argue that a substitute for insurance against economic
insecurity through public policy is made available by informal societal norms of
interaction and cooperation. By considering the available (informal) substitutes for
social insurance, I contribute to an understanding of when and why governments
expend resources towards the relief of labor market risk.
The question of what drives government supply of social welfare policy is one of
the most widely studied in comparative politics. Recent work in the study of social
welfare policy has focused on how variation in the distribution of income and risk
can affect social welfare policy outputs (Moene and Wallerstein 2001; Rehm 2011),
as well as preferences for redistributive policies (Iversen and Soskice 2001; Rehm,
Hacker, and Schlesinger 2012). These individual preferences can then cumulate into
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political influence (Rehm 2011). Well established research has also shown that var-
ious institutions condition the provision of redistributive policy (Esping-Andersen
1990; Hall and Soskice 2001; Hicks and Swank 1992; Kang and Powell 2010; Mares
2003; Martin and Swank 2012). Many of the ideas underpinning these explanations
have their roots in the public choice model of insurance, emphasizing the role of
information asymmetries and coordination problems in the shaping of social insur-
ance programs (Chiu and Karni 1998; Prescott and Townsend 1984; Rothschild and
Stiglitz 1976). I posit an additional piece to the puzzle by highlighting an alter-
native to public policy as a source of insurance against economic insecurity: social
capital. The latent propensity for cooperation fostered by social capital manifests in
variegated coordinating institutions, and as Martin and Swank argue regarding the
development and functioning of social welfare institutions, “processes of collective
engagement matter” (2012, 6).
In developing and articulating this theory, I maintain a focus on social insurance,
and on unemployment insurance specifically, because unemployment is “undoubt-
edly, the most ‘problematic’ social risk” to insure (Mares 2003, 106). Competi-
tive private insurance of individual job-loss risk is generally non-existent. Because
unemployment risk involves problems of moral hazard, adverse selection, and non-
independence of risk, private markets for voluntary insurance of unemployment fail.
This is not strictly the case with other social insurance policies such as health and
pension programs. Limiting my investigation to a policy area with only two feasi-
ble insurance options (informal or public, without a private market option) allows a
more parsimonious set of expectations and empirical tests.
This theory also contributes to the growing literature on the political importance
of social capital. I argue that social capital brings multiple forces to bear on the pol-
icy making process, but these influences depend on the broader risk context. After I
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discuss my novel conceptualization of social capital, I introduce a comparative polit-
ical economy theory of social insurance coordinated by social capital mechanisms. I
argue, and find evidence, that social capital serves more than one function in society,
having plural influences on the provision of public policy. First, a “voluntary and
charitable” dimension of social capital may rival government insurance by serving as
a substitute for public policy programs. Second, a “civic and political” dimension
may serve a more benevolent role by promoting policy responsiveness through the
coverage and generosity of social insurance programs. I take a new perspective in
the study of social capital and public policy, and I suggest that theories of their
relationship should be attentive to the multiple forms this capital may take. In my
empirical analysis, I show that social capital may both push and pull public program
responsiveness to community risk. Previously mixed findings may be attributable to
the confluence of these distinct effects.
In the following sections I review existing theories of both social capital and social
insurance institutions, I posit a more nuanced explanation of their relationship in
market economies, I introduce a set of social capital measures, and I offer a test of my
theoretical expectations in the context of the U.S. states. I conclude by discussing
the restrictions and broader implications of these findings for the study of social
capital and public policy.
3.1 Institutions of Coordination in Comparative Political Economy
The question of how actors coordinate to provide public goods like social insur-
ance in capitalist market economies has inspired a long line of theory in the social
sciences. Modern political science explanations of cross-national variation in coordi-
nation between market actors have come to focus on the importance of inequality and
strategic interactions between market actors, while giving attention to the durability
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of societal and political institutions. The cornerstone of these works is collective
action theory (Olson 1965, 1982) and the view that market outcomes are the conse-
quence of coordination between actors, which is mired in problems of moral hazard,
asymmetric information, and shirking (Milgrom and Roberts 1992). Scholarly at-
tention was first paid to the impact of increasingly open market economies on the
coordination of social insurance (Cameron 1978; Katzenstein and Katznelson 1985)
before shifting toward the equilibrium effects of institutions on coordination (Hall
and Soskice 2001; Thelen 2004). More recent research is now occupied with identify-
ing the direction of causation between labor market and/or social welfare institutions
and inequality (Beramendi and Rueda 2014; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Scheve and
Stasavage 2009), two phenomenon theorized to be endogenously determined (Iversen
and Soskice 2009; Martin and Swank 2012).
To explain institutional differences in market economies, some have pointed to
cleavages within society as the impetus for coordination (or lack thereof). With this
view, patterns of redistribution and public insurance against economic insecurity
are the manifestation of conflicts between societal groups, often rooted in class or
income (e.g., Bradley et al. 2003; Korpi 1983, 1989; Korpi and Palme 2003), which
persist through path-dependency over time (Bonoli 2003; Brooks and Manza 2006;
Esping-Andersen 1990; Skocpol 1992). The success of labor unions in coordinating
and representing the interests of workers is foundational to these explanation of pub-
licly provided social assistance and insurance. By theorizing on strategic interaction
between multiple self-interested actors in a labor market (Scharpf 1997), this latter
approach brings to light the importance of institutions and multi-actor relationships
in an economy.
Taking a different view of market interactions, others have considered the circum-
stances in which the preferences of firms/managers and workers might be brought
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into alignment by preexisting labor market and political institutions (for example,
Hall and Soskice 2001; Mares 1997, 2003, 2006). Firms recognize the advantages for
productivity from the preservation of human capital, and where institutions promote
cooperation with labor interests, economies are characterized by formally coordinated
institutions insuring worker health and investment in skills. The resulting spectrum
of “varieties of capitalism” ranges from “coordinated market economies” (CMEs)
to “liberal market economies” (LMEs), with the former investing relatively more in
skill specificity and comprehensive social benefits, and the latter exhibiting more
contentious labor-employer relations and limited social programs.
Advancing this line of inquiry, and continuing the theoretical shift away from
the determining influence of labor power, Martin and Swank (2012) argue that the
organization of employers’ associations is the key to explaining social welfare policies
cross-nationally. In the process of industrialization, they argue that partisans and
bureaucrats on the right established centrally organized multi-sector associations
in some countries to coordinate against democratization and to cultivate support
for their own self-interested industrial development agendas. Though initially orga-
nized by overtly non-democratic and non-populist motivations, those economies with
the strongest (most coordinated) associations saw the most egalitarian institutions
arise over time. Coordinated employers associations capable of aggregating business
interests maintained political and functional clout, and found the net cost of invest-
ing in social welfare programs to be less than did disaggregated business interests
elsewhere. Multi-party systems with centralized governing institutions perpetuated
these well-organized “peak organizations.” From this perspective, the burden of ex-
plaining coordination of social insurance in capitalist markets is put on the influence
and preferences of firms, in contrast to earlier emphases on labor organization.
Martin and Swank (2012) further argue that these early patterns of organization
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resulted in three ideal types of modern market coordination: macrocorporatist sys-
tems, sector coordination, and pluralist systems. The first of these types exhibits
centralized and highly organized coordination to address collective concerns with em-
ployers, labor, and government through non-legislative channels. The second of these
types sees cooperation between firms and labor at the sector-level, with long-term
cooperation among (sector-specific) firms for research and development, relations be-
tween suppliers and and purchasers, and labor-management interactions. The third
type, the pluralist system, is characterized by several weak employers’ associations
capable only of limited cooperation. The United States typifies this last manifes-
tation of organization. The consequence of coordination in this theory for social
policy development is severe. Where employers were less successful in coordination,
collective action problems were less easily resolved and particularistic self-interests
endured to obstruct the development of comprehensive egalitarian policy institutions.
To summarize in Martin and Swank’s own words (2012, 27):
“Better-organized, encompassing and centralized organizations do more
to educate members about the benefits of social policy, to help members
define common ground, and to solve the transaction costs of collective
action. Thus, the survival of egalitarian social protections depends, in
part, on whether well-organized groups can continue to bring employers
together and on the structures and strategies of the state to bolster the
institutions of coordination.”
These most recent explanations of institutions in market economies, namely the
Hall and Soskice (2001) VoC framework and the employer-centered theories of Mar-
tin and Swank (2012) or Mares (2003), point to coordination as key to explaining
not only the development of social welfare institutions in developed democracies, but
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also their continued role in society. Hall and Soskice (2001) explicitly discuss the
coordination problems inherent in (1) industrial relations between labor and employ-
ers, (2) vocational training and education, (3) corporate governance, (4) inter-firm
relations, and (5) intra-firm relations. Martin and Swank (2012) similarly identify
the coordination problems arising in relations between (1) employers and labor, (2)
business and government, and (3) among firms. How (if) market actors cooperate
to resolve these coordination problems is argued to shape the development of social
policies, and determine their responsiveness to social risks. Historical path dependent
processes, political institutions, and early partisan involvement explain the contem-
porary organization of business and labor interests. The comprehensiveness of social
welfare policies are a consequence of the capacity of these organizations to coordinate
within and between one another and resolve collective action problems. To distill
the relevant lesson from this literature, where formal and informal institutions gen-
erate coordination between market actors, governments find more political support
for investment in social insurance programs.
In the following sections, I recast this discussion of coordination between actors in
the light of social capital theory. If institutions of redistribution and social insurance
result from repeated strategic interactions between trade unions, clients, suppliers,
stakeholders, business associations, and governments, then variation in support for
the unemployed must be explained by coordination among these multiple actors. As
I will discuss below, social capital institutions promote coordination in a variety of
ways that will affect public policy.
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3.2 Social Capital: A Review and Reconsideration of the Many Empirical
Correlates
Whether social capital can make us healthy, wealthy, and wise, as early theory
suggested, is contingent on the context of political institutions, inequality, and po-
larization (Boix and Posner 1998). First, social capital (SC) institutions encourage
cooperation, but this propensity can be directed toward purposes improving equality
or to malevolent/antisocial ends (Putnam 2000). The realized effects of SC depend
on the goals or preferences of those engaging in cooperative ventures. Second, there
are multiple mechanisms through which SC affects cooperation, and some involve
interaction with politics or public policy. In extant research, SC has been linked to
a broad range of empirical outcomes, yet the theorized mechanisms are often only
vaguely specified or fail to account for context dependencies.
3.2.1 The Political
The SC outcome of primary interest to political science is improved quality of
government. Research in other disciplines, namely education and sociology (Bour-
dieu 1986; Coleman 1988b), has argued the importance of SC for both individual
and aggregate outcomes, but it was Putnam (1993) who brought SC theory into
mainstream political science. First in a comparative study of democratic governance
in Italy (1993), and then refined within the US context (2000), Putnam underscores
SC’s role in the functioning of bureaucratic and political institutions. As a resource
that resolves collective problems, fosters trust and reciprocity, encourages a sense of
linked fate, facilitates flows of information, and better equips individuals to handle
trauma or hardship, SC is argued to improve the lives of community members. A
posited consequence of this cooperation and “public-spiritedness” is increased civic
engagement to foster participatory and egalitarian democracy (Putnam 2000).
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Some notable works point to a positive relationship between SC and quality of
government (Putnam 1993, 2000) or perceptions of performance (Jottier and Heyn-
dels 2012), while others offer less consistent evidence (Doh 2014; Knack 2002; Tavits
2006). Knack (2002) finds a positive association between quality of government with
some aspects of SC (volunteering, trust, and census response) but a negative associ-
ation with others (civic engagement as informal networking and associational activ-
ities), suggesting there may be more than one dimension of SC. In a cross-national
study, Doh (2014) finds the effect of social capital to be dependent on economic
development. Evidence against a uniform or unconditional effect on government or
administrative performance is further generated by research on public management.
For example, the relationship between organization-level SC and public organiza-
tional performance is shown to depend on managerial quality or strategy (Andrews
and Brewer 2013, 2015; Compton and Meier 2015; Meier, Favero, and Compton
2014), or on the dimension of social capital considered Andrews (2011a,b).
3.2.2 The Organizational
The link between SC and public policy or service provision relies, in part, on
it’s productivity enhancing effects on intra-organizational interactions and on coor-
dination between public and private actors. The expectation that policy outcomes
are improved by more efficient bureaucratic functioning is especially acute in the
context of public services that rely on the efforts of clients and other community
members to coproduce public goods, including fire and police services, social welfare
and public health services, or education (Andrews and Brewer 2010; Schneider 2006;
Sharp 1980; Whitaker 1980). A rich literature has focused specifically on the lat-
ter policy area of education. Empirical evidence has accumulated across disciplines
that student achievement, particularly student behavioral outcomes, is higher in the
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presence of social capital (Coleman 1988a,b; Dika and Singh 2002; Goddard 2003;
Israel, Beaulieu, and Hartless 2001; Leana and Pil 2006; McNeal Jr. 1999; Perna
and Titus 2005; Portes 1998; Sandefur, Meier, and Campbell 2006; Sun 1999). More
recent evidence suggests, however, that the anticipated organizational benefits of SC
do not always accrue in education outcomes, but have disparate effects across race
or class (Hawes and Rocha 2011; Hero 2003; John 2005; Kao and Rutherford 2007;
McNamara, Weininger, and Laureau 2003), and the effects of this SC for education
are conditional on management strategy (Compton and Meier 2015; Meier, Favero,
and Compton 2014).
3.2.3 The Economic
Beyond the influence of SC on bureaucratic or governance outcomes, previous
theory and research has connected SC to a series of economic outcomes. As Wool-
cock and Narayan (2000) summarize, SC should promote economic productivity by
fostering communication (information) between actors in a market economy, building
networks, creating sustainable formal institutions to promote functioning markets,
or by encouraging productive synergies between public and private actors (e.g. less
corruption). These theoretical mechanisms have implications for the comparative
study of economic development and social welfare policy. Evidence has accumu-
lated in favor of a positive association between SC and growth (Beugelsdijk and van
Schaik 2005; Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004; Whiteley 2000), labor market flu-
idity (Matthews, Pendakur, and Young 2009; Mouw 2003), or innovation (Akçomak
and ter Weel 2009; Miguélez, Moreno, and Artís 2011; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). With
particular relevance to economic development, SC is also associated with increased
risk-pooling or lending (Cassar and Wydick 2010; Millo and Pasini 2010; Petrikova
and Chadha 2013) and the provision of public goods (Anderson, Mellor, and Milyo
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2004).
Further, SC is associated with certain individual economic behaviors, such as di-
rect assistance or exchange of favors between individuals within communities (Jack-
son, Rodriguez-Barraquer, and Tan 2012), with a consequent increased charitable
and nonprofit sector activity (Brooks 2005; Saxton and Benson 2005). Also, evidence
suggests that SC may promote preferences for redistribution (Yamamura 2012). Con-
clusions from these studies, however, are not entirely positive or consistent. Direct
assistance or “sharing obligations” may have negative consequences for aggregate in-
come growth, thereby reinforcing income inequality (di Falco and Bulte 2011; O’Brien
2012). Critically, studies that consider more than one dimension of SC often find
mixed results. For example, Knack and Keefer (1997) and Knack (2003) find civic
norms and trust to be positively associated with economic growth, but only limited
evidence for a link between performance and membership in organizations.
Arguments supporting these multiple theoretical associations between social cap-
ital institutions and political or economic outcomes have grown, but the empirical
implications are not consistent. As Putnam (2000), Hero (2007), and others have
argued, SC should not be viewed as a uniformly positive or benign force in society.
Whether these institutions contribute to the wellbeing or equity of democratic gov-
ernance and outcomes theoretically and empirically unclear, or context dependent.
The mixed evidence yet produced by literatures across the social science highlights
the need for both a consistent SC conceptualization and conscientious theorizing of
causal mechanisms. In the following sections, I first articulate a concise definition of
SC and I expand upon the mechanisms through which social capital can shape public
policy outcomes, with a particular focus on coordination in market economies.
60
3.3 An Institutional Theory of Social Capital
As prior work has noted, consensus is lacking in both theoretical and empirical
definitions of social capital (Bjørnskov 2006; Boix and Posner 1998; Paldam 2000;
Paraskevopoulos 2010; Sobel 2002), with disagreement pivoting on the most valid
level of measurement and the inclusion of trust in the concept. Theoretical con-
ceptualizations of this “resource” vary in their inclusion of institutions, attitudes,
behaviors, and/or their consequences. Some have argued a rational choice theory
of SC as individual behavior including trust (Valdivieso and Villena-Roldan 2014),
while others have advocated an institutional theory of SC as a set of informal norms
(Boix and Posner 1998; Ostrom 1990). The canonical definition offered by Putnam
(1995, 664-65) defines SC as the “...features of social life–networks, norms, and trust–
that enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared interests.”
This definition proliferates throughout the literature, despite the conceptual ambi-
guity. In the following, I identify the domain of social (or individual) phenomena
to be validly incorporated as social capital and I theorize on their consequences for
public policy.
The first conceptual discrepancy is in the inclusion of trust in an SC definition.
Some view trust as epiphenomenal to the social connections, networks, and norms
commonly included in an SC concept (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Keele 2007; Putnam
2000), or to the consequent political and bureaucratic benefits of social capital (Kum-
lin and Rothstein 2005; Larsen 2007; Rothstein and Teorell 2008). This contrasts,
however, with the definition offered by Coleman, one of the first scholars to theorize
on SC in the social sciences, who defines it as the “obligations and expectations,
which depend on trustworthiness of the social environment, information-flow capa-
bility of the social structure, and norms accompanied by sanctions” (2000, 36). With
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this perspective, trustworthiness is a precondition for the institutions of SC and the
consequent cooperation (Paldam 2000). This conceptual discrepancy is reinforced
by empirical evidence that trust and the non-attitudinal components of SC are cor-
related differently with outcomes of interest. Growing evidence favors a separate
consideration and measurement of trust and SC (Bjørnskov 2006; Paraskevopoulos
2010; Rothstein and Teorell 2008; Valdivieso and Villena-Roldan 2014); with respect
to economic growth and investment (Beugelsdijk 2009; Beugelsdijk and van Schaik
2005; Knack and Keefer 1997), corruption (Paldam and Bjørnskov 2004), better gov-
ernance (Knack 2002), or life satisfaction (Bjørnskov 2006). This research suggests
that the trust and network components of social capital may be distinct phenomena,
each serving a unique function in society.
Here I remain agnostic about the causal ordering of trust and the manifestation
of social behavioral norms. Instead, I take an institutional approach in defining SC,
with institutions being the socially devised rules that determine who is involved in
decision making, what options are restricted, how preferences are aggregated, what
information is necessary, and how payoffs will be distributed (North 1990; Ostrom
1990). With a similar perspective, Ostrom defines SC as “the shared knowledge,
understandings, norms, rules and expectations about patterns of interactions that
groups of individuals bring to a recurrent activity” (2000, 176). SC, then, is “a set of
institutionalized expectations that other social actors will reciprocate co-operative
overtures” (Boix and Posner 1998, 686). Distinguishing between SC institutions and
other informal societal institutions thus becomes a question of their contribution to
coordination.
Generally, cooperative behavior is maintained through repeated practices and the
consequent establishment of common expectations (Lubell and Scholz 2012; North
1990). The established and durable processes (institutions) constituting SC shape the
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propensity for solving common resource problems by reducing the cost of monitor-
ing and sanctioning (Ostrom 1990), thereby addressing moral hazard and incentive
problems (Millo and Pasini 2010; Stiglitz 2000) to improve future flows of income
(Ostrom 1994). The provision of public goods, then, is critically influenced by the ex-
istence of institutions maintaining cooperation—social capital.1 Indeed, if routinized
cooperation is possible only with supporting institutions, SC may be necessary for
a range of public or common goods, be it a free market, a sustainable ecosystem, or
redistribution for social security.
Reflecting this conceptualization, I define SC by differentiating structural aspects
and their effects. Social capital is the set of informal institutions that maintain and
incentivize cooperation. This includes any constraint that humans devise and prac-
tice to support cooperative behavior. A social capital institution is any routinized
behavior or societal norm that generates mutual benefits to the actors involved, with-
out requiring that the net benefit to every actor be greater than the individualized
cost. In so doing, SC affects the propensity for collective action and the produc-
tion of public goods. Formal institutions that require or result in these behaviors
are necessarily second-order; they are the consequence of SC. Any formal institution
designed to foster or maintain coordination is inexorably preceded by informal social
capital institutions.
This conceptualization of SC also departs somewhat from that offered by Hero
(2007). In his critique of the Putnam and others, Hero (2007) highlights the multiple
intellectual traditions of political thought that underwrite SC theory. In doing so,
Hero ascribes to SC a system(s) of beliefs about the proper role of the state, hier-
1Public goods, borrowing Samuelson (1954) definition, are “[goods] which all enjoy in common
in the sense that each individual’s consumption of such a good leads to no subtractions from any
other individual’s consumption of that good.” They are to some degree both non-rivalrous and
non-excludable.
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archy, and individual (civic) responsibilities with an emphasis on the role of racial
diversity in the development of these political ideas. While these philosophies define
a context and shape the goals for which societies coordinate, I view the SC insti-
tutions themselves through a neutral lens. SC institutions facilitate coordination
regardless of the motivating goal or the realized political, economic, or social out-
comes. The crucial contribution of Hero (2007) is the recognition of SC institutions’
context dependency: the consequences of SC are conditional on the values and be-
liefs of the actors themselves, emphasizing the traditions of civic republicanism and
racial diversity in the American case. With this perspective, a significant empirical
relationship between SC and economic and civic equality (Putnam 1993), or any
other outcome, should not be assumed as the modal outcome.
The second discrepancy persisting in the literature on social capital concerns
the appropriate level of conceptualization: is SC an individual or an aggregate phe-
nomenon? Some advocate a micro-level definition of SC as an individual attribute,
attitude, or preference (Bourdieu 1986; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Jackman and Miller
1998; Poulsen and Svendsen 2005; Wright 2015), and some take SC as a macro-
concept that manifests in societal level features of community life (Coleman 1988b;
Hawes, Rocha, and Meier 2013; Keele 2005; Putnam 2000), while others hold a
middle ground defining SC as a characteristic of organization within small groups
(Ostrom 1990). Having defined it as a set of institutions, SC is logically a macro-
level phenomenon that conditions individual behavior. Although its effects will be
observable in individual behavior, it is the aggregate pattern of behaviors that define
social capital.
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3.3.1 The Coordinating Mechanisms of Social Capital
Having defined what social capital is and discussed what it is theorized to do,
I now turn to a discussion of how social capital does what it does. In the most
general sense, social capital makes coordination less difficult (costly). Coordination
is fundamental in the provision of common (non-market) goods and services (e.g.,
Hardin 1982; Olson 1965; Ostrom 1990), and social capital can deliver the prerequisite
cooperation. SC, as institutionalized rules and expectations, can allow actors to
overcome collective action problems and work together for a mutually beneficial
goal. In its most simple form, SC “may involve no more than filling in the lacunae
left in a general system of law” (Ostrom and Ahn 2003, 256). These informal rules
in modern democratic free market systems reduce the transaction costs of formal
coordination, including contracts, hierarchies, and bureaucratic rules (Fukuyama
2000). The willingness of actors to cooperate rests on the shared expectation that
“a considerable fraction of members are willing to engage in the costly punishment
of shirkers,” even where repayment for the cost of sanctioning is unlikely (Bowles
and Gintis 2002, 425). Where agreement exists on the value of a common good, but
formal contracts fail to ensure (cost effective) compliance, informal SC institutions
allow the exchange of information necessary for monitoring and enforcement. Indeed,
as Fukuyama (2000) argues, “The fact of the matter is that coordination based
on informal norms remains and important part of modern economies and arguably
becomes more important as the nature of economic activity becomes more complex
and technologically sophisticated.”
No general set of rules will guarantee successful coordination, and the nature of
effective SC institutions depends on cultural traditions, environmental conditions,
extant institutions, and monitoring, sanctioning, and conflict resolution mechanisms
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(Ostrom 1990; Ostrom and Ahn 2003). Further, the distribution of benefits from
the reduction in transaction costs will depend on the actors or institutions involved.
First, where social capital coordinates with formal state and political institutions, it
may contribute to diffuse and less-excludable goods and services. On the other hand,
where social capital coordinates through direct assistance and non-state mechanisms,
it may contribute to public goods that are less widely dispersed with benefits more
closely confined within some groups. Figure 3.1 illustrates my postulated connection
between social capital institutions, coordination through cooperative ventures, and
the realization of public goods. Social capital institutions may promote the coordi-
nation of public goods and services through political and civic institutions or through
direct charitable and voluntary means.
Formal Political & 
Civic Institutions 
(The Governance System)
Social Capital
Direct Assistance & 
Charity 
(Formal or Informal 
Institutions)
Coordination 
(Provision) of  
Public Goods & 
Services
Cooperative Ventures 
Figure 3.1: Mechanisms of Social Capital Influence on Provision of Public Goods
In the following sections, I present a theory of social capital’s role in social insur-
ance through these two mechanisms, and I explain how these coordinating mecha-
nisms dovetail with extant theory of public policy in developed capitalist economies.
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Because coordination is fundamental to theories of market institutions, including
public policies like social insurance, theory of social capital can add additional in-
sight into what drives government responses to stimuli like economic insecurity. In
other words, I recontextualize the arguments from dominant approaches in the study
of political economy with insights from social capital theory to offer novel theoretical
expectations.
3.3.2 Coordination for Unemployment Insurance
Coordinating and implementing social programs that insure against the risk of
unemployment has historically proved difficult (for example, Mares 1997; Sjoberg,
Palme, and Carroll 2010). An optimal (efficient) unemployment insurance (UI) pro-
gram incentivizes workers to work effectively and to move into jobs for which they
are most productive, and will also encourage workers to acquire (specific or techni-
cal) skills as technology evolves (e.g., Baily 1978; Barr 1987). Too little insurance
inhibits risk taking and efficient investment in skills, and too much insurance exac-
erbates problems of moral hazard and suboptimal employment (e.g., Acemoglu and
Shimer 2000; Hopenhayn and Nicolini 1997; Karni 1999). In comparison to insur-
ance of other risks related to health, retirement, or workplace injury, the efficient
insurance of unemployment is actuarily unsound without universal compulsory par-
ticipation (Barr 1987), leaving the task of insuring workers against unemployment
to either informal or government institutions.
In the absence of centralized coordination, fractionalized business interests faced
with carrying the burden of financing unemployment insurance have historically dis-
agreed on (1) whether unemployment insurance should be contributory or assistance-
based and (2) how risk should be redistributed across occupations and industries
(Amenta et al. 1987; Hall and Soskice 2001; Kim 2010; Mares 2003; Skocpol 1992,
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1995). Variation in government responses to provide insurance for the unemployed
in capitalist democratic countries is explained by partisan politics and political in-
stitutions, and, as I argue, informal social institutions. As discussed above, the
predominant political economy explanation of social insurance development relies on
coordination between managers, workers, and political actors. Where managers suc-
cessfully organized to coordinate with governments to invest in long-term workforce
productivity, generous and universalistic social insurance programs arose (such as
the Danish system). In other countries, however, coordination stalled due to parti-
san conflicts (largely due to two-party systems), which challenged the representation
of employer groups, or due to federalism, which hampered national cooperation of
economic interests (Martin and Swank 2012). Coalitions in support of social protec-
tion programs were unsustainable or ineffective, and the provision of social insurance
remains comparatively limited in scope (as in the US or Great Britain) or is relegated
to sector-level organization, as in France or Germany (for description, see Vroman
and Brusentsev 2005).
Without diminishing the importance of formal (partisan and federal) institu-
tional arrangements in explaining the development of insurance programs, I argue
that variation in UI coverage or generosity within political (electoral) institutional ar-
rangements is due the coordinating effects of informal social capital. Through either
political and civic or direct charitable and assistance mechanisms, SC institutions
shape the willingness of business interests and workers to support a UI program,
and also shape the responsiveness of public policy and administration. On the one
hand, SC fosters the coordination in policy making to better represent both business
and worker interests, thereby shaping public policy outputs. On the other hand, SC
facilitates informal efforts to address common needs, like economic insecurity from
unemployment, thereby serving as a substitute for government programs.
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My theory of social capital in facilitating social insurance is most relevant in
contexts lacking strong and formal organization of actors: the “pluralist” systems of
business representation, in Martin and Swank’s (2012) typology (or in LME systems
to use the Hall and Soskice (2001) VoC characterization). In these systems, coordina-
tion rarely exists above the firm level, and “Few formal channels for coordination join
business in consultation with unions and government, and employers’ input into pub-
lic policy is largely limited to the legislative process” (Martin and Swank 2012, 18).
Where institutions are comparatively inhospitable to cooperation, it is the informal
SC institutions that serve the critical role of “providing capacities for the exchange of
information, monitoring, and that sanctioning of defections relevant to cooperative
behavior among firms and other actors” to achieve coordination of social insurance
(Hall and Soskice 2001, 11). In this environment, where the deck is stacked against
coordination, informal SC institutions have a role to play in promoting cooperative
ventures to provide social insurance.
3.3.2.1 Political & Civic Coordination
The first mechanism through which social capital coordinates public goods and
services is by interacting with political and bureaucratic institutions. By facilitating
coordination between governing institutions and private actors, and by reducing the
cost of transferring information about community problems to policy makers, SC
expands the capacity of public institutions to provide public goods. First, as Boix
and Posner (1998) posit, SC institutions may enhance the capacity for cooperation
within and between bureaucratic organizations, and non-governmental organizations,
to achieve public policy goals. This propensity for cooperation extends to private
labor market actors, including labor and employers. Following the theoretical argu-
ments of Martin and Swank (2012) and others, where coordination is more likely be-
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tween private market actors, the coverage of government social insurance programs,
and unemployment insurance specifically, should be more comprehensive.
Second, norms of civic participation or engagement with community affairs re-
duce the cost of articulating collective interests to political leaders. Interaction with
civic organizations facilitates the flow of relevant information, allowing politicians
and bureaucrats to better represent community needs and interests to solve local
issues. The consequence of this transference of political information should be more
sophisticated policy-making that identifies and addresses community problems with
greater efficiency (Tavits 2006), and may be more responsive to changes in needs or
risks.
Social welfare programs are particularly reliant on this form of SC coordina-
tion, because administration of benefits requires community outreach and coordina-
tion across both government agencies and non-profit non-governmental organizations
(e.g., the United Way). The efforts of public employees to contact and coordinate
with clientele, social service organizations, community organizations, provider coali-
tions, and advocacy coalitions are made more effective by SC (Kay and Johnston
2007; Schneider 2006). To put this into more substantive terms, in a context of
greater social capital, public employees may be more likely to pick up the phone
or walk down the hall to coordinate with those working in other programs or for
other organizations. These norms can generate and spread more sophisticated in-
formation about all available sources of public assistance, which public employees
(and other organizational partners) can use to better serve clientele. Having bet-
ter and more frequent connections with community organizations means that public
programs may have fewer obstacles in identifying and enrolling eligible clientele. SC
advantages the administration of these policies, producing higher take-up rates and
more comprehensive coverage of workers in social insurance programs.
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Where SC facilitates contact between citizens and public institutions to spread
information and foster cooperation among market, bureaucratic, and political actors,
it should be associated with more generous or more comprehensive social insurance
programs.
Hypothesis 1: Benevolent Coordination
Public social insurance is more comprehensive where social capital coor-
dinates through civic & political institutions
Further, the influence of social capital in mobilizing policy responses to common
needs should be stronger where the salience of that need (risk) is greater. By in-
creasing the efficiency of public agencies in recruiting and serving clientele or by
increasing the awareness of public employees to the salience of risk, for example, SC
will push public programs to spend more in response to macroeconomic risk than
they otherwise would. In other words, by coordinating through policy or political in-
stitutions, social capital fosters more comprehensive social insurance programs, but I
argue that greater macroeconomic insecurity will increase this effect as SC mobilizes
in response to the magnitude or salience of common needs.
Hypothesis 1𝑏:
Public social insurance is more comprehensive where social capital coor-
dinates through civic & political institutions, and this effect is greater
where economic insecurity is higher.
However, for the reasons discussed above, equality in representation of interests
or policy outcomes is not a necessary consequence of political and civic social capital.
Interaction between community or private actors and public institutions may yield
greater efficiency in public service, but this channel of influence remains susceptible
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to the interests representing biased, malevolent, or anti-democratic preferences. SC
can also facilitate coordination without political involvement, which may have a
different effect on public policy outputs.
3.3.2.2 Direct Charitable & Voluntary Coordination
The second mechanism of SC coordination operates through voluntary or char-
itable activity. Network interactions or organizational activities can transfer infor-
mation about community problems, as well as provide services and goods to directly
resolve common problems or address individual needs (Bowles and Gintis 2002). In
doing so, SC facilitates community activities that may substitute for social insurance
policies, thereby reducing the need or demand for public policy.2
First, because social capital is thought to make information about the community
and other individuals easier to obtain (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Jottier and Heyndels
2012), the magnitude of risks and need for assistance may be better communicated.
Awareness of problems and mobilization to help in times of need are both facilitated
by interaction, networks, and possibly also by social norms. Indeed, social capital is
associated with higher levels of charitable giving or support for redistribution (Brooks
2005; Wiepking and Maas 2009; Yamamura 2012). Charitable organizations seeking
to provide assistance can benefit from information, greater interest and participation,
and charitable donations, all of which make their efforts more effective. For example,
organizations like the United Way make it a priority to help families manage financial
risks. In fact, promoting income stability is one of the United Way’s three primary
objectives, along with the promotion of education and health. They do this by
helping families locate affordable housing, find and maintain employment, develop
2Either because the institutions are circumscribed within a group or because they are more
susceptible to malevolent interests, their benefits may be privately realized only among privileged
few. Again, equality in access to these SC institutions is not guaranteed, but those community
actors with access should find social interactions more productive in resolving problems.
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spending and savings plans, and they connect families to sources of direct income
support and help with the application process.
Further, by strengthening social ties and norms of cooperation and reciprocity,
social capital may facilitate informal risk sharing. In Putnam’s (1993) seminal ex-
amination of the effects of social capital on community governance, it is shown to
facilitate voluntary rotating credit associations as a form of informal risk-pooling,
i.e. insurance. Not only is information on community members’ behavior less costly
to obtain (Bowles and Gintis 2002; Jottier and Heyndels 2012), but societal norms
can increase the costs of defection and incentivize rule compliance (Boix and Pos-
ner 1998; Portes 1998). More formally, rule compliance and reciprocity limit the
problem of moral hazard with the threat of social stigma, reputation, and pressure.
These two functions, information and rule compliance, are critical to the function-
ing of non-compulsory insurance programs (Barr 2001). However, risk pooling need
not take such a formal structure as a credit association. The effect of social capital
could be seen, for example, in an employers’ increased awareness and response to
the threat and consequences of layoffs. When facing an economic downturn, firms
with stronger social capital can elect not to fire or layoff workers, but instead reduce
wages or hours among all workers, thereby pooling risk (Bowles and Gintis 2002).
This kind of risk sharing arrangement has been observed specifically in the plywood
industry in the South Eastern U.S. (Craig et al. 1995).
With respect to individual workers, SC institutions transfer information about
jobs, employers, and potential employees even if they are not intentionally estab-
lished for this reason. The extension of networks beyond familial connections to
include infrequent interactions with acquaintances is more likely to provide novel
information or new job opportunities (Granovetter 1983, 1995; Mouw 2003). Infor-
mation about professional expectations and norms of behavior is also communicated
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more easily in social capital rich communities to further improve job searches and
successful employment (Portes 1998). Indeed, evidence suggests that social capital
is associated with positive job market outcomes; it helps people find better jobs
(Matthews, Pendakur, and Young 2009; Mouw 2003). “Who you know” matters in
finding a job, and social capital increases who and what you know (Lin 2002). Indi-
viduals may also be more prone to directly help each other, one-on-one, in ways that
promote economic insecurity through stable income streams. Beyond its effect on
job searches, social capital may help individuals obtain and maintain employment by
fostering help with child care, transportation, health care, and emotional/mentoring
support (Schneider 2006). These informal services make it easier for people find,
obtain, and maintain work outside of the home.
These mechanisms suggest that by encouraging charitable and voluntary activity,
SC can resolve collective action problems inherent in the provision of social insurance
without the direct involvement of public policy. In this way, SC can coordinate insur-
ance functions that rival formal policy institutions. Alternatively SC may function
to reduce the need for social insurance by expediting information in labor markets.
Therefore, where SC coordinates direct charitable and voluntary activity, public
policy will play a lesser role in insuring individuals against risk because insurance is
provided through alternative means. In these SC contexts, social insurance should
be less generous or comprehensive overall, because market actors coordinate to meet
these needs without the involvement of public policy.
Hypothesis 2: Rival Coordination
Public social insurance is less comprehensive where social capital coordi-
nates through direct charitable & voluntary institutions
Further, SC coordinates community activity that provide a form of collective insur-
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ance, making state policies less relevant in buffering workers against labor market
risk. In other words, where SC serves as a functional substitute to social insurance
policies, demand and supply of these program services should be unresponsive to
macroeconomic insecurity.
Hypothesis 2𝑏:
Public social insurance is less comprehensive where social capital coordi-
nates through direct charitable & voluntary institutions, and this effect
is not conditional on the level of economic insecurity.
In the following section, I discuss in greater depth the empirical policy context in
which I will test these hypotheses.
3.4 The Empirical Social Context of Unemployment Insurance
To test these theoretical expectations, I turn to the U.S. states from 2001-2013.
By comparing sub-national governments, I can confidently identify the influence of
local social and economic context on programmatic outputs because many of the
formal policy institutions in place are uniform across the sample. Also, a reliance on
cross-sectional empirical analyses has led to ambiguous findings about social capital
more generally (Keele 2005). In this study, I use cross-sectional time-series data,
which allow for dynamic inferences. In doing so, I can address some critical weak-
nesses of prior research on social capital. In this section, I will more fully describe
the political context of unemployment insurance in the US, I will introduce novel
measures of social capital, and I will discuss the measurement and specification of
my empirical models.
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3.4.1 Unemployment Insurance in the United States
The Social Security Act (SSA) granted substantial autonomy over many aspects
of UI administration to the states, while Congressional legislation and regulations
set minimum guidelines for program rules and eligibility requirements. In adminis-
tering unemployment insurance (UI), each state workforce agency (SWA) balances
the influence from a state legislature, executive, business interests, and labor organi-
zations, while seeking to maintain support of their constituency and court systems.
This organization has historically resulted in 53 unique UI programs. The existing
UI programs vary in their administrative structure, the sectors covered, qualifying
requirements, eligibility rules, disqualification rules, weekly benefit amount, waiting
period prior to first payment, duration of benefit payments, seasonal provision, and
their financing structure (Blaustein 1993). No two state programs are the same.
Regular unemployment compensation is funded through a complex tax-credit
scheme, paid mostly by employers and supplemented by federal funds under spe-
cific circumstances. Employers pay two taxes: one into to a state account at a tax
rate determined by their “experience rating,” and one variable tax-rate into a fed-
eral account which provides administrative funds, grants and loans to states, and
certain benefits payments. Basing tax rates on employer experience was initially
necessary to gain sufficient political support from employers, and continues to incite
disagreement today (Becker 1981; O’Leary and Wandner 1997). Because employers’
tax rates are a function of their experience with layoffs in the past, business interests
have an incentive to push for more stringent rules governing employe benefit eligi-
bility. Labor groups have historically opposed experience rating, arguing that the
system encourages employers to restrict employee benefits rights and to unjustifiably
challenge claims to keep charges and tax rates down (O’Leary and Wandner 1997).
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Because each program is separately administered, business and labor influences
play out at the state level. First, the state legislature is a formal principal; the
preferences of legislators directly influence UI policy through statutory adjustments.
Ultimately, SWAs are primarily responsible to state governments because they are
directly governed by the rules set by these principals. Evidence of the relation-
ship between state UI statutory provisions and the partisanship of state legislatures
and the governor is ambiguous (O’Leary and Wandner 1997, 148). Second, local
labor/union and employer/management interest groups have divergent goals. Both
groups are involved in state UI programs but employer groups have historically had
greater influence (O’Leary and Wandner 1997; Rubin 1983). Employers fund UI
through a tax rate depending on the employment and layoff experience of the firm.
Businesses have a vested interest in decreasing the number of applicants approved
for UI benefits because this will directly affect the tax rate paid by the employer.
3.4.2 A Measure of Social Capital
Because my theory of social capital entails dynamic processes in both space and
time, an empirical measure must vary on both dimensions. Despite the claim by
Putnam (2000) that SC is declining in the United States and the arguments by Hero
(2007) that SC interacts with contexts that vary sub-nationally, such a measure has
eluded the literature to date. The most influential SC studies have been limited to
variation in one dimension or the other. For example, Putnam’s (2000) SC index
varies only across space (the US states), Keele’s (2007) measure varies only in time
(as a national measure), Wright (2015) considers both time and space but only for
a non-representative subset of the population (12th graders), and Valdivieso and
Villena-Roldan’s (2014) analyze multiple survey years across Chile, Brazil, Mexico
and the US, but maintain a cross-sectional national-level approach.
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One exception to this observation is the Hawes, Rocha and Meier (2013) social
capital factor, which measures SC at the state-level from 1988-2004. However, be-
cause the authors rely largely on original survey responses obtained from a private
marketing firm, they are unable to disaggregate their data entirely, limiting their
analysis to 29 clusters of states. Only by supplementing these survey responses with
measures of crime and health outcomes from other sources, can they produce an SC
estimate for each of the 48 contiguous US states. Although their measure constitutes
a substantial advancement for the literature in political science, it is severely limited
by the inability to differentiate between community organizational life, engagement
in public affairs, and community volunteerism within state clusters. Perhaps the
most problematic cluster is the lumping together of the southwest states New Mex-
ico, Arizona, Utah, and Nevada. The Hawes, Rocha, and Meier (HRM) measure of
social capital offers critical over-time variation, but remains limited in the validity
of its cross-sectional variation.
To address this limitation in the literature and to produce a measure of social
capital across space and time, I turn to the Current Population Survey (CPS) admin-
istered by the U.S. Census Bureau every month. The supplement themes and years
included in my measures are reported in Table 3.1. This survey is representative at
the state-level, and routinely includes questions on civic participation, volunteering
activities, and engagement in public affairs. In aggregating responses to generate
state-year level estimates of these behaviors, I overcome some critical restrictions of
previous work. First, by analyzing estimated aggregate behaviors, I model SC at a
more appropriate level of observation, at a higher level of aggregation than the indi-
vidual, but lower than the national level. Second, by pooling survey responses across
multiple survey questionnaires, I can incorporate measures of each of Putnam’s four
behavioral components of SC, which reflect my institutional concept: community
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organizational life, engagement in public affairs, community volunteerism, and infor-
mal sociability. In total, over three million responses over the years 2000-2013 are
used to generate these SC estimates.
Table 3.1: Current Population Survey Supplements and Years
CPS Supplement Years Available
Volunteers Supplement 2002-2009, 2011-2013
Civic Engagement Supplement 2008-2011
Voting and Registration Supplement 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012
Participation in the Arts 2002, 2008, 2012
Total Survey Respondents Included: 3,667,079
After selecting question items from the volunteering, voting, participation in the
arts, and civic engagement CPS monthly supplements, I combine responses to similar
or redundant questions to produce dichotomous measures of individual participation
in different types of activities. This process reduces the count of individual survey
items from 61 to 36 SC indicators. Those responses originally recorded in ordinal
form are dichotomized and those originally recorded as continuous (i.e. total number
of hours volunteered) are kept in their original metric. Using the CPS provided
probability weights within each state-year-survey supplement, I then estimate state-
year levels of participation in each activity. Table A.1 in the Appendix reports the
descriptive statistics of these indicators, as observed.
Because some supplements are administered in some years and not others, miss-
ing state-year observations for each SC indicator must be dealt with before a factor
analysis can be completed. To avoid bias and overconfidence in estimation inherent
in interpolation, case-wise deletion, or other methods, I use multiple imputation to
account for this incomplete data (King et al. 2001). Missing state-level estimates
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of aggregate behaviors predetermined by the year of observation (timing of CPS
supplements) are treated as missing at random, as the probability of missingness
is not conditional on values of the unobserved data, so I use an iterative Markov
chain Monte Carlo multiple imputation method (King et al. 2001; White, Royston,
and Wood 2011). This sequential regression multivariate imputation procedure is
flexible to accommodate both continuous and truncated (proportion) variables, and
produces parameter estimates with fully conditional prediction specifications to ac-
count for possible dependence in arbitrary missing data (Raghunathan 2004).3 Hav-
ing obtained SC indicators from multiple (10) rectangularized matrices of state-year
estimates, I can proceed with my factor analysis. Following the method of Hawes,
Rocha, and Meier (2013), I factor analyze the 36 measures using principal component
factor analysis. Two factors emerge, with eigenvalues of 7.71 and 5.78 respectively,
together explaining 34% of the observed variance. The results of this analysis are
reported in Table A.2 in the Appendix. The scoring coefficients from these two re-
tained factors are then used to predict two social capital indices with the multiply
imputed dataset.
The first retained factor captures charitable activity, some aspects of commu-
nity organizational life, most indicators of community volunteerism, and a mix of
informal sociability and engagement in public affairs indicators. The items loading
most heavily on this first factor include all of the charitable activity indicators, par-
ticipation in education and youth organizations, volunteering, and overall quantity
of time volunteered. Voluntary and charitable activities aimed at direct assistance,
with little engagement in political activities, are represented by this first factor. The
second retained factor captures community service, engagement in public affairs, and
some informal sociability indicators. The items loading most heavily on this factor
3The multiple imputation (mi) suite of commands in Stata 13 were used for this estimation.
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Figure 3.2: Comparison of Social Capital in the United States, 2000-2012 Average
represent direct participation in public affairs and the use of interpersonal networks.
I posit that the first factor represents the theoretical charitable SC manifesting in
direct assistance through services or goods within a community. The second fac-
tor reflects well the theoretical civic and political SC, representing engagement with
public affairs and civic participation.
Figure 3.2 represents the average charitable and civic SC measures for each state
over the entire 2000-2013 period. These factors are measured to have an overall
sample mean of zero and standard deviation of one, thus the quadrants in this fig-
ure are determined by the grand mean of each measure. Further, I have included
a bivariate fit line between the state averaged measures, which are insignificantly
correlated at 0.087. Note that although the two SC measures are orthogonal in
the pooled cross-sectional time-series sample (𝑁 = 700), the state averages over the
period demonstrate a slight positive correlation. As shown in Figure 3.2 there is sub-
stantial variation within geographic regions along both dimensions, and a few states
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stand out in their predicted SC levels. First, the value of charitable SC predicted for
Utah far exceeds that of any other state. Similarly, Vermont is predicted to have a
higher civic SC value than any other state. This highlights the value of my measures
in comparison to the HRM SC factor, which has difficulty distinguishing between
the cluster of four southwest states, as well as between the New England states of
Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. By using SC indicators from a representative
survey, I can pull apart these clusters of states to more accurately predict social
capital at the state-level. In Figure 3.3, I also show the over-time variation in each
social capital measure for each state.
3.4.2.1 Validating the Measure
Table 3.2: Social Capital Factor Correlations
Full Sample (all 50 States)
Charitable Civic & HRM Putnam
SC Political SC SC Factor SC Index Trust
Charitable SC 1
Civic & Political SC 0 1
HRM SC Factor 0.354∗ 0.373∗ 1
Putnam SC Index 0.453∗ 0.293∗ 0.679∗ 1
Trust 0.504∗ 0.194∗ 0.562∗ 0.809∗ 1
Excluding Utah and Vermont (48 states)
Charitable Civic & HRM Putnam
SC Political SC SC Factor SC Index Trust
Charitable SC 1
Civic & Political SC 0.06 1
HRM SC Factor 0.414∗ 0.326∗ 1
Putnam SC Index 0.472∗ 0.279∗ 0.667∗ 1
Trust 0.495∗ 0.194∗ 0.554∗ 0.797∗ 1
Note: Correlation coefficients reported, 𝑝 < .05∗.
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(a) Comparison with Hawes, Rocha, and Meier
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Figure 3.4: Comparison of Social Capital Measures
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To further validate my measure, I compare each of my two SC measures to the
Putnam (2000) and the HRM (2013) SC estimates in Figures 3.5a and 3.5b, respec-
tively. Although I see a positive correlation between each of these SC measures,
there are notable differences. In comparison to their high ranking by the Putnam
SC index, for example, many of the Midwest states exhibit lower levels of civic SC
and higher than average levels of charitable SC by my measures.
In Table 3.2, I report the pairwise correlation coefficients for further comparison
of my measures with the HRM and Putnam SC measures. In the top of Table 3.2,
the correlation coefficients are calculated for the complete sample of 50 states. To
ensure that the large values of civic and charitable SC in Vermont and Utah, respec-
tively, are not biasing the observed relationships between these measures, I report
in the bottom half of Table 3.2 the correlation coefficients for the sample excluding
these two states. The omission of these states changes the strength of these relation-
ships only slightly—the HRM and Putnam measures remain positively correlated
with both the civic and charitable SC measures. In this table, the charitable SC
factor is more strongly correlated with both the HRM and Putnam SC measures
than is the civic SC factor. This suggests that these two previous measures tapped
more into the charitable and voluntary activity dimension of social capital than the
civic and political engagement dimension. Overall, the civic SC and charitable SC
measures correlate as expected with previously produced measures, but demonstrate
notable variation in these relationships, which further supports the value of these
new measures.
3.4.3 An Empirical Model of Unemployment Insurance
To test my hypotheses about the influence of SC on the unemployment insurance
programs across the U.S. states, I use 8 separate indicators to measure state UI
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efforts. Table 3.3 reports the summary statistics for these indicators and for every
other variable used in my models. “Generosity” of a social insurance program can be
conceived of in multiple dimensions (for some perspectives, see Barr 2001; Pallage,
Scruggs, and Zimmermann 2013; Pfeifer 2012; Rehm 2011; Vroman 2007), and here
I consider four sets of measures. First, I look at overall spending on UI programs by
the states, in UI benefits paid, in logged real 2007 dollars and as UI benefits paid, as a
percent of GSP. These two indicators represent the overall size or economic impact of
a social insurance program. These measures exclude administration costs and other
employment training programs, and include only the cash value of regular benefit
payments. I also exclude extended and emergency funds provided by the federal
government, which are granted in the case of high or extended unemployment in a
state.
Measures of aggregated spending on social insurance programs, however, cannot
distinguish comparative variation in program generosity in terms of eligibility, dura-
tion, or payment amount (Sjoberg, Palme, and Carroll 2010; Vroman and Brusentsev
2005). Accordingly, I use three additional sets of UI program indicators. First, I con-
sider the coverage provided by a UI program. The insured rate measures the number
of full time employees insured by the state unemployment insurance program as a
percent of the labor force. Also, the recipiency rate represents the percent of the
unemployed population receiving UI benefits. These two indicators capture the inclu-
siveness of a program. Next, I measure the generosity of the average benefit amount
paid. The average weekly benefit amount in real 2007 dollars indicates the absolute
generosity of a program, while the replacement rate, as the average ratio of individ-
ual benefits to prior wages, indicates the relative generosity of a program. Lastly, I
consider the duration of eligibility for UI benefits with the average duration of benefit
payments for all recipients in weeks and the average duration of benefit payments
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for benefit exhaustees, also in weeks. All eight dependent variables are panel station-
ary according to the Hadri Lagrange multiplier stationarity test (Hadri 2000). Each
of these variables are measured such that relatively greater values reflect greater
generosity.
3.4.3.1 Economic Context
In addition to the social capital measures discussed above, I include a number
of independent variables to account for a state’s economic and political context. To
represent macroeconomic insecurity, or risk, I use a measure of each state’s aver-
age annual unemployment rate. To control for the financial wellbeing of a state’s
unemployment insurance program, I include the reserve ratio, which is the previous
year-end ratio of UI trust fund balance to total monthly wages covered. This is a
commonly used indicator of UI program solvency. Next, I include a number of other
economic variables in my models. I control for the overall size of an economy using
the log of GSP, in millions of real 2007 dollars and log of labor force. Lastly, I include
a measure of economic growth as the change in real personal income, measured in
per capita personal income in 2007 US dollars.4
3.4.3.2 Political Context
Relying on models from the comparative social welfare literature, I control for
additional theoretically relevant factors. Labor union strength should influence the
level of unemployment insurance coverage in a state, since unions have historically
advocated more generous UI benefits. I define this measure as the ratio of non-
agricultural workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement (Hirsch, MacPher-
son, and Vroman 2001). Second, I include government liberalism to account for the
4Each dependent variable measure, as well as all economic indicators, are available from the US
Department of Labor (2016) at http://www.oui.doleta.gov/unemploy/DataDownloads.asp, or
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2012) at http://www.bea.gov/regional/.
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role of government ideology in determining policy priorities (Hibbs 1977; Hicks and
Swank 1984), and measure it using a weighted average of the ideology scores for each
chamber of the state legislature and the governor (Berry et al. 2007, 1998, 2010).
More left-leaning governments are expected to place greater emphasize unemploy-
ment oriented public policies. This measure is constructed on a zero to 100 scale,
with greater values representing a more leftist ideology. I lag both of these measures
with the expectation that any union or government influence will take effect in the
following period. Lastly, I control for the potential influence of racial diversity on
social insurance policy outputs (Soss et al. 2001).
Table 3.3: Annual US State Summary Statistics 2001-2013
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. N
UI Generosity Indicators
UI Benefits Paid, log real $ 12.2 1.2 9.2 15.4 650
UI Spending, % of GDP 0 0 0 0 650
Insured Employment Rate 72.8 4.3 60.5 90.5 650
Recipiency Rate 35.3 10.6 15.2 71 650
Avg. Weekly Benefit Amt, real $ 4.9 0.2 4.4 5.3 650
Replacement Rate 36.4 5.9 21.7 57.7 650
Avg. Duration for Exhaustees, weeks 22.4 2.8 14.3 27.3 650
Avg. Duration, weeks 15.6 2.5 9.5 27.1 650
Social
Civic & Political SC𝑡−1 0 1 −2.6 4.3 650
Charitable & Voluntary SC𝑡−1 0 1 −2.8 4.8 650
Ethnic Diversity 84.2 12.1 50.1 98.6 650
Economic
Unemployment Rate 6.1 2.1 2.6 13.7 650
Reserve Ratio𝑡−1 1.1 1.1 −0.5 4.8 650
Log Labor force 14.4 1 12.5 16.7 650
Log of Real GSP 12 1 10 14.5 650
∆ Income Growth, real per cap. 3.2 2.9 −11.3 17.6 650
Political
Government Liberalism𝑡−1 49.9 29.2 0 99.2 650
Union Strength𝑡−1 11.5 5.6 2.3 26.9 650
88
3.4.4 Modeling UI Coverage
The advantage of testing my hypotheses with panel data is the opportunity to
model a dynamic process, because public policy measures, such as the dependent
variables I use here, are determined by both short and long term processes. Because
path dependent budgetary and administrative forces come to bear on policy outputs
like spending or programmatic generosity measures, estimating a model of policy
indicators across space and time invites biased inferences from autocorrelation and
unit heterogeneity. Thus, I characterize this process as a function (Eq. 3.1) of a
lagged dependent variable term 𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1, a vector of independent variables x𝑗𝑡, and
an error term 𝑢𝑗𝑡 composed of both an individual error term and random error
component for both states and years.
𝑦𝑗𝑡 = 𝜙𝑦𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝛼+x
′
𝑗𝑡𝜷 + 𝑢𝑗𝑡
where 𝑢𝑗𝑡 = 𝑣𝑗𝑡 + 𝜖𝑗 + 𝑘𝑡
𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇
(3.1)
89
Table 3.4: Linear Models of UI Generosity, 2001-2013
Spending Coverage Benefit Amount Duration
UI Spend UI Spend Insured Recipiency Weekly Replacement Exhaustee Average
% GSP Log Rate Rate Benefit Rate Duration Duration
Lag Dep. Var 0.500∗∗∗ 0.663∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.965∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.900∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Rate 0.002 −0.011 0.042 −1.294∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.330∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.089) (0.074) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000)
Civic & Pol. SC𝑡−1 0.007∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ −0.050 0.849∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ −0.022 0.369∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.659) (0.000)
Charit. & Vol. SC𝑡−1 0.002 −0.013 0.003 −0.323∗ −0.003 −0.164∗∗ −0.077 0.011
(0.261) (0.133) (0.931) (0.041) (0.065) (0.004) (0.075) (0.837)
Labor Force, log 0.068∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ −1.536∗∗∗ 3.649∗∗ 0.017 1.545∗∗∗ −0.279 −0.786
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.117) (0.000) (0.382) (0.051)
Gov. Liberalism𝑡−1 0.000∗∗ 0.001∗∗ −0.004∗ 0.002 −0.000 −0.003 0.002 0.007∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.691) (0.414) (0.137) (0.179) (0.000)
Union Strength𝑡−1 0.002∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ −0.013 0.193∗∗∗ 0.001 0.026∗ 0.016 0.024∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.121) (0.000) (0.092) (0.027) (0.081) (0.033)
Reserve Ratio𝑡−1 0.010∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.109∗ 1.086∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ 0.037 0.101
(0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.427) (0.088)
Real GSP, Log −0.063∗∗∗ −0.050 1.438∗∗∗ −2.694∗ −0.009 −1.344∗∗ 0.334 0.921∗
(0.000) (0.408) (0.000) (0.019) (0.385) (0.002) (0.286) (0.019)
∆Income, real pc. −0.008∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ −0.633∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗∗ −0.262∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.202∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnic Diversity −0.000 −0.000 0.003 0.015 −0.000 −0.008 0.007 −0.010
(0.193) (0.605) (0.383) (0.301) (0.067) (0.114) (0.099) (0.056)
Constant −0.154∗∗∗ −1.442∗∗∗ 7.817∗∗∗ −8.787∗ 0.122 −1.534 2.002 6.898∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.046) (0.063) (0.336) (0.101) (0.000)
N 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Note: Coefficient estimates from linear multi-level models with random effects by state and year. ∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01, ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. For
each dependent variable, a Hausman Specification test fails to reject 𝐻0 that estimates from a random-effects model are consistent (Hausman 1978). Sample includes
each of the 50 U.S. states from 2001-2013.
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3.5 Results
Results from linear dynamic models of unemployment insurance generosity are
reported in Table 3.4.5 The four delineated columns in this table group the four sets
of dependent variables that I use: spending, coverage, benefit amount, and duration
of benefits. Looking across the eight models, a few interesting and theoretically con-
sistent results are worthy of note. In my discussion of these results, I will first focus
on the short term estimated effects of the independent variables, before discussing
the implications of a lagged dependent variable specification for estimating long term
effects.
First, in Table 3.4 union strength is generally a positive and often significant
predictor of UI generosity, as would be expected. In representing and protecting the
interests of workers, labor unions are expected to support more generous UI. Second,
government liberalism is positively associated with spending overall, but whether this
increase is explained by greater coverage, benefit generosity, or extended duration of
benefits is not immediately evident, because the coefficient is not significant in those
models. Lastly, as should be expected, a positive change in real per capita income
is estimated to reduce indicators of generosity across the board (with the exception
of the insured rate). If individual income buffers workers from the insecurity of
unemployment insurance, then take-up or demand for UI should wane as income rises.
Overall, these results conform to general expectations. I now turn to a discussion of
my key independent variables and support for my hypotheses.
My first hypothesis (𝐻1) would be supported by positive estimated coefficients for
the civic and political SC measure, because this would indicate that social insurance
is more generous where SC coordinates through bureaucratic or policy institutions.
5Results from alternative model specifications, including a state-fixed effects model and estima-
tion using with panel-corrected standard errors, are reported in the Appendix in Tables A.3-A.5.
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Indeed, this SC measure is consistently associated with greater generosity at conven-
tional levels of statistical significance. There are two exceptions to this result: the
insured rate and the exhaustee duration. Civic and political SC is negatively, but
insignificantly, associated with these two dependent variables. This offers promis-
ing support for my first hypothesis that UI programs are more comprehensive and
generous in the presence of civic and political SC coordination.
Support for my second hypothesis (𝐻2) would be evidenced by negative coeffi-
cients on the charitable and voluntary SC variable, as this would indicate that SC
coordinating directly within communities is associated with less generous UI program
indicators. In these models, the influence of charitable and voluntary SC is not con-
sistently significant, though the estimated effect is often negative. Where the effect
is statistically significant at a conventional level, social capital operating through di-
rect charitable or voluntary institutions is estimated to reduce the rate of unemployed
receiving UI benefits (the recipiency rate), as well as the generosity of UI benefits
as measured by the ratio of benefit amount to prior wages (the replacement rate).
This evidence offers limited support for my second hypothesis— although charitable
and voluntary SC is negatively associated with most UI generosity indicators, the
estimated effect is not significant.
The substantive magnitude of these estimated effects however, are difficult to
interpret without some additional arithmetic. To put these results in more substan-
tive terms and to consider the overall impact of the key explanatory variables on
UI generosity, Table 3.5 reports the estimated total or long-run effect of both SC
measures. According to these results, a one standard deviation increase (one unit)
in civic and political SC is associated with a long-run increase in the recipiency rate
equal to about 4.3 points, an increase in the replacement rate of about 5.7 points,
and an increase in the average duration of benefit receipt of 0.9 weeks. These effects
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Table 3.5: Total, Long-Run Linear Effects of Social Capital on UI Generosity
Long-Run Effect Estimates
Civic & Political SC Charitable & Vol SC
UI Spending, % of GDP 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000
UI Benefits Paid, log real $ 0.127∗∗∗ −0.037
Insured Employment Rate −0.926 0.062
Recipiency Rate 4.277∗∗∗ −1.628∗
Avg. Weekly Benefit Amt, log real $ 0.275∗∗ −0.079
Replacement Rate 5.711∗∗ −3.495∗
Avg. Duration for Exhaustees, weeks −0.218 −0.771
Avg. Duration, weeks 0.864∗∗∗ 0.025
Note: Table reports estimated total effects of a one standard deviation increase in SC on UI generosity from models
in Table 3.4 including a lagged dependent variable parameter, ̂𝜙, equal to 𝐿𝑇𝐸𝑋 =
̂𝛽
1−?̂? , with the immediate or
short run effect being equal to ̂𝛽 (De Boef and Keele 2008). ∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01, ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001 for Wald-type test of
𝐻0 ∶ 𝐿𝑇𝐸𝑋 = 0.
are all statistically significant. On the other hand, a one standard deviation increase
in charitable and voluntary SC measure is significantly associated with a 1.6 point
decline in the recipiency rate, and a 3.5 point drop in the replacement rate.
I turn now to Table 3.6 to test my next set of hypotheses. First, hypothesis 𝐻1𝑏
states that civic and political social capital will have a greater influence on policy
outputs in the context of greater economic insecurity, and hypothesis 𝐻2𝑏 states
that the influence charitable and voluntary social capital will not be conditional on
economic context. The organization of this table is similar to Table 3.4, except that
I have now included a multiplicative interaction term for each social capital measure
with the average annual state unemployment rate to test this conditional hypotheses.
A cursory look at the coefficients in this table suggests that some of the more general
results seen in Table 3.4 hold in these interactive models. However, the inclusion of
interaction terms complicates interpretation, so I turn to a graphical representation
for more valid inference (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2005).
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Table 3.6: Interactive Models of UI Generosity, 2001-2013
Spending Coverage Benefit Amount Duration
UI Spend UI Spend Insured Recipiency Weekly Replacement Exhaustee Average
% GSP Log Rate Rate Benefit Rate Duration Duration
Lag Dep. Var 0.535∗∗∗ 0.688∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗ 0.816∗∗∗ 0.967∗∗∗ 0.953∗∗∗ 0.901∗∗∗ 0.589∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Rate 0.001 −0.015∗∗ 0.034 −1.382 −0.010∗∗∗ −0.349 −0.078∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗∗
(0.373) (0.024) (0.162) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.001)
Civic & Pol. SC𝑡−1 −0.027∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗ 0.268∗ −1.871∗∗∗ −0.012∗ −0.329 −0.066 −0.183
(0.000) (0.004) (0.045) (0.001) (0.013) (0.090) (0.657) (0.325)
C&P SC × Unemp𝑡−1 0.005∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.049∗ 0.455∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.099∗∗ 0.007 0.091∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.754) (0.002)
Charit. & Vol. SC𝑡−1 −0.012∗∗ −0.066∗∗ 0.293∗ −0.127 −0.002 −0.135 −0.082 0.007
(0.002) (0.006) (0.011) (0.786) (0.637) (0.424) (0.527) (0.964)
C&V SC × Unemp.𝑡−1 0.002∗∗ 0.008 −0.048∗ −0.067 −0.000 −0.012 0.000 −0.005
(0.003) (0.055) (0.013) (0.386) (0.598) (0.675) (0.984) (0.840)
Labor Force, log 0.069∗∗∗ 0.430∗∗∗ −1.561∗∗∗ 3.954∗∗∗ 0.019 1.604∗∗∗ −0.274 −0.682
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.069) (0.000) (0.392) (0.089)
Gov. Liberalism𝑡−1 0.000 0.001 −0.003∗ −0.002 −0.000 −0.004 0.002 0.006∗∗
(0.173) (0.071) (0.039) (0.739) (0.172) (0.066) (0.200) (0.002)
Union Strength𝑡−1 0.002∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.010 0.186∗∗∗ 0.001 0.027∗ 0.016 0.023∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.200) (0.000) (0.081) (0.021) (0.083) (0.037)
Reserve Ratio𝑡−1 0.009∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ −0.097∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.037 0.102
(0.000) (0.000) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.442) (0.089)
Real GSP, Log −0.065∗∗∗ −0.075 1.485∗∗∗ −2.949∗∗ −0.011 −1.397∗∗ 0.329 0.824∗
(0.000) (0.206) (0.000) (0.009) (0.275) (0.001) (0.295) (0.036)
∆Income, real pc. −0.008∗∗∗ −0.055∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗ −0.585∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.253∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ −0.198∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnic Diversity −0.000 −0.000 0.005 0.023 −0.000 −0.006 0.007 −0.007
(0.234) (0.641) (0.245) (0.121) (0.186) (0.219) (0.098) (0.146)
Constant −0.149∗∗∗ −1.385∗∗∗ 7.480∗∗∗ −10.921∗ 0.100 −1.864 1.972 6.240∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.012) (0.125) (0.242) (0.109) (0.000)
N 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Note: Coefficient estimates from linear multi-level models with random effects by state and year. ∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01, ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. For
each dependent variable, a Hausman Specification test fails to reject 𝐻0 that estimates from a random-effects model are consistent (Hausman 1978). Sample includes
each of the 50 U.S. states from 2001-2013.
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In Figures 3.5-3.8, the predicted marginal effects of social capital are shown along
the vertical axis of each subfigure, as indicated. Each set of four subfigures corre-
sponds to the four types of UI policy indicator (spending, coverage, generosity, and
duration) that I use as dependent variables. The horizontal axes represent the full
in-sample range of the unemployment rate. Each figure represents the marginal effect
of a social capital type, as indicated, and 95% confidence intervals estimated under
defined conditions based on a two-tailed hypothesis test.6 In the Appendix, Figures
A.1-A.4 show the inverse of these marginal effects by graphically reporting the pre-
dicted marginal effects of unemployment across levels of each social capital measure,
respectively. In those figures, the scenarios are distinguished by holding either social
capital measure constant at its mean plus or minus two standard deviations, which
will be indicated by each legend.
In the figures here, statistical significance can be interpreted in two ways. First,
the significance of the horizontal axis variable can be inferred if, for any value of the
vertical axis, the confidence intervals for a single conditional scenario do not overlap.
In other words, the variable is significant if the confidence interval for a conditional
scenario increases or decreases with the horizontal axis so as to have no overlapping
vertical axis values. Second, the significance of the variable distinguishing each pair
of lines is inferred where the two separate sets of confidence intervals do not overlap.
In other words, for any value of the horizontal axis, if the two sets of confidence
intervals in each figure do not overlap, the variable labeled in the legend may be
interpreted as having a significant effect, at that specific value of the horizontal axis.
It is worth noting that these figures represent only the short run predicted effects,
6These conditional marginal effects are predicted using the margins suite of commands in Stata
12. In each scenario, key independent variables are either held constant at their sample mean or
vary as indicated in each figure. All control variables are similarly held constant at their sample
means, but inferences do not change if their values are allowed to vary as observed.
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Figure 3.5: Short Run Marginal Effects of Unemployment on UI Benefit Spending
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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Figure 3.6: Short Run Marginal Effects of Social Capital on UI Coverage
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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Figure 3.7: Short Run Marginal Effects of Social Capital on UI Weekly Benefit
Amount
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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Figure 3.8: Short Run Marginal Effects of Social Capital on UI Benefit Duration, in
Weeks
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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and do not represent the total effect over time.
Two important results stand out in Figures 3.5-3.8. First, by looking at each of
the left-hand subfigures it is evident that with the exception of the insured rate, the
estimated marginal effect of civic and political social capital is significantly positive
and the magnitude of this effect is larger where unemployment is higher. The up-
ward sloping line indicates that the marginal effect is greater at higher levels of the
horizontal axis variable, the unemployment rate, and this effect is persistently signif-
icant. This suggests that the mobilizing influence of social capital on social insurance
is greater in contexts of macroeconomic insecurity, and it supports my hypothesis
1𝑏.
The second finding of note from these figures is seen in the right-hand side of
each subfigure. The marginal effect of charitable and voluntary social capital on
unemployment insurance program outputs is often negative, it is not consistently
significant (where the 95% confidence intervals overlap with zero), and neither is
the effect consistently conditional on the unemployment rate. Social capital may
coordinate substitute informal institutions for social insurance programs, and thereby
reduce the de facto generosity, size, or comprehensiveness of these public policy
outputs. This effect does not appear to be significantly conditional on the level of
economic insecurity in the broader environment. Hypothesis 2𝑏 is therefore supported
by these findings— the evidence points to an unconditional and dampening effect of
charitable and voluntary social capital on unemployment insurance coverage. This
suggests that SC may provide functional substitutes for social insurance, and that
individuals in communities with greater charitable and voluntary SC may turn not
to public programs for assistance in times of need, but may find their needs met
through non-state coordination.
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3.6 Findings & Discussion
I have argued that in pluralist or liberal market economies, where there are few
or weak formal institutions coordinating business, labor, and state interests, that
there exists an important role for informal social institutions of cooperation. It is in
these political-economic contexts that social capital should be most likely to exert
influence on labor market and public policy outcomes. When theorized as a set of
informal institutions that maintain and incentivize cooperation between actors, the
functions of social capital in a capitalist market economy can be viewed through
the lens of political economy theory. Public programs buffering individuals against
risks inherent in modern labor markets, including unemployment insurance, devel-
oped over time as interested actors negotiated their design out of self-interest. In
contexts facilitating greater cooperation, the coordination was less costly and states
developed comprehensive and inclusive institutions of social insurance. I have argued
that, given a state’s contemporary arrangement of social policies and formal coordi-
nating institutions, variation in program generosity and responsiveness to collective
problems is associated with variation in the informal rules governing coordination—
social capital.
More specifically, I have articulated a theory with greater attention to the mech-
anisms of informal coordination than previous scholarly work. Informal institutions
can interact with state political and civic organizations, and in such contexts will
prompt greater responsiveness of public programs to common needs. This function
of SC lowers the transaction cost of transferring information to improve public policy
design and implementation, thereby increasing the sensitivity of public social insur-
ance programs to macroeconomic insecurity. Where informal SC mobilizes organiza-
tion through direct charitable and voluntary means, without formal interaction with
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state institutions, public social insurance programs will be less relevant in buffer-
ing individuals from insecurity. In these contexts, actors may coordinate informal
risk-sharing arrangements that rival state programs, or the more efficient transfer
of information to improve labor market outcomes may reduce a need/demand for
short-term assistance. I have tested the implications of this theory in the US states
from 2001-2013 using novel data and a cross-sectional time-series research design.
If informal social institutions coordinate actors in market economies to facilitate
the provision of social insurance, evidence would be seen in a positive and signif-
icant association between SC indicators and measures of unemployment insurance
generosity, coverage, and/or duration. However, as I have argued, only when these
social norms and expectations motivate coordination through formal state institu-
tions will they affect policy outputs. Where coordination is motivated independently
or in parallel to political and civic institutions, there will not be a significant positive
association between SC and policy outputs. The results I offer here support these
expectations. On the one hand, I have shown that not only do unemployment in-
surance programs apparently offer benefits that are more generous, comprehensive,
and longer in duration in contexts of stronger political social capital, but they are
also more sensitive to macroeconomic insecurity. On the other hand, I have also
shown that unemployment insurance programs are largely unaffected by the context
of charitable and voluntary social capital, and it does not shape the responsiveness
of programmatic indicators to macro-unemployment.
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4. SOMETIMES MISTAKES HAPPEN: A THEORY OF ELECTORAL
CYCLES IN ADMINISTRATIVE PERFORMANCE
The question of whether politicians seek to cultivate popular goodwill and sup-
port among voters by strategically timing the distribution of public budget or policy
goods has fascinated political science for a generation. Preceding an election, incum-
bent politicians are expected to provide economic goods to safeguard and grow their
support among voters, thereby improving chances for reelection. Whether to deliver
on prior electoral promises or to more generally demonstrate competence and effec-
tiveness in office, politicians may establish political budget or policy cycles. What
has received less attention by political science research, however, are the mechanisms
through which budget, policy, or broader economic outcomes are delivered to po-
tential voters. Politicians have many tools at their disposal to strategically foster
improved public policy and service outputs, some more costly than others. Beyond
budget or expenditure manipulation, one of the tools available is the quality of pub-
lic service provision. When politicians face certain political or economic constraints,
they should be more likely to turn to bureaucratic public goods than expenditures
to shore up electoral support.
In this chapter, I contribute to the literature on political budget and policy cycles
by theorizing on the mechanisms through which policy goods are delivered to voters,
and by positing a theory of when politicians are more likely to prefer expenditure-
based or bureaucratic-administrative public goods. Because politicians rely on ad-
ministrative organizations to implement policy and deliver public services to voters,
they have an opportunity to manipulate various bureaucratic levers to realize a de-
sired distribution of goods or services. The distribution of social policy benefits to
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claimants should be specifically targeted by officials as a vehicle to directly deliver
these strategic policy goods. Increased generosity of benefit payments and improved
bureaucratic performance in accuracy of decision making are administrative goods
which can be subject to political influence and are directly received by potential
voters. Administrative goods also offer politicians some advantages over the tradi-
tionally studied policy manipulations: improved administrative efficiency demands
few if any fiscal resources, and applying pressure to public agencies may require less
political coordination than budget maneuvering.
A second important contribution made in this chapter is the articulation of a
theory of political control that gives proper attention to electoral cycles. The study
of public administration has long searched for evidence of consistent political control
of bureaucratic outputs, with some notable success. There should be little reason,
however, to expect influence of political actors on bureaucratic organizations or per-
formance in all political environments. Rather, political manipulation of bureaucracy
should be most likely when elected officials face an acute incentive to deliver better,
faster, more generous public services: when an election looms near or when fiscal
constraints are great. Despite scholarly acceptance of a political bureaucracy, the-
ory of an electoral cycle in administration has yet to be offered. In this chapter,
I consider theory of political control through the lens of a political business cycle
to generate a theory of political influence on bureaucratic performance sensitive to
electoral dynamics.
To test the implications of my theory, I turn to the U.S. states to examine varia-
tion in the subnational implementation of unemployment insurance. The American
unemployment insurance system allows substantial autonomy for states to determine
benefit and eligibility rules, as well as procedures for the delivery of benefit payments.
In other words, while programs must conform and comply with minimum standards
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set by the federal government, the administration of unemployment insurance (UI)
is decentralized to state governments. Such delegation provides local politicians the
opportunity to influence bureaucratic operations at the state and local level. These
public agencies are required to report in detail on the service performance both in
the accuracy of payment decisions and the timeliness of payments issued, as well as
the generosity of payments made. Exploiting this resource, I offer a novel test for
political business cycles in bureaucratic performance, thereby offering a peek inside
the black box of political control.
4.1 Election Cycles and Public Goods
Rational explanations of political behavior have come to identify personal re-
election prospects as the key motivation driving elected officials. Self-interested
politicians are argued to behave so as to maximize their support among more or less
naive and retrospective voters (Downs 1957). Governments, being composed of these
interests, are theorized as collectivities employing rational and adaptive strategies.
To shape voters’ preferences and solidify sufficient support for reelection, these ra-
tional government and political actors will use the tools available to them, including
public policies. There are innumerable policy instruments that may be exploited for
electoral gain, but it is economic policy that may be especially targeted for it’s po-
tentially broad reach, high salience, and substantive impact. “It is obvious enough:
incumbent politicians desire re-election and they believe that a pre-election economy
will help achieve it” (Tufte 1978, 5). Reflecting this expectation, the early focus of
the rational choice approach was on the macroeconomic correlates of electoral cycles
(Akerman 1947; Fair 1975; Kalecki 1943; Kramer 1971; Lau and Frey 1971). How-
ever, despite the intuitive appeal of this hypothesis, consistent empirical support
from decades of research remains ambiguous.
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Bringing notable attention this line of research, Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck
(1976) contributed to the “political business cycle” model of political exploitation
of the Phillips curve to extract electoral benefits from short term unemployment
relief through inflationary policies. Only after an election are the consequences of
these public policies realized in high inflation, requiring reactionary austerity efforts
and thereby provoking unemployment. Periods of macroeconomic expansion should
precede elections, and recessionary periods should follow. Rivaling traditional theory
of economic policy founded on principles of social welfare maximization, these works
brought to the fore of political science a theory of government policy-making as
a function of individual electoral self-interest, as well as “ideological satisfaction”
(Dubois 2016; Lau and Frey 1971). Recognizing that voters, and therefore politicians,
are heterogeneous in their preferences for macroeconomic outcomes (Hibbs 1977),
theories also came to incorporate partisan or ideological preferences into cyclical
models of political control of the economy (Alesina 1987; Alesina and Sachs 1988;
MacRae 1977; Tufte 1978).
However, the expectation undergirding these early works that governments ma-
nipulate unemployment and inflation weakens when voters are granted rational fore-
sight. Rather than short term tweaking of the macroeconomy, this line of theory
evolved into a model of the “political budget cycle,” or “PBC” (Rogoff 1987), with
an emphasis on rational partisan differences in policy priorities (Alesina 1987). The
game governments play becomes one of budget manipulation under the condition
of asymmetric information. Rational but incompletely informed voters reward the
appearance of competence as signaled by efficient and/or effective provision of public
goods and services, like employment (Persson and Tabellini 1990; Rogoff and Sib-
ert 1988), with a bias towards observable and immediate consumption rather than
investment (Rogoff 1990). Expansionary spending intended to signal or stimulate
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real economic growth should precede elections, with an associated impact on budget
deficits or payroll taxes realized only after an election.
Emphasizing less the real macroeconomic effects of monetary policy, scholars thus
came to study the timing and targeting of public spending or transfers as evidence
of electorally motivated policy manipulation. Any short term bump in transfer pay-
ments aligning with the election cycle reflects the ability of the executive (president)
to “mobilize the bureaucracy and the Congress to give real disposable income an ex-
tra stimulative kick via transfer payments right before an election” (Tufte 1978, 43).
Targeted redistributional payments through Social Security Act programs including
unemployment, retirement, disability, or health insurance, or veterans benefits, are
especially attractive for their immediate and visible impact on real disposable income
(Castro and Martins 2016; Keech and Pak 1989; Schultz 1995; Tufte 1978). The real
impact of these strategies on long term welfare, however, may be ambiguous after
allowing voters to observe the real economic consequences of budgetary manipula-
tion, because more competent politicians can exploit additional policy instruments
varying in visibility (Lohmann 1998).
An alternative rationale for PBCs in fiscal policy is the opportunity for political
credit claiming. Rather than seeking to signal a robust macroeconomy, politicians
may strategically time (and target) public goods and services to optimize visibility
and credit claiming to improve reelection prospects. Even in the absence of real or
perceived macroeconomic impacts, incumbents can time announcements of public
goods to maximize advantageous political attention— to claim credit (Mayer 1995).
With this logic, PBCs are not the consequence of information asymmetry and the
capability of governments to distort perceptions of the economy, but rather, they
are the consequence of politicians directly targeting benefits to voters, potentially
with special attention to critical or marginal voters. This clientelistic PBC is seen
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in health personnel spending in Italy, where and PBCs are stronger in less devel-
oped regions where voters have fewer alternatives to public employment (Stolfi and
Hallerberg 2015). PBCs are seen in legislative appropriations, where back-loading
federal awards in a term allows senators to claim credit just before reelection (Shepsle
et al. 2009), or new awards early in a term may help shore up longer term support
for more competitive Congressional seats (Bickers and Stein 1996). Electoral cycles
are also seen in support to the agriculture sector, especially by right-wing govern-
ments (Klomp and De Haan 2013a), and in dips in four year university tuition rates
(Reynolds 2014), both affecting targeted constituents.
Overall, the evidence is mixed for PBCs in a variety of fiscal policy outcomes
across developed democracies. Some have identified support (Baleiras and da Silva
Costa 2004; Blais and Nadeau 1992; Blomberg and Hess 2003; Brender and Drazen
2005; Efthyvoulou 2012; Franklin, Richey, and Yonk 2013; Guillamon, Bastida, and
Benito 2013; Klomp and de Haan 2013b; Rosenberg 1992; Shi and Svensson 2006;
Veiga and Veiga 2007), yet others have found less systematic evidence (Alesina, Co-
hen, and Roubini 1993; Andrikopoulos, Loizides, and Prodromidis 2004; Bee and
Moulton 2015). Research has also identified diverse and important conditional rela-
tionships (de Haan and Klomp 2013). For example, the magnitude of PBC manipu-
lation may be conditional on electoral risk or competition (Aidt and Albornoz 2011;
Hanusch and Magleby 2014; Schultz 1995). Institutional context also affects PBCs:
fiscal transparency dampens PBCs (Alt and Lassen 2006), as do stricter fiscal rules
(Bastida, Beyaert, and Benito 2013; Klein and Sakurai 2015; Rose 2006), institu-
tionalized separation of powers (Saporiti and Streb 2008), and term limits (Besley
and Coate 1995). On the other hand, PBCs are more likely or are stronger in ma-
joritarian electoral systems (Klomp and De Haan 2013a), systems with greater fiscal
decentralization (Gonzalez, Hindriks, and Porteiro 2013), weaker political parties
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(Shelton 2014), and multiparty systems (Potrafke 2012).
Scholars have also looked for evidence of opportunistic cycles in an increasing vari-
ety of policy tools, in addition to direct transfers or aggregate budget allocations. For
example, opportunistic fiscal manipulation is seen in direct public employment (Bee
and Moulton 2015; Dahlberg and Mork 2011; Stolfi and Hallerberg 2015) and in labor
market policies aimed to reduce unemployment (Mechtel and Potrafke 2013). Nelson
(2000) also found no evidence of tax cuts at the US state-level preceding an election,
but rather found tax increases to fall just after elections. Rather than distributing
public benefits, this suggests that state politicians abstain from increasing the tax
burden in the lead up to an election. Furthermore, cross-national evidence suggests
that election-motivated fiscal policies significantly increase electoral support for par-
ties or incumbents in government (Aidt and Albornoz 2011; Balaguer-Coll et al. 2015;
Klomp and de Haan 2013b), pointing to real payoffs for incumbent governments.
An enduring oversight within this literature, however, has been a lack of attention
paid to the mechanisms underlying these observed BPCs. How do elected politicians
bring about the opportunistic distribution of goods and services? While studies of
policy and budgetary outputs have occupied scholars in this literature, the potential
for administrative services to reflect electoral cycles has been overlooked. This is
not a wholly novel critique; as Mayer (1995, 167) writes, “Studies that find electoral
cycles in economic policy should be able to explain how the incumbents control the
relevant policy tools, who controls the levers, and how decisions are implemented.”
Recognizing the importance of administrative mechanisms underlying PBCs, Tufte
(1978) argues that in the ramp up to an election, politicians will “prod” government
agencies in their preferred direction. With respect to transfer agencies specifically,
they should “accelerate processing of new beneficiary applications, the payment of
retroactive benefits, and the initiation of new programs” (Tufte 1978, 48). The few
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studies that do broach this question by looking to bureaucratic outputs have provided
suggestive evidence, but they have not gone far enough identify the administrative
mechanisms at work.
Mayer’s (1995) study of civilian contract awards and state found no evidence of
cycles in spending, but found that federal contract awards accelerated and deobli-
gations were reduced immediately before presidential elections. Similarly, Corder
(1998) finds that the federal Small Business Administration issues more credit subsi-
dies prior to presidential, but not mid-term, elections. With perhaps greater insight
into the method of political influence, Gordon (2011) shows that potentially vul-
nerable Republican congressional districts received unusually large new contracts
issued by the General Services Administration. This pattern of contracting followed
a presentation in 2006 to the department by a white house staffer, who explicitly
identified potentially at-risk districts. All of these studies, however, look only to fed-
eral contracting, which is a relatively centralized bureaucratic operation. Further,
when economic context may make spending politically unpalatable, politicians may
lean on other bureaucratic outputs, such as quality of service or improved efficiency.
The sizable literature on electoral cycles in policy making, and the inconsistency
in conclusions drawn, has led political science towards a consideration of the variety
of policy tools available to politicians. From an initial focus on electoral cycles in
real macroeconomic outcomes via manipulation of the Philips curve, to the study of
fiscal policy levers having cyclical budget and deficit consequences, the attention of
research on political cycles has now broadened to public goods and services more gen-
erally. This literature, however, has not yet explored the possible effects of political
opportunism on public administration, and specifically on bureaucratic performance.
On the other hand, research cross-cutting public administration and political science
has long studied the institutional and political determinants of political control over
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bureaucracy has also stopped short by failing to account for the cyclical political
opportunism inherent in democratic systems. In the following section, I review the
extant literature on political control of bureaucracy broadly, before synthesizing
these two orthogonal theoretical traditions into a theory of political administration
cycles.
4.2 Political Control of Bureaucracy
Whether, or to what extent, elected officials have sway over the actions of indi-
vidual bureaucrats is a perennial question across political science and public admin-
istration. An influential literature has demonstrated persistent covariation between
bureaucratic outputs and political variables, yet uncertainty remains as important
conceptual issues are overlooked (Meier and O’Toole 2006b) and technical issues dom-
inate contemporary debate (Moe 2012). Beginning with an initial focus on public
choice conceptions of an intransigent bureaucracy, this literature soon evolved into
theories of rational institutional design as a method of control. Short on predictive
power, this institutional approach gave way to a focus on strategic interaction and
an attempt to build more general (comparative) theories of delegation and control,
and also to move beyond the traditional preoccupation with the American case. As
seminal works have shown, bureaucratic values are resilient in determining organiza-
tional behavior (Wilson 1989), thus the question now facing political science regards
the contexts and institutions in which politicians are more likely, more interested,
or more capable of shaping bureaucratic behavior.
4.2.1 An Agency Perspective
In the public choice tradition, principal-agent models are the workhorse of the-
ories on the relationship of control and influence between bureaucracy and elected
officials. In short, (political) principals expect contracted agents (bureaucrats) to
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exploit information asymmetries to shirk from their delegated tasks, so these princi-
pals (legislatures and executives) thus seek to control the agents’ behavior through a
variety of institutions. Bureaucrats as “agents” in this perspective, are both capable
and interested in shifting policy outcomes away from original and current political
preferences (Downs 1967; Dunleavy 1991; Niskanen 1971; Tullock 1965). These argu-
ments leave open the door to theories of political influence on bureaucracy explained
by rational expectations in multiple actor relationships, in the context of asymmet-
ric information (e.g., Banks and Weingast 1992; Bendor et al. 1987). In response,
political principals design ex ante the structure and rules of policy administration
to minimize “bureaucratic drift” (McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Moe 1990),
as well as ex post oversight (Moe 1989; Rosenbloom 2000; Wood and Waterman
1994), and they strategically determine the scope of discretion delegated (Epstein
and O’Halloran 1994).
Further complicating the channels of political influence on bureaucratic organiza-
tions are institutions of separated powers across levels of government, just as Madison
(1788) would have wanted. Decentralized or federal systems provide the opportu-
nity for both national centralized and local decentralized actors or interests to seek
influence over bureaucratic functions. Yet, the weight of research on political control
has taken place at the national level, and more often than not in the US context,
to explain the relative influence of national-level principals on federal bureaucracies.
The institutional reality, however, is that most bureaucratic organizations in the
US are not federal, and remain accountable (and responsive) to political interests
nested in multiple levels of government (Gormley 1986; Liu et al. 2010; Scholz and
Wood 1998; Scholz and Wang 2006; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991; Whitford
2007; Wood 1991). Government agencies do not operate within clearly delineated
hierarchies of control, they experience competing pressures for different goals from
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the multiple principals and interested groups. Where multiple principals hold au-
thority over a bureaucratic agency, each will seek influence on agency functions out
of rational self-interest, and these political interests often, if not always, diverge to
some degree.
The outcome of policy goal conflict will be partly determined by the level of
discretion granted to bureaucratic agencies, which is a function of multiple factors.
First, whether or not disagreement between political principals grants agencies more
or less discretion is unclear. Models of delegation, and their empirical support, con-
tradict one another on this point. Some find that political disagreement or divided
government increases agent discretion (Ferejohn and Weingast 1992; Hammond and
Knott 1996; Huber and Shipan 2002), and others predict (and find) the opposite
(Bawn 1997; Epstein and O’Halloran 1994, 1999b; Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001;
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast 1989; Volden 2002; Yackee and Yackee 2009). As
Oosterwaal, Payne, and Torenvlied (2012) argue, this theoretical ambiguity results
from the coincidence of multiple political incentives: compromise between princi-
pals, efficient agency choice (with regard to information or risk), or the maintenance
of coalition support. In other words, whether disagreement among principals is ex-
pected to grant politicians greater leverage over agents depends on context and other
political factors.
The degree of political control will also be conditioned by the relative salience and
complexity of a policy (Carpenter 2002; Gormley 1986; Ringquist 1995; Ringquist,
Worsham, and Eisner 2003). Schmidt (2003) proposes that national political author-
ities have less control over local administration of policies on complex issues for which
field decisions are justifiable. Thus, control efforts are more likely when policies are
especially salient, and therefore of greater political value to elected officials.
In focusing on the relationship between agents and principals, these studies point
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to strategic institutional design and divergence in preferences between political actors
as the key limitations on delegation and political control. However, The outputs of
bureaucratic organizations are determined not only by top-down political influence,
but also by local and individual level values and preferences. A contemporary shift
towards theory of bureaucracy at the individual “street-level” has brought to light the
many organizational and personal obstacles in “controlling” administrative outputs.
4.2.2 Bringing the Bureaucrat Back In
Executive and legislative controls should be understood as a dynamic tug-of-
war in which control by one actor is conditional on the action of another as well
as the history of agency response (Whitford 2005). However, bureaucratic values
are also critical determinants of administrative outputs; indeed in some cases agency
values matter more than political overseers (Meier and O’Toole 2006b; Schmidt 2003).
Although political control may be less likely to alter agency goals, values, or the
general direction of policy, it may still be effective in augmenting outputs (EPA
enforcement activity, in this case, Ringquist 1995). A reluctance to alter values in
the face of top-down organizational reform is also seen in welfare agencies (Fording,
Soss, and Schram 2007; Riccucci 2005). More simply, bureaucrats exercise discretion
in their everyday tasks and individual workers choose how to use it and when to
submit to external pressures (Tummers and Bekkers 2014), and direct efforts to alter
individual bureaucratic goals or values rarely have uniform or substantial effects
(Sandfort 2000; ?).
The external political environment will also affect political control and bureau-
cratic outputs; local social and political forces shape policy outputs by local agencies
(Fording, Soss, and Schram 2007; Liu et al. 2010; Scholz and Wang 2006; Scholz,
Twombly, and Headrick 1991; Soss et al. 2001). In addition to local political in-
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fluences, the local institutional arrangements of state legislatures can make control
more or less costly (Gerber, Maestas, and Dometrius 2005). In studying the re-
sponsiveness of state agencies to various federal and state principals and interests,
Scholz and Wei (1986) find that agencies may respond with symbolic or instrumen-
tal policy changes depending on the principal exerting pressure. State agencies are
rational agents seeking to maintain the support of “critical actors” and institutions
responsible for budget and statutory control (Scholz and Wei 1986). This extant lit-
erature concedes that the preferences of both state and national politicos contribute
to agency outputs, and that bureaucracies should be understood as rational actors
responsive to those institutions with budgetary and statutory power.
Most empirical tests of political control utilize data from regulatory agencies (for
example, Carpenter 2002; Gerber and Teske 2000; Ringquist 1995; Ringquist, Wor-
sham, and Eisner 2003; Scholz and Wei 1986; Scholz, Twombly, and Headrick 1991;
Spence 1999; Whitford 2005, 2007; Wood 1991; Wood and Waterman 1994; Yackee
and Yackee 2009); only a few studies analyze political control of other policy types
(see Huber, Shipan, and Pfahler 2001; Volden 2002). It is not immediately clear
how well findings from studies of federal regulatory agencies may be generalized to
other policy areas such as social welfare. Meier and O’Toole (2006a) suggest that
regulatory agencies may be more amenable to political influence than other agency
types on the basis of three dimensions: political support, expertise, and cohesion.
Being “craft agencies,” regulatory agencies produce relatively less observable out-
puts, which allow the opportunity for comparatively stronger influence from outside
the organization (Wilson 1990). In contrast, bureaucracies producing more observ-
able outputs (such as transfer payments through social security programs) have less
opportunity for obfuscation of bias in decision making. Thus, the task at hand, being
the type of good or service provided, contributes to bureaucrats’ risk of capture or
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influence special interests, including political influences (Lipsky 1980; Wilson 1990).
4.3 A Theory of Political Administration Cycles
Previous research has provided theoretical and empirical evidence of the incen-
tives faced by elected officials when making policy decisions, and about the mecha-
nisms available to manipulate bureaucratic outputs. Bringing the implications from
these separate literatures together, I now offer a theory of cyclical control of bureau-
cratic performance. Administrative performance, efficiency, or generosity in discre-
tion are potential targets of political influence. Maintaining the assumption that
voters are retrospective in evaluating their electoral choices (Fiorina 1981), incum-
bents will seek to fortify support among voters in the periods preceding an election
to improve their electoral chances, and politicos should be expected to optimize their
use of policy tools to bolster their electoral odds.
In hopes of favorably affecting perceptions of macroeconomic outcomes, or to
target public goods at specific groups, politicians can manipulate budgets, pass new
legislation, or direct the allocation of public goods. They can also put pressure on
bureaucratic organizations to improve their performance. A political administration
cycle (PAC) would provide better public services to voters, allowing elected officials
the opportunity to claim credit for improving government through administrative
functions. Leaning on bureaucrats to work harder or faster could be as simple as
making a phone call to a top official in an agency, an office visit by a political staffer,
or a memo sent around an agency by a political appointee. Being reliant on legislative
budgets for resources and political support for public programs leaves agency officials
in need of the cooperation of elected officials, to some degree. Because top officials
surely prefer to maintain positive and beneficial relationships with political officials,
they face some incentive to respond to political preferences.
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Following prior research on PBCs in targeted redistribution programs with imme-
diate and visible impacts on disposable income, including unemployment, retirement,
disability, veterans, or health insurance, (Castro and Martins 2016; Keech and Pak
1989; Schultz 1995; Tufte 1978), I tailor my theory to the administration of social
benefits. With respect these bureaucratic operations, electorally motivated pressure
may be realized either a short term increase in de facto generosity or an improvement
in service quality, each having unique advantages. On the one hand, bureaucrats may
be encouraged to work harder or better, thereby having a positive effect on service
quality provided to clientele. Providing this public good (service quality) to citizens
requires little or no additional budgetary resources, indeed, improved efficiency may
reduce the real or perceived fiscal burden of some programs. On the other hand,
bureaucrats could be encouraged to exercise greater generosity in deciding benefit
claims, to increase the impact of benefits on household income.
With a diverse toolbox available, politicians may choose any one or a combination
of policy levers to optimize their delivery of pre-electoral goods. The choice of these
tools will depend not only on ideology or partisanship, but also the economic and
political contexts. Below, I argue that electoral cycles in administrative performance
or exploitation of discretion are more likely when (1) incumbents face strong compe-
tition for reelection, (2) economic constraints make some policy tools less appealing,
(3) when the policy area is critical to an incumbent’s ideological position, and lastly,
(4) where coordination of direct budget or legislative adjustments is difficult.
First, I offer naive expectations about the existence of a PAC, that administra-
tive quality improves or de facto generosity increases in the periods leading up to
an election. Administrative behavior may support a politician’s pre-electoral inter-
est in stimulating voter support either by providing better public services and the
perception of better governance, or by extending greater generosity in benefit checks
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to boost income. Empirically, a positive PAC will be evidenced by improvement
in bureaucratic service quality and/or a change in the effective level of generosity
exercised in decision making in the periods preceding an election.
Hypothesis 1: Political Administration Cycles
𝐻1𝑎: Administrative service quality is better in the periods preceding an
election.
𝐻1𝑏: Administrative generosity is greater in the periods preceding an
election.
Where competition in a political system is greater, politicians face a greater incen-
tive for the opportunistic delivery of goods and services. Close elections with tough
challengers demand greater efforts by incumbents to retain their seats. Support-
ing the intuition behind this argument, Sørensen (2014) and Helland and Sørensen
(2015) find that contexts with less party competition, generally, are associated with
less administrative efficiency and service quality. Bureaucratic efficiency may be
linked to or responsive to a competitive political environment. I argue the PACs will
be more likely where incumbents face greater electoral uncertainty. Alternatively,
that policy manipulation will be less likely where an executive finds herself facing a
term limit, with no opportunity for reelection. Thus, political competition should
motivate opportunistic policy cycles.
Hypothesis 2: Politically Competitive PACs
𝐻2𝑎: Positive electoral cycles in service quality are more likely where
political competition is greater.
𝐻2𝑏: Positive electoral cycles in payment generosity are more likely where
political competition is greater.
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I next argue that poor fiscal circumstances will mitigate the incentive for PACs
in effective generosity, but will have a positive effect on PACs in service quality.
Research has identified the importance of macroeconomic conditions in shaping gov-
ernment spending on social welfare programs (for example, Bonoli 2010; Lipsmeyer
2011; Lipsmeyer and Zhu 2011).1 Where economic conditions are poor or govern-
ments face greater budgetary or fiscal stress, political officials should be less willing
to encourage spending, generally. Not only might more generous spending worsen
the real state of the budget, but it might also attract unwanted attention from a
public concerned about government debt. In this context, opportunistic policy ma-
nipulation is less likely to be seen in the effective generosity of benefits, and more
likely to be seen in service quality, which should have a neutral fiscal impact.
Hypothesis 3: Fiscally Constrained PBCs and PACs
𝐻3𝑎: Positive electoral cycles in service quality are more likely in poor
fiscal circumstances.
𝐻3𝑏: Positive electoral cycles in payment generosity are less likely in poor
fiscal circumstances.
The policy preferences of incumbents in government will also condition PBCs
or PACs. With respect to generosity of social welfare benefits, ideology is a salient
dimension in determining political priorities. This suggests that positive cycles in
de facto generosity of transfer payments should be more likely under a more left
government (e.g., Hicks and Swank 1984, 1992), social welfare programs are more
1These studies point to the conditionality of policy responses to macroeconomic stimuli (i.e.,
Alesina 1987), suggesting that the sensitivity of spending to economic circumstances is contingent
on government ideology and other global forces. This highlights an important area for future
development of my theory— how fiscally constrained PACs might be conditional on partisanship
or ideology, for example. However, these theoretical extensions lie beyond the scope of the current
project.
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salient or important policy issues to these parties in maintaining the support of their
electoral base (e.g., Boyne et al. 2012; Hibbs 1977). Alternatively, a negative cycle
in generosity may be an attractive strategy to a right-wing government seeking to
demonstrate commitment to a policy goal (Jensen 2011). Right wing governments,
however, may be more inclined to squeeze efficiency as an electoral strategy, sug-
gesting that a PAC in service quality may be more likely under such incumbent
governments. However, Boyne et al. (2012) find that left and right parties are no
more likely to be associated with better public service performance, but rather it is
partisan competition that motivates efficiency. Given these mixed results, I argue
that governments from either end of the ideological spectrum should be interested
in an electoral policy cycle, but that more left governments should be more likely to
seek opportunistic cycles in generosity and less likely to seek cycles in efficiency or
bureaucratic performance.
Hypothesis 4: Ideological PBCs and PACs
𝐻4𝑎: Positive electoral cycles in service quality are more likely in right-
leaning governments.
𝐻4𝑏: Positive electoral cycles in payment generosity are less likely in
right-leaning governments.
Lastly, I consider the influence of veto players in budget coordination as a motivat-
ing factor in the choice of a PBC tool. Where institutions make budget negotiations
more difficult, the use of administrative tools to achieve policy outcomes may be
more appealing to politicians. It is difficult or impossible for politicians to unilat-
erally manipulate aggregate budget allocations, though pressure on administrators
may still affect generosity at the margin. Budget coordination should be made more
difficult by certain political institutions, including a bicameral legislature, a divided
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government, or a divided government with a veto proof majority in the legislature, for
example (Tsebelis 1995, 2002; Tsebelis and Chang 2004). In systems with compara-
tively more hurdles to political cooperation, service quality will be a more attractive
opportunistic policy tool.
Hypothesis 5: Coordinated PBCs and PACs
𝐻5𝑎: Positive electoral cycles in service quality are more likely where
budget coordination is more difficult.
𝐻5𝑏: Positive electoral cycles in payment generosity are less likely where
budget coordination is more difficult.
In the following sections, I introduce the empirical context in which I test these
expectations: the US unemployment insurance system. I will then discuss in some
depth a novel data source for the study of bureaucratic performance more broadly,
before offering a test of my hypotheses. I conclude with a discussion and recommen-
dations for future extensions of this theory.
4.4 Political Administration Cycles in Unemployment Insurance
To test my expectations about political cycles in administrative performance
and generosity, I turn to the U.S. states. Comparing such similar programs allows
for more valid comparison of decision making and performance by holding constant
many important structural or organizational variables. All programs, for example,
are required by the federal government to use similar audit procedures to establish,
report, and publish indicators of performance. For a longer discussion of the US UI
program, refer to Appendix 1.
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4.4.1 Benefit Accuracy Measurement
The U.S. federal Office of Unemployment Insurance designed and implemented an
improper payment detection system beginning in the 1980s, called Benefit Accuracy
Measurement (BAM). This program has since become the template used by many
other agencies to monitor the accuracy of claims payments. Subject to rules set
by the federal Department of Labor, each state administers a random audit of paid
and denied UI claims each week to reinvestigate. Only claims made for regular state
unemployment compensation are considered, which means that all UCX, UCFE, EB,
and EUC claims are excluded from BAM audits, and thus from all improper payment
estimates. Though the rules governing statistical sampling are set by the DOL, each
state agency is responsible for managing the implementation of BAM.
Once selected, every aspect of the claim determination process is scrutinized
to establish accuracy of payment at every step. This requires confirmation of all
documentation provided by the claimant, employer, and third parties (often labor
unions filing on behalf of a claimant), and reconsideration of every decision made by
agency employees. Each states’ monthly and annual improper payment and integrity
rates are calculated from the weekly Paid Claims Accuracy (PCA) and Denied Claims
Accuracy (DCA) statistical samples. These rates are then used by the DOL in
performance reviews— states are held accountable for minimum levels of service
quality.
Though it would be convenient to use states’ aggregated integrity rates, or error
rates, to compare the quality of administrative performance, this is not a strictly
valid comparison to make because states vary widely in their eligibility requirements,
some being more strict, detailed, or technical than others. Also, integrity rates are
a function of the quality of the random audit and investigation process. States with
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higher quality performance management investigation programs may report higher
error rates than those states with lower quality audit programs simply because the
audit program is better at detecting errors made. This means that any comparison
of states’ aggregate program integrity rates must consider the possibility than an
increase in reported errors may be due either to a decline in determination quality
or an improvement in BAM quality. A longer discussion of these threats to validity
is included in Appendix 1.
To overcome this problem of comparing aggregate performance indicators, I use
a within-state approach by examining the accuracy and generosity of individual level
claims, while including state-fixed effects in each specification. The unit of observa-
tion in my design is an audit report for an individual claim made by an unemployed
individual to a state workforce agency office. Having the population of BAM sampled
claims from 2002-2013 for all states (roughly 600,000 claims) allows me to test the
influence of political and economic context on individual-level performance.2 Each
audit report includes information on the claimant’s socio-economic and demographic
characteristics, and also includes detailed information on the errors identified through
reinvestigation. For the purposes of this study, I focus on two primary outcomes:
whether an error was made by an agency employee in the determination of payment,
and the weekly benefit amount paid to the claimant.
In Figure 4.1, the trend in error rates across states over time is shown.3 The
solid grey lines report the agency error rates— the percent of sampled claims in
which an error was detected in the claim process, and an agency bureaucrat was
determined to be at fault. The dotted lines report the overall error rate— the
2These reports were obtained by direct contact with staff at the Department of Labor (Employ-
ment Training Administration 2015).
3Mississippi and Louisiana are omitted from this matrix of figures, but are included in Appendix
Figures A.5 and A.6, because the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the performance of these two
states makes it difficult to compare the magnitude of their error rates over the period of 2006-2007.
123
0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6 0.2.4.6
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
20
02
m1
20
04
m1
20
06
m1
20
08
m1
20
10
m1
A
K
A
L
A
R
A
Z
C
A
C
O
C
T
D
E
FL
G
A
H
I
IA
ID
IL
IN
K
S
K
Y
M
A
M
D
M
E
M
I
M
N
M
O
M
T
N
C
N
D
N
E
N
H
N
J
N
M
N
V
N
Y
O
H
O
K
O
R
PA
R
I
SC
SD
T
N
T
X
U
T
VA
V
T
W
A
W
I
W
V
W
Y
A
ge
nc
y 
E
rr
or
 R
at
e
A
ll 
E
rr
or
 R
at
e
Fi
gu
re
4.1
:A
ll
Er
ro
rs
an
d
Ag
en
tE
rro
rs,
20
02
-2
01
0
124
percent of sampled claims in which any error was detected, regardless of fault. A
few key points standout from this figure. First, as can be clearly seen in Kansas,
the introduction of automated claims processing drastically cut error rates of both
types. Next, there is substantial variation in the ratio of all claims to agency-fault
claims across states. New Jersey and Minnesota, for example, have comparatively
lower agency error rates relative to their overall error rate. This contrasts with states
like Oklahoma or Kentucky, in which the agency and all-error rates are more similar.
To further consider errors made in claims determinations, in Figure 4.2 I compare
the two types of payment error: overpayments and underpayments. In addition to
identifying the party at fault for an error in a claim determination, the monetary
value of the error in payment made to a claimant is established. In Figure 4.2, I
represent only the average rate of over- and underpayments, and not the actual value
of these errors. As shown in this figure, some states, like Minnesota or Nebraska, have
higher overpayment rates relative to underpayments, while states like Massachusetts
have relatively higher underpayment rates. These charts are intended to demonstrate
the variation in service quality patterns across the U.S. states.
In Figure 4.3 I consider the relationship between each of the two outcomes of
pertinence to my theory (agent errors and generosity of benefit payments) and prox-
imity to an election, for illustrative purposes only. Each subfigure depicts a local
polynomial smooth of either variable, with 95% confidence intervals shown in grey.
The horizontal axes in Figure 4.3 represent the (reverse) count of days to the next
gubernatorial election.4 This count is calculated as the number of days between the
date of initial UI claim filing– the day an individual filed their claim– and the date of
the closest upcoming election. Each vertical line represents an interval of 365 days,
4It is important to note that because the sampling procedure used in the BAM program retroac-
tively randomly selects a sample from each week of approximately the same size, the distribution
of observations across time is close to uniform.
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Figure 4.3: Performance and Generosity over Days to Next Election, 2002-2010
Note: Each graph depicts a local polynomial smooth of either variable plotted over the count of days to next election,
with 95% confidence intervals.
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an annual interval. As seen in the lower subfigure plot of the average real weekly
benefit amount logged, there are notable seasonal trends in the administration of
unemployment insurance. Predictable dips in generosity correspond with the sum-
mer months, for example. A point of note in this figure, however, is the decline in
the average weekly agency fault error rate in the months and days counting down to
zero.
To better analyze these relationships, however, I now proceed with a more so-
phisticated analysis. In the following section, I describe the covariates used in my
model of administrative outputs and the model specification(s) that I use. I then
discuss the results and findings with respect to my theoretical expectations.
4.4.2 Measurement of Individual Characteristics and Political Economy Context
As briefly discussed above, I focus my empirical analysis on two dependent vari-
ables. First, I use a dichotomous variable equal to one if it was determined the BAM
by audit process that an agent was at fault for an error in the claim determination.5
This measure of agency error is a simple indicator of the occurrence of an error.6
Second, I operationalize effective generosity of program benefits as the weekly benefit
amount paid by the agency, in logged 2007 USD.
4.4.2.1 The Individual
The outcome of an individual unemployment insurance claim is a function not
only of the administrative, political, and economic contexts, but also a host of indi-
5Agent responsibility is defined as any error in a payment determination identified through BAM
“for which the SWA was either solely responsible or shared responsibility with claimants, employers,
or third parties, such as labor unions or private employment referral agencies. The rate includes
fraud, nonfraud recoverable overpayments, nonfraud nonrecoverable overpayments, official action
taken to reduce future benefits, and payments that are technically proper due to finality or other
rules” (Office of Unemployment Insurance 2012).
6An alternative measure would be the net or absolute value of the monetary value of the error
made by an agent, which is available in the BAM claims reports, and will be investigated in future
research.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics, 2002-2010
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. N
Individual Claim Characteristics
Days Until Next Election, log 6.2 1 0 7.3 336,286
Error, any Fault 0.2 0.4 0 1 336,286
Error, Agent at Fault 0.1 0.3 0 1 336,286
Claim was Underpaid 0.1 0.3 0 1 336,286
Claim was Overpaid 0.1 0.3 0 1 336,286
Wkly Benefit Amount, log real $ 4.8 0.5 −0.7 5.9 300,520
Indiv. Replacement Rate, Actual 42.2 21.3 0 100 332,966
Paid Error Amt (Net) 13 42.6 −260.5 282.8 190,017
Denied Error Amt (Abs. Val.) 13.8 42.5 0 320.3 146,269
Prior Wage, log real $ 5.6 0.5 −1.6 10 336,286
Female 0.4 0.5 0 1 336,286
Minority 0.4 0.5 0 1 336,286
College Degree 0 0.2 0 1 336,286
Filed Claim in Person 0.2 0.4 0 1 336,286
State Characteristics, Monthly
Admin. Resources 12.6 7.9 1.9 90.5 332,966
Reserve Ratio 1.1 1 −0.5 4.4 332,966
Change in Workload 0 0.2 −0.5 3.7 332,966
Workload 12.2 1.2 8.6 15.2 332,966
Unemployment Rate 5.8 2 2.3 14.9
State Characteristics, Quarterly
Debt to GSP Ratio 7.7 3.8 1.6 20.7 332,966
Real Income per cap, log 9.8 0.1 9.5 10.1 332,966
Real GSP Growth 2.1 1.8 −5.6 8.5 332,966
State Characteristics, Annual
State Competitiveness 88.1 8.2 65.4 100 332,966
Safe Seats, % 85.1 7.7 57.3 97.5 332,966
Divided Government 0.5 0.5 0 1 332,966
Veto Proof Leg. Majority 0.2 0.4 0 1 332,966
Gub. Lame Duck Term 0.3 0.5 0 1 332,966
Government Liberalism 54.2 28.2 3.5 97.9 332,966
Union Strength 11.4 5.7 2.3 26.2 332,966
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vidual characteristics. Individual skill (college degree), industry of prior employment
(at the 2-digit ISCO level), and prior wage (in logged real USD) will explain much
of the variation in amount paid in weekly benefits, and I further include gender (fe-
male) and an indicator for self-identified racial or ethnic minorities. These factors
are also relevant to models of administrative service quality. As Ryu, Wenger, and
Wilkins (2012) have shown, the descriptive characteristics of a claimant have signifi-
cant predictive power over the probability of a determination error, with women and
minorities experiencing a higher probability of agency errors. Additionally, I include
an indicator for claims that were filed in person, as opposed to online, by phone, or
by mail, because automated claims processing is shown to improve outcomes in UI
claims, particularly for women (Wenger and Wilkins 2009). Lastly, I include a di-
chotomous indicator of payment– whether the claim was paid or not. For claims that
were denied payment, I either measure the paid weekly benefit amount as zero, or I
use the adjusted payment amount after BAM audit evaluation. Descriptive statistics
for each of these individual level variables, as well as all other measures, are reported
in Table 4.1.
4.4.2.2 The Political
To represent the theoretical political and economic concepts involved in my the-
ory, I use measures published by Klarner (2013a) and Klarner (2013b). First, I
include safe seats, the percentage of legislative seats in the last election won by a
margin of 10% or more, as a measure of political competitiveness in a state. Greater
values for this variable indicate comparatively less competitive contexts. I also in-
clude an index of state competitiveness, which incorporates into a single measure the
proportion of the state (1) senate and (2) house seats held by Democrats, (3) the
proportion of the two-party vote for the Democratic candidate in the last election,
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and (4) a dummy variable equal to one if the Democrats have unified control of the
government. Greater values of this variable indicate comparative more competitive
political environments. As a final indicator for political competition, I also include
a dichotomous variable equal to one if the governor faces a term limit and is in the
last year of the term, a lame duck term. As economic measures, I include state
fiscal circumstances measured by the state debt to GSP ratio, real GSP growth, the
unemployment rate and real per capita income.
To model the role of veto players in the policy process, I include an indicator
equal to one for divided government, if the legislature and the governor are of differ-
ent parties, and an indicator equal to one if the legislature has a veto proof majority,
by either party. Next, I include government liberalism to account for the role of
government ideology in determining policy priorities (Hibbs 1977; Hicks and Swank
1984), and measure it using a weighted average of the ideology scores for each cham-
ber of the state legislature and the governor (Berry et al. 2007, 1998, 2010). This
measure is constructed on a zero to 100 scale, with greater values representing a more
leftist ideology. Lastly, as an additional control for the political environment sur-
rounding unemployment insurance more generally, labor union strength is measured
by the ratio of non-agricultural workers covered by a collective bargaining agreement
(Hirsch, MacPherson, and Vroman 2001).
4.4.2.3 The Organizational
To account for the organizational factors that can shape bureaucratic behavior,
I include four administrative control variables. First, I measure the current monthly
reserve ratio of the current UI trust fund balance to covered wage; this is used as
an indicator of program solvency. Second, I include a measure of administrative
resources, which is the number of real dollars divided by the number of regular state
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UI program claims per month. Next, I control for the size of a state program, or the
overall workload, which is a count of all claims made in a state in a month, logged.
Lastly, I include a measure of the change in workload, which is the percentage change
in monthly claims made in a state. Together, these variables should control for the
financial state of the UI program, the overall size of the program, and the intensity
of the current workload, all of which might affect individual bureaucratic decision
making.7
4.4.3 An Empirical Model of Political Administration Cycles
I model administrative outcomes as a function of a vector of individual-level
characteristics x𝑖 and a vector of state political and economic variables z𝑗𝑡 observed
each month (or quarterly, or annually, depending on the variable, refer to Table
4.1 for more detail). However, a number of issues must be dealt with to avoid
biased inferences arising from the multi-level structure of these data. First, the
unit of observation (an individual claim) is nested within a state, and each state
has a unique UI program, policies, and BAM administration. Although I include
some administrative variables in my models, I account for heterogeneity in policy
institutions across states using a fixed effects model by including a separate fixed
intercept for each state, 𝛼𝑗. I am also concerned about heterogeneity across time, so I
also include fixed effects for each year, 𝜁𝑡. This specification controls for any change in
policy at the federal level that might affects states in the same way. Lastly, to account
for unobserved idiosyncratic processes within individual agency offices, I assume an
error components model with an error term composed of both an individual error 𝑣𝑖
constant across time and space, and a random error term unique to each office, 𝜖𝑜
(Greene 2012). This model specification is shown in Eq. 4.1
7Each of these organizational variables are available from US Department of Labor (2016).
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𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛼𝑗 + 𝜁𝑡 + x
′
𝑖𝜷 + z
′
𝑗𝑡𝜸 + 𝑢𝑖𝑜
where 𝑢𝑖𝑜 = 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜖𝑜
𝑖 = 1, ..., 𝑁 ; 𝑜 = 1, ..., 𝑂 ;
𝑗 = 1, ..., 𝐽 and 𝑡 = 1, ..., 𝑇
(4.1)
In the following section, I report the results from estimation of this model.
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Table 4.2: Models of Agent Errors in Claims Determinations, 2002-2010
Linear Safe Seats Lame Duck Debt Ratio Gov. Ideology Divided Gov.
Individual Fixed Effects: 𝐻1𝑎 𝐻2𝑎 𝐻2𝑎 𝐻3𝑎 𝐻4𝑎 𝐻5𝑎
Days to Next Election, log −0.012 −0.144 −0.023∗ −0.016 0.015 0.007
(0.140) (0.058) (0.019) (0.339) (0.371) (0.579)
Prior Wage, log Real $ −0.010 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010 −0.010
(0.531) (0.537) (0.525) (0.532) (0.531) (0.528)
Female 0.014 0.015 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015
(0.326) (0.322) (0.327) (0.326) (0.327) (0.319)
Minority 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025 0.025
(0.099) (0.097) (0.102) (0.098) (0.101) (0.096)
College Degree 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046 0.046
(0.270) (0.270) (0.271) (0.270) (0.271) (0.268)
Claim Filed in Person −0.141∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.140∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.141∗∗∗ −0.142∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Claim was Paid −0.742∗∗∗ −0.742∗∗∗ −0.742∗∗∗ −0.742∗∗∗ −0.742∗∗∗ −0.742∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cross-Level Fixed Effect Interactions:
Days to Elec., log × Safe Seats, % 0.002
(0.082)
Days to Elec., log × Lame Duck 0.035∗
(0.031)
Days to Elec., log × Debt 0.000
(0.823)
Days to Elec., log × Gov. Liberal. −0.001
(0.053)
Days to Elec., log × Divided Gov. −0.033∗
(0.026)
State Fixed Effects:
Safe Seats, % −0.003 −0.013 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003 −0.003
(0.271) (0.040) (0.307) (0.269) (0.288) (0.259)
Gub. Lame Duck Term −0.039∗ −0.040 −0.262∗ −0.039∗ −0.041∗ −0.038
(0.046) (0.041) (0.013) (0.046) (0.038) (0.055)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.2 – Continued from previous page - Models of Agent Errors
Linear Safe Seats Lame Duck Debt Ratio Gov. Ideology Divided Gov.
Debt to GSP Ratio 0.118∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Government Liberalism −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.002 −0.005∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.302) (0.000)
Divided Government 0.128∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.337∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
State Competitiveness −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Veto Proof Leg. Majority −0.297∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ −0.289∗∗∗ −0.296∗∗∗ −0.298∗∗∗ −0.304∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Union Strength −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.044∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Admin. Resources 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.003
(0.246) (0.317) (0.276) (0.247) (0.186) (0.205)
Reserve Ratio −0.099∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.099∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Workload 0.202∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.203∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗ 0.212∗∗∗ 0.201∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
∆Workload −0.065 −0.064 −0.067 −0.065 −0.067 −0.063
(0.207) (0.215) (0.193) (0.208) (0.198) (0.221)
Real GSP Growth 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Constant −3.154∗∗∗ −2.306∗ −3.108∗∗∗ −3.130∗∗∗ −3.446∗∗∗ −3.222∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Random Effects:
Var(Administration Office ID) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286 336,286
Note: Coefficients from logistic regression with random effects by administrative office to which claim was made. Dependent variable is dichotomous indicator equal
to one if determination error was made and an agency employee was at fault. Coefficients for fixed-effects prior industry of employment, year, and state in which
claim were made are estimated and not reported here. ∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01, ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. Fixed effects for individual industry of prior
employment included, but not reported here. Sample includes each of the 50 U.S. states from 2002-2010.
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Table 4.3: Models of Claims Determination Generosity, 2002-2010
Linear Safe Seats Lame Duck Debt Ratio Gov. Ideology Divided Gov.
Individual Fixed Effects: 𝐻1𝑏 𝐻2𝑏 𝐻2𝑏 𝐻3𝑏 𝐻4𝑏 𝐻5𝑏
Days to Next Election, log 0.001 −0.015 −0.001 0.006∗∗∗ 0.000 0.002∗
(0.070) (0.057) (0.554) (0.000) (0.917) (0.038)
Prior Wage, log Real $ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗ 0.553∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗ −0.053∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Minority −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
College Degree −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Claim Filed in Person 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.357) (0.338) (0.314) (0.355) (0.363) (0.365)
Claim Was Paid 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cross-Level Fixed Effect Interactions:
Days to Elec., log × Safe Seats, % 0.000∗
(0.035)
Days to Elec., log × Lame Duck 0.007∗∗∗
(0.000)
Days to Elec., log × Debt −0.001∗∗
(0.002)
Days to Elec., log × Gov. Liberal. 0.000
(0.326)
Days to Elec., log × Divided Gov. −0.002
(0.264)
State Fixed Effects:
Safe Seats, % 0.002∗∗∗ 0.001 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.391) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Gub. Lame Duck Term −0.004∗ −0.004∗ −0.046∗∗∗ −0.004∗ −0.004 −0.004
(0.047) (0.042) (0.000) (0.041) (0.054) (0.055)
Continued on next page
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Table 4.3 – Continued from previous page - Models of Generosity
Linear Safe Seats Lame Duck Debt Ratio Gov. Ideology Divided Gov.
Debt to GSP Ratio −0.001 −0.001 −0.000 0.003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.446) (0.453) (0.645) (0.070) (0.462) (0.442)
Government Liberalism −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Divided Government 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.007∗ 0.017
(0.013) (0.016) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.069)
State Competitiveness 0.000∗ 0.001∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗ 0.000∗
(0.028) (0.026) (0.045) (0.032) (0.030) (0.037)
Veto Proof Leg. Majority 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Union Strength 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.169) (0.148) (0.178) (0.246) (0.172) (0.186)
Admin. Resources −0.000∗ −0.001∗ −0.001∗ −0.000 −0.001∗ −0.000
(0.048) (0.033) (0.038) (0.051) (0.041) (0.054)
Reserve Ratio 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.325) (0.379) (0.259) (0.344) (0.348) (0.314)
∆Workload −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008 −0.008
(0.123) (0.128) (0.102) (0.127) (0.124) (0.125)
Workload −0.004 −0.004 −0.004 −0.003 −0.005 −0.004
(0.474) (0.473) (0.528) (0.554) (0.436) (0.474)
Real GSP Growth −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗ −0.002∗∗
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014) (0.012) (0.011) (0.009)
Constant 1.616∗∗∗ 1.717∗∗∗ 1.624∗∗∗ 1.584∗∗∗ 1.630∗∗∗ 1.612∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
State Random Effects:
Var(Administration Office ID) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 300,517 300,517 300,517 300,517 300,517 300,517
Note: Coefficients from GLS regression with random effects by administrative office to which claim was made. Dependent variable is weekly benefit amount paid,
in logged 2007 USD. Coefficients for fixed-effects by prior industry of employment, year, and state in which claim were made are estimated and not reported here.
∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01, ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. Fixed effects for individual industry of prior employment included, but not reported here. Sample
includes each of the 50 U.S. states from 2002-2010.
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4.5 Results and Findings
Results from six model specifications of each dependent variable are reported in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Both tables are organized in the same way, with the hypothesis
tested in each column noted in the heading. Before discussing the results of my hy-
pothesis tests, a number of points are worth noting from these tables. First, in Table
4.2, it is surprising that almost no individual characteristics predict the probability
of agent error. This contradicts the expectation from some previous literature (Ryu,
Wenger, and Wilkins 2012). In Table 4.3, however, individual factors are strong
and significant predictors of generosity in payment, as should be expected. Having
a higher prior wage increases the amount paid in benefits, while being female or a
minority reduces claim generosity. Oddly, having a college degree, ceteris paribus,
is associated with less generous benefit payment. Further down the tables, the es-
timated effects of state political and economic context are reported. With respect
to the first column in Table 4.2, errors in claims are less likely in states with more
liberal governments, greater political competitiveness, and a higher reserve ratio.
The first column in Table 4.3 reports fewer significant results, and a puzzling result
is the negative (though very small) association between government liberalism and
generosity.
I now turn to a discussion of my hypotheses tests. The first columns in these
two tables report results from models testing my first hypotheses that errors will be
less likely and generosity will be greater in closer proximity to an election. Evidence
for these expectations would be seen in a positive coefficient on the days to next
election variable in Table 4.2 and a negative coefficient on this variable in Table 4.3.
However, neither the signs on these coefficients, nor the significance are supportive
of my theorized PAC pattern. Rather, the results in the first columns of these two
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tables suggest that proximity to an election is not significantly associated with either
agent errors or generosity. This null result with respect to the coefficient estimates
on proximity to the next election persists across most specifications in these tables.
To test each of my interactive hypotheses (sets 2 through 5), I include in each
model a multiplicative interaction term between the days to election variable and the
relevant political indicator. I now proceed with a limited discussion of the evidence
for the remaining four sets of hypotheses, despite the difficulty of interpretation with-
out graphically presenting predicted marginal effects (Brambor, Clark, and Golder
2005).8 My second hypothesis that political competition will increase the magnitude
of opportunistic manipulation of both agency service quality and generosity are not
strongly supported by the results. In Table 4.2, although the estimated coefficients
the safe seats and lame duck variables are in the expected direction, they are not
significant. The interaction terms are similarly in the expected positive direction,
but Wald-type tests of the joint significance of the nonlinear combination of the two
constitutive terms and the interaction terms for both the safe seats and lame duck
models in Table 4.2 fail to reject the null hypothesis. Similarly, the results in Table
4.3 offer inconsistent evidence. The results from these two models testing the second
hypothesis suggest that generosity is greater in less competitive political environ-
ments, and that this relationship increases with distance to an election. Overall,
these results are not supportive of my expectations.
My third hypothesis anticipated that increased financial strain, indicated by a
higher debt ratio, will reduce the magnitude of an electoral cycle in generosity, but
will positively impact the cycle in agent errors. Again with respect to the results
8The size of this sample and complexity of the model specification make prediction of these
marginal effects computationally intense. Figures representing these interactive relationships will
be made available to the reader in the near future. For now, I proceed without them. As the
discussion makes clear, the findings presented here are unlikely to be substantively altered by
graphical inferences.
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from the models of agent errors, significance in effects is illusive, and the coefficients
are also not in the expected direction. The interactive debt ratio models in Table 4.3
also fail to support my expectation, and indeed the estimated effects are significant,
but in an unexpected direction. Again, these results do not support my third set
of hypotheses that fiscal constraints incentivize political cycles in administrative
performance.
Next, the columns titled “government ideology” in these two tables report the
results of my fourth hypothesis test. I expect that less liberal governments will
magnify a positive electoral cycle in performance, but will not be associated with
a similar increase in generosity preceding an election. Neither dependent variable
model offer any evidence in support of these expectations. Finally, the last columns in
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report the results of my fifth and final hypothesis test. I expected
that increased difficulty of coordination in government policy maker, operationalized
by an indicator for divided government, would increase the presence of a cycle in
performance, but not in generosity. Again, in neither dependent variable model is
evidence strongly supportive of my expectations. In the next section, I discuss the
implication of these null results for future research.
4.6 Discussion and Conclusion
The findings from my empirical tests offer no consistent support for my theory
of a political administration cycle in either effective generosity or in performance
quality. In fact, where significant associations are seen between the political variables
I identify and the outcomes of interest, the relationships are often in the opposite
direction of what I expected. Given the overwhelming lack of support for my theory,
I offer some suggestions for future extensions or alterations to this theory.
First, I maintained individual claims as the unit of observation in this study to
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control for claimant characteristics and to exploit fine grained detail in proximity
to elections. To reconsider these theoretical expectations using aggregated agency
performance or generosity indicators may be worthwhile. Reconsidering operational-
ization of theoretical concepts, including proximity to an election, might also yield
more meaningful findings. Considering alternative dependent variable measures is
also worthy of consideration. BAM claims reports include far greater detail of indi-
vidual claims errors, in type, responsibility, and magnitude of under/over-payment
than I have been able to explore in this chapter.
Alternatively, this lack of support for an electoral cycle in public service quality
or effective generosity may reflect the empirical reality that politicians do not exploit
administration of unemployment insurance for electoral gain. First, the visibility of
service quality is low, and arguably only perceived by those citizens receiving in the
service. If used for clientelistic purposes, this may be a weak tool with little payoff.
Second, the potential efficiency gains from improved service quality might positively
impact budgets or performance evaluations, which can be used by politicians to claim
credit, but the effect will be delayed. Simply, the political advantages of encourag-
ing greater efficiency or accuracy of decision making in bureaucratic organizations
may be too small. Lastly, the clientele of unemployment insurance programs are the
individuals most likely to perceive the improvement in public service, however, this
is only a small subset of the population, and it has been documented that economic
adversity is negatively associated with voter turnout (Rosenstone 1982). Thus, al-
though the set of administrative policy tools may be less costly to elected officials
than coordinating an opportunistic allocation of budget items, the benefits of ex-
ploiting these bureaucratic levers may be too narrowly focused, targeted at unlikely
voters, and/or simply not visible enough to attract the political attention.
141
5. CONCLUSION
Understanding how and why governments choose policy instruments is a critical
component of evaluating the responsiveness and effectiveness of democratic gover-
nance. Politicians and bureaucrats make decisions at every stage of the policy mak-
ing process that have very real consequences for citizens’ wellbeing, as well as equity
and representation. In this dissertation, I have incorporated into a political economy
explanation of unemployment insurance the importance of political motivations, eco-
nomic context, and social institutions. The politics of unemployment insurance are
shaped not only by economic risk and the inherent problems of information asymme-
try and coordination, but also by social institutions, strategic political maneuvering
for control, and by electoral motivations. By linking together separate literature
to bridge insights from across subfields and disciplines and acknowledging specific
features of unemployment insurance policies, I offer theoretical innovations and two
original data sources with which to test their implications. The contribution of this
dissertation is both theoretical and empirical.
In answering these questions, I have argued and demonstrated that the choice
of policy instrument to alleviate economic insecurity cannot be explained without
attention to the political and economic context in the development and ongoing func-
tioning of social insurance programs. Government responses to economic insecurity
cannot be explained without acknowledging the conditioning or moderating influence
of economic, social, or political (contextual) factors.
In Chapter 2, I synthesized the literature from comparative politics on decentral-
ization and the literature from public administration on institutional choice. Under-
lying both of these extant sets of theories are principles of coordination and informa-
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tion asymmetries. Using a game theoretic framework, I derived a series of testable
implications which will feed into future research projects to more completely explain
why politicians sometimes abdicate control by delegating administrative authority
to lower levels of government. The interconnectedness of economic (efficiency) and
political motivations explain why sometimes it is rational to give away authority to
best represent policy preferences.
By integrating these theoretical approaches into a single model under a unified
set of assumptions, I have advanced a more general model of institutional choice.
The precision gained by formally expressing these ideas allows for the derivation of
expectations in multiple dimensions. First, there is a critical trade-off between cost
of control and oversight, and the advantages gained by delegating to experts. Sec-
ond, there is a trade-off between economic efficiency and the flexibility of policy to
represent diverse interests. Lastly, these considerations are further shaped by preex-
isting and persistent policy institutions, which make policy reversals or alterations
more difficult. As I have shown in this dissertation, the decision to delegate and
decentralize is context dependent, and conditional on political polarization, political
uncertainty, and institutionalized veto players.
The lesson from this chapter is that public policy is politically motivated, yet often
the consequences of political institutions for policy or objective outcomes are consid-
ered without considering the endogeneity of their form. Reiterating the foundational
argument from theory of path dependency, this chapter illustrates the importance
of past decision making to contemporary or future policy adjustment. Specifically, I
have identified political polarization, political uncertainty, and veto players as crit-
ical factors in the decision to delegate authority by decentralizing unemployment
insurance and maintaining centralized social security in the US. These institutional
choices will have consequences for the implementation and development of public
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policy over time, making recentralization of unemployment insurance, for example,
far more costly. Simply, the policy making process is a rational process, and only by
modeling this process including those initial choices of institutional design can the
outputs and real effects of governance be understood.
In Chapter 3, I brought together theories on the political economy of comparative
social welfare and social institutions’ role in policy making. Coordination is critical to
the development, evolution, and functioning of social welfare policy institutions, and
it is through informal social institutions (social capital) that communities may orga-
nize informal insurance or may prompt more comprehensive and responsive public
policy. I have argued that there exists an important role for informal social institu-
tions of cooperation. Being a critical factor in providing public goods, such as the
provision of unemployment insurance, the propensity of market actors to cooperate
will have implications not for public policy as well as the ability of communities to
coordinate informal substitutes for social insurance.
When theorized as a set of informal institutions that maintain and incentivize
cooperation between actors, the functions of social capital in a capitalist market
economy can be viewed through the lens of political economy theory. Public pro-
grams buffering individuals against risks inherent in modern labor markets, including
unemployment insurance, developed over time as interested actors negotiated their
design out of self-interest. Where coordination was less costly, governments devel-
oped comprehensive and inclusive institutions of social insurance. Furthermore, the
influence of social capital on policy outcomes is not unidimensional, and may serve
to promote greater generosity or serve as a functional substitute for public insurance.
The implications from this chapter are twofold. First, theory of comparative so-
cial welfare institutions can be advanced by considering the role of informal social
institutions not only in shaping the public policy process, but also as the provider of
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public goods or services that rival the state. Second, theory of social capital can be
advanced by taking a multidimensional view of these informal institutions. Coordina-
tion may work through state institutions with implications for policy responsiveness,
or it may provide functions that rival public policy through informal insurance.
Finally, in Chapter 4, I integrated literatures from the study of political-electoral
cycles in public policy and from the study of political control of public administra-
tion. Despite both having roots in the public choice tradition, these two separate
theories have not been fully integrated to offer a unified theory of political cycles
in bureaucratic performance. Having advanced an initial theory of such political
administration cycles, I use novel data to test my expectations. The contribution
of this chapter is again, both theoretical and empirical. Although little empirical
evidence for my expectations is found, there are opportunities to extend this chapter
in more fruitful directions.
The findings in this chapter reiterate previous literature in both public admin-
istration and political economy. I find no evidence of political manipulation of bu-
reaucratic outputs, just as political control and public management theory would
suggest. Street-level bureaucrats are well insulated and resilient to any effect of elec-
toral cycles. Also, these null results align with the extant ambiguity of empirical
support for political budget cycles. Although politicians may have multiple policy
tools available to them, these findings suggest that they either do not attempt or
find themselves unable to exploit administrative performance as a policy instrument
for electoral gain.
In conclusion, the choices made in the public policy process are shaped by histor-
ical political context and uncertainty, the outputs of public programs are conditional
on informal social institutions, and the administration of program outputs are not
susceptible to electoral cycles. These findings contribute to theory in comparative
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politics and public administration, and they point towards the importance of a gover-
nance perspective of public policy. Substantive implications from the study of public
policy will be improved by theories that account for these economic, social, and po-
litical factors explaining both the development and functioning of public programs
in modern capitalist democracies.
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A. APPENDIX: ADDITIONAL TABLES & FIGURES
Table A.1: Social Capital Indicator Descriptive Statistics, 2000-2013
SC Survey Indicator: Mean S. D. Min Max
Charitable Activity
Donated Clothing 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.09
Donated Food 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.12
Donated Money 0.52 0.05 0.38 0.72
Fundraising Activity 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.09
Community Organizational Life
Arts Organization 0.04 0.03 0.00 0.22
Civic Organization 0.07 0.02 0.01 0.12
Education Organization 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.15
Social or Community Service Org. 0.16 0.03 0.06 0.29
Social Organization 0.78 0.09 0.49 0.99
Sports Organization 0.04 0.02 0.00 0.15
Youth Organization 0.06 0.02 0.00 0.13
Community Volunteerism
Contribute to Fix a Prob. in Community 0.09 0.03 0.02 0.23
Not Participate for“Lack of Interest” 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.17
Not Participate for “Lack of Resources” 0.44 0.07 0.09 0.63
Not Participate for “Life Situation” 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.21
Environmental Organization 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07
Health Organization 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.14
Hours Volunteered, Overall 1.18 0.78 0.00 4.42
Immigrant or Migrant Organization 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.04
International Organization 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05
Number of Weeks Volunteered 0.55 0.21 0.00 1.60
Participated for Self-Motivated Reasons 0.35 0.09 0.07 0.68
Volunteered (Yes/No) 0.38 0.12 0.17 0.74
Volunteered Professional Services 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.17
Engagement in Public Affairs
Attended a Political Meeting 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.24
Contact Elected Official Direct 0.12 0.03 0.05 0.25
Discusses Politics with Friends 0.73 0.08 0.45 0.94
Participated in a Boycott 0.10 0.04 0.01 0.24
Registered to Vote 0.42 0.09 0.17 0.81
Volunteered for Political Party 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.07
Voted in Last Election 0.66 0.10 0.40 0.92
Informal Sociability
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 – Continued from previous page
SC Survey Indicator: Mean S. D. Min Max
Contact Employers Direct in Job Search 0.88 0.05 0.69 1.00
Does Favors for Neighbors 0.60 0.07 0.33 0.84
Invited by Friends and Family 0.30 0.05 0.10 0.48
Invited by Co-Worker 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.20
Time at Current Address 5.01 0.15 4.36 5.38
Friends and Family for Job Search 0.19 0.08 0.00 0.48
Professional Network for Job Search 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.20
Invited by Someone Else 0.45 0.05 0.32 0.73
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Table A.2: Principal Component Factor Analysis, 2000-2013
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4
Eigenvalue 7.71 5.78 4.79 2.53
Difference 1.92 0.99 2.25 0.22
Proportion 0.20 0.15 0.12 0.07
Cumulative 0.20 0.35 0.47 0.53
SC Survey Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness
Charitable Activity
Donated Clothing 0.51 −0.24 0.72 0.12 0.16
Donated Food 0.62 −0.18 0.52 −0.02 0.30
Donated Money 0.70 0.24 0.1 0.23 0.39
Fundraising Activity 0.38 −0.12 0.7 0.29 0.27
Community Organizational Life
Arts Organization 0.41 0.37 −0.11 −0.51 0.43
Civic Organization 0.31 0.48 −0.1 0.21 0.62
Education Organization 0.77 −0.4 0.31 −0.09 0.14
Social or Community Service Organization 0.08 0.65 0.01 0.18 0.54
Social Organization −0.21 0.52 0.72 −0.02 0.17
Sports Organization 0.41 0.62 0.25 −0.37 0.24
Youth Organization 0.79 −0.35 0.2 −0.15 0.19
Community Volunteerism
Contribute to Fix a Problem in Community 0.56 0.42 0.02 0.34 0.4
Did Not Participate for “Lack of Interest” 0 0.67 −0.3 −0.43 0.27
Did Not Participate for “Lack of Resources” 0.21 −0.65 −0.07 0.32 0.42
Did Not Participate for “Life Situation” −0.01 −0.37 −0.44 0.3 0.57
Environmental Organization 0.04 0.39 −0.24 0.34 0.67
Health Organization 0.47 −0.41 −0.28 −0.14 0.52
Hours Volunteered, Overall 0.55 −0.47 −0.26 0.01 0.42
Immigrant or Migrant Organization 0.31 −0.07 −0.68 −0.08 0.43
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – Continued from previous page
SC Survey Indicator Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness
International Organization 0.37 0.01 −0.53 −0.01 0.58
Number of Weeks Volunteered 0.75 −0.37 0.43 −0.06 0.11
Participated for Self-Motivated Reasons 0.08 −0.23 −0.15 −0.19 0.88
Volunteered (Yes/No) 0.61 0.31 −0.25 −0.26 0.39
Volunteered Professional Services 0.75 0.23 0.44 −0.07 0.18
Engagement in Public Affairs
Attended a Political Meeting 0.64 0.31 −0.46 0.38 0.13
Contacted Politician or Elected Official Directly 0.47 0.56 −0.16 0.27 0.37
Discusses Politics with Friends 0.57 0.03 −0.55 0.25 0.32
Participated in a Boycott 0.51 0.61 −0.1 −0.12 0.34
Registered to Vote −0.1 −0.24 0.17 0.48 0.67
Volunteered for Political Party −0.05 0.39 0.13 0.44 0.63
Voted in Last Election 0.26 0.62 0.01 −0.15 0.53
Informal Sociability
Does Favors for Neighbors 0.57 −0.2 −0.42 0.25 0.4
Invited by Friends and Family to Volunteer −0.37 0.21 −0.04 0.16 0.79
Invited to Participate by Co-Worker to Volunteer −0.29 0.22 −0.11 0.13 0.84
Time at Current Address −0.22 0.24 0.27 0.2 0.78
Uses Friends and Family Network for Job Search −0.32 0.29 0.41 0.06 0.65
Uses Professional Network for Job Search 0.04 0.23 0.1 0.31 0.84
Was Invited to Participate by Someone Else 0.34 −0.2 0.11 −0.16 0.81
182
Table A.3: Models of UI Generosity, 2001-2013, with Panel-Corrected Standard Errors
Spending Coverage Benefit Amount Duration
UI Spend UI Spend Insured Recipiency Weekly Replacement Exhaustee Average
% GSP Log Rate Rate Benefit Rate Duration Duration
Lag Dep. Var 0.311∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗ 0.750∗∗∗ 0.951∗∗∗ 0.937∗∗∗ 0.910∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Unemployment Rate 0.000 0.005 −0.040 −1.458∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.361∗∗∗ −0.078∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.060) (0.750) (0.450) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Civic & Pol. SC𝑡−1 0.000∗∗ 0.067∗∗ −0.057 1.180∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.357∗∗ −0.032 0.368∗∗∗(0.002) (0.003) (0.455) (0.008) (0.000) (0.008) (0.358) (0.001)
Charit. & Vol. SC𝑡−1 0.000 −0.007 −0.018 −0.355 −0.003 −0.189∗ −0.068∗ 0.040(0.309) (0.697) (0.786) (0.212) (0.171) (0.041) (0.034) (0.560)
Labor Force, log 0.000∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ −2.455∗∗∗ 4.413∗ 0.022 1.677∗ −0.083 −1.204∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.125) (0.021) (0.758) (0.047)
Gov. Liberalism𝑡−1 0.000∗∗ 0.002∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.009 −0.000 −0.004 0.002 0.007∗∗(0.004) (0.002) (0.001) (0.313) (0.498) (0.160) (0.443) (0.007)
Union Strength𝑡−1 0.000∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −0.025 0.266∗∗∗ 0.000 0.021 0.011 0.027(0.000) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) (0.328) (0.259) (0.115) (0.130)
Reserve Ratio𝑡−1 0.000∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ −0.142∗ 1.158∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.399∗∗∗ 0.093∗ 0.164(0.001) (0.000) (0.014) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.172)
Real GSP, Log −0.000∗∗∗ −0.137 2.406∗∗∗ −3.392∗ −0.010 −1.413 0.150 1.400∗
(0.000) (0.175) (0.000) (0.030) (0.483) (0.055) (0.570) (0.019)
∆Income, real pc. −0.000∗∗∗ −0.047∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ −0.618∗∗∗ −0.005∗∗∗ −0.256∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗ −0.182∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnic Diversity −0.000 −0.001 0.003 0.018 −0.000 −0.008 0.005 −0.006
(0.140) (0.192) (0.445) (0.228) (0.076) (0.174) (0.205) (0.393)
Constant −0.000∗∗∗ −2.388∗∗∗ 13.933∗∗∗ −9.923 0.133 −1.824 1.336 7.081∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.168) (0.185) (0.390) (0.272) (0.004)
N 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Note: Coefficient estimates from OLS regression with a panel-specific AR1 correction and Panel-Corrected Standard Errors reported in parentheses (Beck 2001).
∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01, ∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. Sample includes each of the 50 U.S. states from 2001-2013.
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Table A.4: Linear Models of UI Generosity, 2001-2013, with State Fixed Effects
Spending Coverage Benefit Amount Duration
UI Spend UI Spend Insured Recipiency Weekly Replacement Exhaustee Average
% GSP Log Rate Rate Benefit Rate Duration Duration
Unemployment Rate 0.000∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗∗ −0.244∗∗ −1.102∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗ 0.054 0.669∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.003) (0.292) (0.000)
Civic & Pol. SC𝑡−1 0.000∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ −0.031 1.059∗∗ 0.003 0.110 −0.071 0.121(0.001) (0.000) (0.604) (0.002) (0.333) (0.265) (0.122) (0.254)
Charit. & Vol. SC𝑡−1 −0.000 −0.034∗∗ −0.221∗∗∗ −0.696∗ −0.009∗∗ −0.278∗ −0.008 0.170∗(0.477) (0.002) (0.001) (0.021) (0.005) (0.024) (0.854) (0.024)
Labor Force, log 0.000∗∗∗ 1.841∗∗ −31.201∗∗∗ 39.589∗ 0.272 12.156 1.902 −6.637
(0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.017) (0.154) (0.070) (0.489) (0.124)
Gov. Liberalism𝑡−1 0.000∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.000 −0.003 0.001 0.010∗∗(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.941) (0.551) (0.667) (0.002)
Union Strength𝑡−1 0.000∗ 0.023∗ −0.084 0.497 0.003 0.103 −0.048 0.041(0.044) (0.049) (0.390) (0.115) (0.292) (0.186) (0.472) (0.573)
Reserve Ratio𝑡−1 0.000 0.028 0.575∗ 1.263 0.007 0.220 −0.091 −0.427∗∗(0.063) (0.249) (0.012) (0.063) (0.346) (0.372) (0.556) (0.003)
Real GSP, Log −0.000 0.635∗∗ 22.181∗∗∗ −5.353 0.416∗∗∗ 0.901 0.384 6.062∗
(0.063) (0.005) (0.000) (0.322) (0.000) (0.737) (0.717) (0.012)
∆Income, real pc. −0.000∗∗∗ −0.039∗∗∗ −0.057∗∗∗ −0.837∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.245∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.094∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Ethnic Diversity 0.000∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.558∗∗ 2.440∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 1.054∗∗∗ 0.213∗ 0.150
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.270)
Constant −0.005∗∗∗ −33.115∗∗∗ 212.078∗∗ −677.339∗∗ −6.919∗ −240.750∗∗ −27.108 21.649
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.006) (0.012) (0.009) (0.535) (0.741)
N 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Note: Coefficient estimates from OLS regression with state fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. ∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01,
∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. Sample includes each of the 50 U.S. states from 2001-2013.
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Table A.5: Interactive Models of UI Generosity, 2001-2013, with State Fixed Effects
Spending Coverage Benefit Amount Duration
UI Spend UI Spend Insured Recipiency Weekly Replacement Exhaustee Average
% GSP Log Rate Rate Benefit Rate Duration Duration
Unemployment Rate 0.000∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ −0.269∗∗∗ −0.938∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.059 0.684∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.282) (0.000)
Civic & Pol. SC𝑡−1 −0.000∗∗ 0.083∗ −0.068 0.121 −0.005 −0.209 −0.112 −0.057(0.004) (0.031) (0.831) (0.891) (0.565) (0.471) (0.484) (0.813)
C&P SC × Unemp𝑡−1 0.000∗∗∗ −0.007 0.010 0.121 0.001 0.047 0.006 0.026(0.000) (0.188) (0.827) (0.322) (0.400) (0.248) (0.787) (0.564)
Charit. & Vol. SC𝑡−1 −0.000∗∗∗ −0.176∗∗∗ 0.176 −3.412∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗ −0.653∗∗ −0.082 −0.089(0.000) (0.000) (0.389) (0.000) (0.003) (0.009) (0.470) (0.680)
C&V SC × Unemp.𝑡−1 0.000∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.072 0.475∗∗∗ 0.002 0.063 0.013 0.044(0.000) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.112) (0.191) (0.551) (0.221)
Labor Force, log 0.000∗∗ 2.016∗∗∗ −31.651∗∗∗ 41.824∗∗ 0.280 12.331 1.951 −6.487
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.156) (0.073) (0.479) (0.137)
Gov. Liberalism𝑡−1 0.000∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗ 0.039∗∗ −0.000 −0.004 0.001 0.009∗∗(0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.002) (0.880) (0.424) (0.701) (0.003)
Union Strength𝑡−1 0.000 0.020 −0.075 0.406 0.002 0.086 −0.050 0.030(0.287) (0.074) (0.401) (0.199) (0.396) (0.282) (0.469) (0.686)
Reserve Ratio𝑡−1 0.000 0.023 0.591∗∗ 1.114 0.006 0.193 −0.096 −0.444∗∗(0.196) (0.340) (0.009) (0.099) (0.407) (0.432) (0.533) (0.002)
Real GSP, Log −0.000 0.513∗ 22.501∗∗∗ −7.112 0.408∗∗∗ 0.727 0.342 5.927∗
(0.066) (0.010) (0.000) (0.174) (0.000) (0.783) (0.744) (0.015)
∆Income, real pc. −0.000∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.793∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.064∗∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)
Ethnic Diversity 0.000∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗∗ 2.460∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ 1.065∗∗∗ 0.214∗ 0.155
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.023) (0.253)
Constant −0.005∗∗∗ −33.979∗∗∗ 214.350∗∗ −689.748∗∗ −6.969∗ −241.965∗ −27.402 20.701
(0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.010) (0.532) (0.750)
N 650 650 650 650 650 650 650 650
Note: Coefficient estimates from OLS regression with state fixed effects included and standard errors clustered by state reported in parentheses. ∗𝑝 < .05, ∗∗𝑝 < .01,
∗∗∗𝑝 < .001, for a two tailed hypothesis test. Sample includes each of the 50 U.S. states from 2001-2013.
185
-.0
00
02
0
.00
00
2
.00
00
4
M
.E
. o
f 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-3 -1 1 3 5
Civic & Political SC
Low Charitable SC High Charitable SC
-.0
00
02
0
.00
00
2
.00
00
4
M
.E
. o
f 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-3 -1 1 3 5
Charitable & Voluntary SC
Low Civic & Pol. SC High Civic & Pol. SC
(a) UI Benefit Spending, % of GSP
-.1
-.0
5
0
.05
.1
.15
M
.E
. o
f 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-3 -1 1 3 5
Civic & Political SC
Low Charitable SC High Charitable SC
-.1
-.0
5
0
.05
.1
.15
M
.E
. o
f 
U
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
-3 -1 1 3 5
Charitable & Voluntary SC
Low Civic & Pol. SC High Civic & Pol. SC
(b) UI Benefit Spending, log real $
Figure A.1: Short Run Marginal Effects of Unemployment on UI Benefit Spending
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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Figure A.2: Short Run Marginal Effects of Unemployment on UI Coverage
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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Figure A.3: Short Run Marginal Effects of Unemployment on UI Weekly Benefit
Amount Generosity
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Figure A.4: Short Run Marginal Effects of Unemployment on UI Benefit Duration,
in Weeks
Note: Each graph reports 95% confidence intervals for the indicated marginal effect estimates obtained using coeffi-
cients from models in Table 3.6 while holding all variables not labeled in the figure constant at their sample mean,
including the lagged dependent variable term. “High” and “Low” values are defined by the variable sample mean
plus or minus 2 standard deviations, respectively.
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Figure A.5: All Errors and Agent Errors in Louisiana and Mississippi, 2002-2010
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B. APPENDIX: ADMINISTRATION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE IN
THE UNITED STATES
B.1 Additional Nomenclature
ALP Acceptable Level of Performance
BAM Benefit Accuracy Measurement
BQC Benefit Quality Control
CPS Current Population Survey
DCA Denied Claims Accuracy
DOL Department of Labor
EB Extended Benefits
ESI Economic Security Index
ETA Employment Training Administration
EUC Emergency Unemployment Compensation
FUTA Federal Unemployment Tax Act
IPIA Improper Payment Information Act
IRS U.S. Internal Revenue Service
OASDI Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
OUI Office of Unemployment Insurance
PCA Paid Claims Accuracy
SSA Social Security Act
SQSP State Quality Service Plan
SWA State Workforce Agency
UA Unemployment Assistance
UB Unemployment Benefits
UC Unemployment Compensation
UCFE Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees
UCX Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members
UI Unemployment Insurance
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B.2 Introduction
The United States unemployment insurance (UI) program was created by
the Social Security Act (SSA) in 1935 to serve multiple objectives. First, the
program was meant to provide short term relief in the form of income security to
the involuntarily unemployed. Second, the program was intended to provide a
macroeconomic income-smoothing function across periods of economic expansion
and contraction. Lastly, the program was meant to stabilize unemployment by
distributing the costs of the program by responsibility for layoffs.
The present structure of UI also reflects not only these multiple goals, but
also the compromises made between interested groups. First, to ensure passage of
the Social Security Act (SSA) in Congress, states were granted substantial
autonomy over many aspects of UI administration while Congressional legislation
and regulations set minimum guidelines for program rules and eligibility
requirements. In administering UI, each state workforce agency (SWA) balances
the formal or informal influence of a legislature, UI advisory boards, businesses,
and labor organizations, while seeking to maintain support of their constituency
and court systems. The 53 UI programs in existence today vary in their
administrative structure, the sectors covered, qualifying requirements, eligibility
rules, disqualification rules, weekly benefit amount, waiting period prior to first
payment, duration of benefit payments, seasonal provision, and their financing
structure (Blaustein 1993). Further, there exists substantial heterogeneity in
administrative quality and financial management.
The second defining compromise affected the funding of UI, and was made
to appease business interests in the initial passage of the SSA. Funding of the
regular UI system is a complex tax-credit scheme, paid mostly by employers and
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supplemented by federal funds under specific circumstances. Employers pay two
taxes: one into to a state account at a tax rate determined by their “experience
rating,” and one variable tax-rate into a federal account which provides
administrative funds, grants and loans to states, and certain benefits payments.
Basing tax rates on employer experience was initially necessary to gain sufficient
political support from employers, and continues to incite disagreement today
(Becker 1981; O’Leary and Wandner 1997). The key issue is this: because
employers’ tax rates are directly determined by their experience with layoffs in the
past, incentives exist for employers to provide false evidence, to appeal UI
determinations, and to reorganize businesses to evade accurate experience-rating.
Labor groups have historically opposed experience rating, arguing that the system
encourages employers to restrict employee benefits rights and to unjustifiably
challenge claims to keep charges and tax rates down (O’Leary and Wandner 1997).
Because each program is separately administered, business and labor influences
engage at the state level. The terms of the experience-related tax formula and
benefit determinations are decided by each state, the result of which is 53 unique
financing systems.
These two defining features of the UI system have contributed to variation
in almost every aspect of program eligibility and benefit rules, administrative
quality, and financial solvency across the U.S. states and territories. The following
sections of this chapter highlight some of the most important features of state
programs: financial management and taxation, generosity of benefits, and quality
of administrative performance. In recent years, in the context of the great
recession, these different aspects of the UI programs have become important in
different and predictable ways. Ultimately, UI is first and foremost an insurance
program subject to fundamental actuarial rules.
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B.3 Current State of Unemployment Insurance
Each U.S. state, the District of Columbia, the Virgin Islands, and Puerto
Rico administers its own UI program. Variation in these 53 sub-national UI
programs can be summarized along four dimensions. Each program varies in (1)
financial solvency and tax structure, (2) the generosity of benefits, and (3) the
quality of administrative services. Also, the (4) nature of demand for
unemployment compensation varies across states, and this has important
implications for the administrative quality and generosity of state UI programs.
The following sections of this appendix will first summarize in greater detail how
the national UI system operates, and will continue on to summarize state and
regional variation along these broad categories.1
An notable feature of the UI system is the tendency of states within regions
to follow different trends with respect to certain outcomes of interest. In this
appendix, I will identify some of these trends by identifying differences between the
four major geographic regions within the U.S., but the analysis presented here
cannot fully explain these trends.2 To summarize, the Northeast U.S. tends to rank
highly in various generosity measures and highly in most administrative quality
measures, with the exception of timeliness in first-payment promptness. The South
tends to rank low across all generosity and administrative quality measures. The
Midwest and West regions follow generally the same trends over time, falling
between the northeast and south. However, because the outputs used as measures
in this chapter are a function of policy and economic conditions, the determinants
of these trends are not identified here and direct comparison of certain outcomes
1For the remainder of this chapter, I consider the 50 US UI programs and the District of
Columbia, and I exclude the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico from the analysis.
2The four regions referred to include the Northeast, West, Midwest, and South, and their defi-
nitions are included in section B.8.1.
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should be made with care. What is clear, however, is that UI programs across the
U.S. regions have demonstrated substantial differences in generosity and quality
performance outputs.
B.4 Administration of Unemployment Insurance
The UI system is set up such that the federal government retains essential
power and oversight on certain rules and aspects of administration. Generally, the
federal government sets minimum standards for eligibility and benefit rules and
administrative quality, and it is the responsibility of the states to (1) ensure that
state legislation and program rules conform to the minimum standards set by
federal legislation and to (2) comply with said laws. The federal government also
plays a roll in lending additional funds to states as necessary, in offering extended
or emergency benefits if states trigger specified high unemployment levels, and
finally, the Department of Labor (DOL) conducts ongoing reviews to ensure
administrative quality in the states. There has historically existed tension between
the states and federal government over the management of funds and certain rules
governing UI. The implications of this federal-state partnership can only be
understood after a discussion of how funds are collected and distributed, and the
enforcement mechanisms available to ensure compliance and conformity.
B.4.1 Funding
For the purposes of financing, the UI system can be decomposed into three
parts: state administration costs, benefit payments, and other Department of
Labor administration expenses. General Department of Labor expenses, including
all Employment Training Administration and Office of Unemployment Insurance
administration costs are funded by the federal government general revenue. The
other categories are each funded through separate means.
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States administer payment of (1) regular state UI unemployment
compensation, (2) Unemployment Compensation for Ex-Service Members (UCX),
(3) Unemployment Compensation for Federal Employees (UCFE), as well as (4)
payments made through Extended Benefits (EB) or Emergency Unemployment
Compensation (EUC) programs. Although the actual benefit checks are issued by
states, the funds for each of these benefit tiers are different. The first of these
benefit payment types, regular state UC, is funded by the states. UCX is funded by
the various branches of the military, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration, and the U.S. Public Health Service. UCFE is funded by the
various federal agencies. EUC and EB are funded in a more complex manner, to be
discussed below.
B.4.1.1 Regular State Unemployment Compensation
Regular unemployment compensation benefits are funded by states’
unemployment insurance tax, typically collected through an experience rating
system. Federal law stipulates that this unemployment insurance tax be collected
on the first $7,000 in eligible wages, a figure that has not changed since the early
1980s. Most states have elected to use a higher taxable wage base, but this is not a
federal requirement. In 1990, 16 states retained the minimum taxable wage base,
but by 2010 only five states retained the minimum base of $7,000 (US Department
of Labor 2016).
At inception, the social security tax rate and wage base was comparable to
the UI taxable wage base and tax rate. In 1938, UI and the Old Age, Survivors and
Disability Insurance (OASDI) programs were funded through a tax on the first
$3,000 of eligible wages. Beginning in 1972, the OASDI taxable wage base has been
linked to the National Average Wage Index with a more constant tax rate applied.
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States’ UI programs, however, are not required to index their taxable wage base,
though some states choose to do so. To maintain financial solvency while retaining
a constant nominal taxable wage base, states must increase UI tax rates, which is
politically challenging. The alternative is to restrict benefit payments or recipiency.
Failure to increase either the UI tax rate or the taxable wage base may explain
much of the financial strain state programs are experiencing, and may perhaps
contribute to declining recipiency (recipiency rates will be discussed in a following
section).
Historically, state contributions collected in excess of benefit payments have
been held by the U.S. Treasury in a trust fund account for each state. In times of
economic contraction and high unemployment, states were meant to draw on their
trust fund accounts and recover the balance with greater contribution rates in
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times of expansion. State UI trust funds were designed to meet the objective of UI
to smooth income across business cycles and prevent increases in UI taxes during
times of high unemployment.
The net trust fund balance for all state accounts as a percent of covered
wages is shown across time in Figure B.1, as is the ratio of taxable wage base to
total wages. The important thing demonstrated by this figure is the decline in the
capacity of the UI system to play a role in providing economic stability. Over the
decades, states have contributed less and less to their trust fund accounts relative
to total wages, thus savings in the system has declined. This is partly the result of
state tax cuts made during the economic recoveries of the mid-late 1990s and mid
2000s, which have limited revenue for the UI systems and prevented trust fund
balances from recovery (Vroman 2011). Increasingly, current contributions have
been used to cover current benefit payments. In recent years, many states’ trust
fund balances have fallen below zero. Negative balances are possible through the
extensions of loans from the Federal government to fund regular UI benefit
payments.
In recent decades, contributions to the UI program have not exceeded benefit
payments by a significant margin. Figure B.2 demonstrates this trend using totals
for all state UI contributions (through state UI taxes) and all regular state benefit
payments as a percent of total wages, these data are produced by Employment
Training Administration (2016). Recession periods, as defined by the Bureau of
Economic Analysis (2012), are denoted by the vertical grey columns. Note that not
since the 1980s have contributions substantially outpaced benefit payments.
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B.4.1.2 Emergency and Extended Unemployment Compensation
In times of exceptionally high national or state unemployment, additional
tiers of unemployment compensation may be triggered. The Extended Benefits
(EB) program is triggered when states experience high unemployment (the
definition of this standard has been subject to change) and allows for the Federal
government to contribute up to 50% of the cost of 13 weeks of unemployment
compensation. These additional weeks of UC may be claimed only after a claimant
has exhausted their state’s regular unemployment compensation, the typical
maximum benefit allowance under regular UC is 26 weeks. EB is a perpetual
program that does not require reauthorization by Congress, however, the definition
of the look-back period for the EB “high unemployment” trigger may result in the
failure of states to qualify for EB status if unemployment remains at high levels for
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multiple years. This definition of the EB trigger is subject to change, and it also
has the effect of ending EB despite continued high unemployment levels within
state economies.
When national unemployment levels are sufficiently high, Congress may
choose to pass Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) legislation
allowing for additional weeks UC or benefit amounts in all states, though states will
fall within multiple tiers of benefit amounts depending on local economic
conditions. These additional benefits are fully funded by the federal government,
and all EUC benefits cease when authorization expires. For a demonstration of the
claims made under the different tiers of UC from January 1986 through May 2012,
see Figure B.3. Note that the measures in this chart are simply counts of claims
made, and are not weighted by any client or population measure. This figure was
adapted from its original source authored by the US Department of Labor (2016).
The important thing to note about the different tiers of UC is the
complexity inherent in the system. Each SWA is responsible for determining
eligibility and administering payments under all tiers of benefits. It is reasonable to
expect that increased claims volumes and the requisite adaptation to the
administration of these multiple tiers will have an effect on local state service
quality. It is a theoretically interesting question whether some states are better
able to adapt to greater and/or more complex work load and what factors affect
this ability to adapt or learn, the recent years of claims experience in the UI system
has provided an example of such variation in work load.
B.4.1.3 State Administration
Funding for the administration of state UI programs is provided through a
small federal payroll tax collected by the IRS according to the terms of the Federal
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Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA). These funds are then redistributed to the states
according to anticipated need. This award of grants for administration from the
federal government constitutes a key enforcement mechanism used to ensure
administrative compliance, conformity, and quality across the states.
State workforce agencies (SWAs) apply for grants to fund the administration
of UI programs once a year by submitting a State Quality Service Plan (SQSP) to
the Department of Labor. These SQSPs include a formula defined by the DOL that
uses past financial and claims details to estimate the amount of monies required for
proper administration of the state UC program. The SQSPs also include a narrative
written by the SWA addressing goals for administrative quality improvement and
action plans for addressing past quality issues. If a state has failed to meet
acceptable levels of performance as delineated by the DOL, the annual SQSP must
include a corrective action plan to address each issue. The bottom line is this: costs
of state UI administration are covered by grants from the federal government,
funded by FUTA payroll taxes paid by employers, but these grants are contingent
on state compliance and conformity with federal UI law and regulations.
B.4.2 Conformity and Compliance
To ensure that states comply with federal law governing UI, the Department
of Labor produces a bi-annual review of state laws (for a summary of certain state
provisions, see US Department of Labor 2016). In such a case that a state is out of
conformity with the SSA or the FUTA, the two major pieces of federal legislation
concerning UI, there are a number of possible steps that may be taken to reinstate
conformity. First, if FUTA law is violated, FUTA tax credits granted to employers
may be revoked, meaning that employers would be subjected to a substantially
higher tax rate. Employers earn a FUTA tax credit for any taxes paid into a state
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unemployment insurance account if the state program is in conformity. Therefore it
may be assumed that employers themselves are advocates of conformity with
federal regulation. Second, funding for the administration of UI programs is
distributed by the DOL, subject to conformity with federal regulations governing
the financing, eligibility, and administration of UC programs. Legally, it is possible
for the Department of Labor to restrict administration grants from states, though
this option has never been implemented to date. Ultimately, the federal
government has the option of suing the state or state workforce agency for failure
to comply with federal law and pursue a resolution through the federal court
system. This course of action has been taken on a number of occasions (see
O’Leary and Wandner 1997, pages 562-571 for a discussion).
In addition to conformity with federal laws, states must also comply with
their own state-laws governing UI. In the case of compliance violations, the federal
government has two key enforcement mechanisms, though generally the
Department of Labor’s Office of Unemployment Insurance plays a collaborative role
with SWAs in determining the appropriate corrective action. First, in the case of
egregious violations, the Department of Labor has, again, the threat of revoking
administration funds. Second, the DOL has the option of requiring written
corrective action plans. These corrective action plans are typically included in a
state’s annual SQSP. To date, no state has been denied funding for a failure to
comply with administrative quality standards, but corrective action plans are
frequently required of states to ensure improvement. These plans can be costly to
develop and implement, and constitute a burden on the states. Though generally
SQSPs are treated as an opportunity for communication between the SWAs and
the DOL, states with chronic violations may be subject to a more intrusive DOL
investigation. In addition, claimants or third parties have the right to sue states
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and state workforce agencies for failure to comply with state law or federal law.
Although this option is outside of the direct responsibility of the Department of
Labor, it may in fact pose a sufficient threat to ensure state compliance.
Thus, by playing some role in almost every aspect of the funding of
unemployment insurance, the DOL is able to ensure conformity and compliance
through various means. Additionally, actual or threatened suit action by claimants
or third parties may also pay an important role in the administration of UI. Having
now introduced the essential rules and characteristics of the finance and
administration of the U.S. UI system, the following sections will consider outcomes
of the UI program.
B.5 Program Generosity
The essential purpose of UI is to insure against risk of income loss from
unemployment. However, there is substantial room for states to restrict or expand
the generosity of payments made in this purpose, and there are a number of
different output measures which offer insight into the variation in generosity of UI
program across the U.S. Generosity is a multi-faceted concept and its measurement
should thus reflect the multiple aspects.
Social insurance generosity has been measured by some in the comparative
politics literature as the replacement rate, which is generally the percent of wages
replaced by program benefits (for a discussion, see Scruggs 2006). This is a decent
indicator of the generosity of benefit payments, and it is superior to alternative
monetary measures such as program spending per capita or as a percent of state
income. However, the replacement rate remains an incomplete measure because it
fails to capture the breadth of program generosity. One may think of the
replacement rate as an indicator of how generous social insurance program benefits
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are for those who receive them. My analysis here goes beyond this one-dimensional
measure of generosity to capture the breadth and duration of generosity as well.
The following sections advance upon the basic measurement of generosity as
the replacement rate and consider alternative measures: the maximum benefit
allowance ratio, recipiency rates, and duration. Though some comparative studies
have multiplied the average replacement rate by the recipiency rate to generate a
“generosity index” (Vroman 2007), this chapter refrains from considering more
sophisticated generosity indices.
B.5.1 Benefit Levels
A straightforward and popular measure of social program generosity is
simply the level of benefits provided to claimants. I consider two alternative
measures within this category. First, the average weekly benefit ratio, or the
replacement rate, reflects the generosity of the program to the average recipient. I
also consider the maximum benefit ratio, which indicates the maximum potential
generosity of a state UI program.
B.5.1.1 Average Weekly Benefit Ratio, or the Replacement Rate
A common measure of social wage-replacement or insurance program
generosity is the ratio of benefits to prior wages, this is referred to as the
replacement rate. This measure indicates the proportion of former wages replaced
by social program benefits. A higher replacement rate represents more generous
program benefits. Figure B.4 plots regional averages of the actual regular state UC
replacement rate from 1938-2011, using data from Employment Training
Administration (2016). The average replacement rate is calculated here as the ratio
of the average weekly benefit amount divided by the average weekly wage in eligible
employment. The national replacement rate since 1938 has averaged about .356,
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Figure B.4: Average Replacement Rate, by Region
which means that across the U.S. states UI benefits have equalled about 36% of
average wages. This is not a direct measure of state policy, but is rather a measure
of UI program outputs, and it is important to note that this figure is derived from
macro economic data and not from individual claims reports.
Figure B.4 shows that since the 1950s, the South has tended to experience
the lowest average replacement rates of the U.S. regions. Also, it is interesting to
note that these regional averages vary over time in slightly different patterns.
Figure B.5 lists the states with the highest and lowest average replacement rates
over the period. State average replacement rates range from a low of 25.7% in
Alaska to a high of 42.6% in Hawaii, which also points to the substantial variation
within geographic regions as both Alaska and Hawaii are included in the West.
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Rank State
Average Weekly 
Benefit Ratio Rank State
Average Weekly 
Benefit Ratio
1 Hawaii 0.426 42 Texas 0.329
2 Utah 0.419 43 Indiana 0.328
3 North Dakota 0.410 44 Arizona 0.322
4 Rhode Island 0.406 45 New York 0.322
5 Wyoming 0.405 46 Missouri 0.318
6 Idaho 0.405 47 Delaware 0.318
7 Iowa 0.400 48 Alabama 0.318
8 Kansas 0.393 49 California 0.315
9 Wisconsin 0.389 50 Tennessee 0.315
10 Pennsylvania 0.388 51 Alaska 0.257
Source: Author calculation, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Training Administration, Handbook 394 Financial Data, 2012
Highest Long Term Replacement Rates Lowest Long Term Replacement Rates
Figure B.5: Highest and Lowest Long Term Replacement Rates
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Figure B.6: Maximum Benefit Ratio, by Region
207
Rank State
Maximum Benefit 
to Wage Ratio Rank State
Maximum Benefit 
to Wage Ratio
1 Massachusetts 0.796 42 California 0.417
2 Maine 0.722 43 Tennessee 0.415
3 Rhode Island 0.721 44 New York 0.413
4 Hawaii 0.675 45 Louisiana 0.409
5 Pennsylvania 0.649 46 Mississippi 0.406
6 West Virginia 0.644 47 Georgia 0.404
7 Arkansas 0.636 48 Missouri 0.384
8 Washington 0.635 49 District of Columbia 0.362
9 North Carolina 0.633 50 Alabama 0.361
10 Ohio 0.632 51 Arizona 0.348
Highest Ratio Lowest Ratio
Source: Author calculation using U.S. Department of Labor Significant Provisions of State UI Laws, 2012
Figure B.7: Highest and Lowest Long Term Maximum Benefit Ratios, 1990-2010
B.5.1.2 Maximum Benefit Ratio
In addition to the replacement rate as a measure of experienced generosity,
the ratio of maximum benefit allowance to average wages is a useful indicator of the
potential generosity of the UI programs. In practice, maximum weekly benefit
allowances averaged $432 in 2010, compared to the average weekly benefit payment
of $293. I define the maximum benefit ratio as the ratio of a state’s maximum
benefit cap (a direct policy measure) divided by average wages in a state in the
same period, and I calculate this measure using data from the (Employment
Training Administration 2016; US Department of Labor 2016). This measure
reflects the generosity of a state’s maximum benefit allowance relative to average
wages. Whereas the replacement rate reflects actual payments relative to actual
wages, the maximum benefit ratio indicates the potential generosity of programs as
defined by state benefit allowance rules. Another crucial difference between the
replacement rate and maximum benefit ratio is the availability of data for its
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calculation; the maximum benefit ratio is only currently available from 1990.
Figure B.6 shows regional trends in the maximum benefit ratio and Figure
B.7 lists the states with the highest and lowest average ratios over the period
1990-2010. It is interesting to note that the South again tends to have the lowest
maximum benefit ratio over the period relative other states, that the Northeast has
the highest over time, and that these regions appear to be moving in opposite
directions on this measure. Also, several of the top or bottom ten states in terms of
replacement rates (in Figure B.5) are also listed in the top or bottom ten in terms
of their maximum benefit ratios in Figure B.7. For example, according to this
measure, Hawaii is again ranked as more generous and California and New York
tend to be less generous, on average. Although comparison of actual and potential
benefit payment generosity is a useful introduction to the generosity of different
states’ UI programs, these measures do not capture all aspects of program
generosity.
B.5.2 Recipiency
Not every unemployed person files a claim for benefits, and not every claim
is paid. There are numerous ways a state can limit or expand program generosity
to include or exclude applicants or potential applicants using eligibility or other
administrative rules. Additional measures of program generosity should be
considered. Therefore, I consider the recipiency rate, also called a take-up rate, as a
measure of how broadly benefits are distributed across the citizen or client
population. This measure is an indicator of the breadth of UI program generosity.
There are a number of different ways to measure a recipiency rate. The
most common measure is simply the ratio of benefit recipients to total
unemployment. Recipiency rates may also be understood as measures of program
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effectiveness. If the mission of an unemployment insurance program is to provide
income security to those who are unemployed, then one measure of program
effectiveness should be 1) the extent to which unemployed citizens apply for UC
and 2) the extent to which unemployed receive UC.
A Department of Labor sponsored report defines four common measures of
unemployment insurance recipiency, each captures a slightly different aspect of
programmatic recipiency:
1. Standard Rate: number of weekly claims for regular program
unemployment insurance benefits, as a proportion of all unemployed workers
2. All Programs Rate: number of weekly claims for all program (regular,
extended and federal) unemployment insurance benefits, as a proportion of all
unemployed workers
3. Standard Short-term Rate: number of weekly claims for regular program
unemployment insurance benefits, as a proportion of job losers unemployed
less than 27 weeks; and
4. All Programs Job Loser Rate: number of weekly claims for all program
(regular, extended and federal) unemployment insurance benefits, as a
proportion of all job losers (Wittenburg et al. 1999).
An additional measure of the standard rate, used by Vroman (2009), utilizes weekly
benefit recipients as the numerator, which has the effect of measuring actual
recipiency as compared to a claimant rate. Each of these rates vary in their
definition of the underlying population (the denominator) or in the definition of
recipient (the numerator), and will therefore differently respond to macroeconomic
conditions. The standard rate, for example tends to increase in times of economic
contraction because the proportion of those unemployed classified as “job losers”
rather than “job leavers” increases. Because job losers are the primary population
targeted for benefits by UI programs, the recipiency rate will increase as the
proportion of unemployed job losers increases. For such reasons, it has been
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Figure B.8: Standard Recipiency Rate, National Average
suggested that recipiency rates only be compared across similar economic
conditions (Wittenburg et al. 1999). The important point here is that
macroeconomic conditions have an impact on UI program outputs.
The standard recipiency rate in the U.S. since 1976 has averaged .35, which
means that, on average, around 35% of unemployed Americans claim regular state
UC in a given month (this figure was calculated using data available from US
Department of Labor 2016). Figure B.8 clearly demonstrates the responsiveness of
the standard recipiency rate to the business cycle; not only are seasonal trends
discernible, but the effects of economic contraction and expansion clearly affect the
rate. This figure shows the national average standard rate, measured monthly, for
the period 1976-2011, using data provided by US Department of Labor (2016). The
decline in the standard recipiency rate in recent years is somewhat misleading
because this rate considers only regular state UC and does not consider the
proportion of unemployed collecting EB or EUC. The important thing to note
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about this figure is that the UI recipiency is a function of economic factors as well
as the policies and administrative rules of a state.
In addition to macroeconomic conditions, recipiency rates will be affected by
a states industrial composition, benefit levels, and non-monetary and monetary
eligibility rules. For example, in states with more stringent non-monetary eligibility
requirements (i.e. strict separation rules), employers have an incentive to actively
dissuade employees from making UI claims or to provide false information about
the employee or separation reason as part of the UI claim process. The presence of
stronger unions should also be expected to affect recipiency rates, perhaps by either
pressuring states to extend coverage or by informing the unemployed of their
eligibility for benefits. Vroman (2009) finds the primary cause of low recipiency
rates to be individuals’ ignorance of their eligibility for UC; many unemployed
individuals do not apply for UC because they (wrongly) believe they are ineligible
for benefits. The source of this (mis)information about eligibility is an interesting
and politically salient question that merits future theoretical and empirical
consideration.
Though recipiency rates do not directly measure administrative rules, it is
the case with UI that not all administrative rules affecting eligibility or benefit
payments are easily accessible for study. Such rules may be informal, inconsistently
administered within states, or not well documented, as identified in site visits by
(Wittenburg et al. 1999). Thus indirect measures of recipiency or generosity are
required to compare state programs coverage and generosity, and more
sophisticated empirical analyses can model these processes to better estimate the
factors affecting these outcome measures.
It is worth noting that the denominator in some measures of recipiency is
the number of unemployed in a state, this means that longitudinal comparison of
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recipiency rates is contingent on a consistent measurement of unemployment. The
Office of Unemployment Insurance does not itself administer unemployment
measures, this is the task of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Current Population
Survey (CPS). Since the initiation of UI, the CPS has changed the methodology of
measuring unemployment a number of times. For example, explicit attempts were
made in the 1980s to better represent minorities in the CPS, with the effect of
increasing estimates of unemployment (due to the heterogeneity of unemployment
rates across minority groups). Therefore, some variation in recipiency rates over
time may be attributed to CPS methodology advances, rather than changes in the
UI program. However, research suggests that the change in measurement
methodology is not the dominant factor determining the declining trend in
recipiency rate in recent decades (Wittenburg et al. 1999). Also, recipiency rates
that use applicant population as the denominator presumably do not have the same
measurement problem.
B.5.2.1 State and Regional Trends in Recipiency
Figure B.9 clearly demonstrates the point that recipiency varies across the
U.S. states and regions. This figure was generated using data provided by US
Department of Labor (2016). Although each region seems to follow a similar trend
in terms of annual fluctuations, it is interesting that the Northeast consistently has
the highest recipiency rate of the four regions (revolving around 40%), the South
has the lowest (around an average of 25%), and the Midwest and West have
converged toward approximately the same rate over the past decade. Figure B.10
lists the highest and lowest average state standard recipiency rate for the period
1976-2010. Recall that the national average standard recipiency rate for the this
period is about 35%. This figure demonstrates the notable spread in long term
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Standard Recipiency Rates, by region
Figure B.9: Long Term Standard Recipiency Rate, by Region
recipiency rates; South Dakota has the lowest rate of 15.9% and Alaska has the
highest rate at nearly 60%. These figures were generated using the weekly UI
claims reports (US Department of Labor 2016).
B.5.3 Duration
Another measure of program generosity is the duration of benefit payments,
which is the number of weeks of benefits paid to UC claimants. This aspect of
generosity indicates how long benefits may be paid to claimants. States may be
more or less generous in their policies governing eligibility duration as well as their
determination of eligibility subject to those policies. For this reason, measures of
state policies governing duration of benefit payments are inadequate measures of
generosity. Claimants may be denied continued benefits due to non-monetary
non-separation eligibility rules, these rules are difficult to measure and almost
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Rank State
Long Term 
Recipiency Rate Rank State
Long Term 
Recipiency Rate
1 Alaska 0.596 42 New Hampshire 0.222
2 Rhode Island 0.463 43 Mississippi 0.213
3 Connecticut 0.455 44 New Mexico 0.212
4 Massachusetts 0.446 45 Oklahoma 0.203
5 New Jersey 0.445 46 Arizona 0.199
6 Pennsylvania 0.442 47 Colorado 0.195
7 Vermont 0.437 48 Virginia 0.194
8 Wisconsin 0.424 49 Texas 0.185
9 Delaware 0.407 50 Florida 0.181
10 Hawaii 0.379 51 South Dakota 0.159
Highest Rates Lowest Rates
Source: Author calculation, U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Training Administration, Weekly Claims Reports, 2012
Figure B.10: Highest and Lowest Long Term Standard Rates, 1976-2010
impossible to compare due to differences in states’ interpretation.3 Therefore, an
indirect measure of benefit duration is necessary to capture any informal or
un-measurable stringency in the determination and administration of UC payments.
In most states, eligibility duration is uniform; the maximum duration of
regular UC is generally 26 weeks. As of January 2012, only six states had a
maximum duration of more or less than 26 weeks, all states rules fell between 20
and 30 weeks (US Department of Labor 2016). In a small number of states,
however, eligibility duration may be extended in times of high unemployment, or
subject to the claimants industry of employment or completion of approved
training. In addition to the rules governing duration and eligibility, economic
conditions will directly affect the job market and the duration of unemployment,
thus affecting the experienced average duration of insured unemployment.
Figure B.11 demonstrates the trend in average duration by region from
3Non-monetary non-separation eligibility rules vary by state and include such requirements as
the claimant must be available for work, must be actively searching for work, or must not reject a
reasonable job offer. Claimants failing to meet these eligibility requirements, as determined by the
state UI agency, are generally disqualified from continued claims.
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Figure B.11: Average Duration of Regular UI Claims, by Region
1990-2011. Average UC duration is calculated here as the number of UC weeks paid
divided by the number of first-payments made in a period, this is an estimate of
the average number of weeks compensated per initial claim. This figure was
produced using data available from Employment Training Administration (2016)
and US Department of Labor (2016). The average duration increase in recent years
can be attributed to increased unemployment across the country over the same
period. Although direct comparisons of average duration across U.S. states or
regions are not a direct measure of program generosity, it is interesting to note that
the Northeast again tends to rank highest across the period. A valid comparison of
the generosity in terms of duration of state UC would control for the policy and
economic factors discussed above. However, it is worth noting that the long term
average duration of regular state UC ranges from a high of 17 weeks in the District
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Rank State
Duration 
of UC Rank State
Duration 
of UC
1 District of Columbia 17 42 Nebraska 12
2 New York 16 43 Idaho 12
3 Louisiana 15 44 South Carolina 12
4 New Jersey 15 45 Arkansas 11
5 California 15 46 Indiana 11
6 Alaska 15 47 South Dakota 11
7 Massachusetts 15 48 North Carolina 11
8 New Mexico 14 49 Georgia 11
9 Washington 14 50 Virginia 10
10 Illinois 14 51 New Hampshire 10
Source: Author calculation U.S. Department of Labor Significant Provisions of State UI Laws, 2012
Longest Duration Shortest Duration
Figure B.12: Highest and Lowest Long Term Average Duration of UI Claims
of Columbia to a low of 10 weeks in New Hampshire (as shown in Figure B.12,
calculated using data available from Employment Training Administration (2016)
and US Department of Labor (2016)).
B.6 Administrative Performance Quality
Similar to generosity, administrative quality is not uniform across all states
or regions, or eligibility rule. Certain components of a UI claim or payment will be
more or less prone to timelines or accuracy concerns. The DOL is primarily
concerned with with the accuracy and timeliness of eligibility determinations and
benefit payments, but additional measures of administrative performance exist.
The following sections will consider timeliness and accuracy of benefit payments
and reemployment rates as outputs of the UI program that indicate public agency
performance.
Before introducing the performance quality measures, however, a discussion
of the different types of eligibility rules is needed because administrative
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performance will likely vary across these types. Eligibility rules consist of two
types: monetary and non-monetary. Monetary eligibility criteria consist of
qualifying wage levels or employment duration, whereas non-monetary eligibility is
determined by criteria such as reason for separation, work-search efforts, or denial
of suitable work. These criteria are largely determined by each state program,
federal rules governing eligibility criteria are minimal. Thus the quality of state
programs with regard to the accuracy or timeliness of these rules can be difficult to
compare because each state has it’s own rules and de-facto interpretation.
In recent decades the process of determining monetary eligibility has shifted
mostly to electronic verification and processing. Wage and other employment
details reported by an applicant to the state workforce agency can be verified using
national databases of new hires and payroll details. This has led to the automation
of most (if not all) aspects of monetary eligibility determination, allowing little to
no room for discretion on the part of the agent making the determination. Errors
and time-lapses in monetary eligibility determinations should be much lower than
those in non-monetary eligibility determinations because of this automated process,
though errors do still occur.
Non-monetary eligibility rules allow for greater discretion on the part of
agents (Rubin 1983), and may require subjective judgements about the claimant’s
work-search efforts or work-separation behavior. Thus, it is in the area of
non-monetary determinations that errors are more common. States vary widely in
their non-monetary requirements, most states have some rule governing separation
cause; for example, voluntary work leavers are typically disqualified or must wait a
period before re-qualifying for unemployment compensation. Variation in the
complexity or stringency of state rules governing these non-monetary separation
and non-separation eligibility rules are certain to affect some measures of
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administrative quality because of the complexity introduced into the claim
determination process. Therefore, any comparison of quality measures across states
must be made with care and attention to state-specific rules governing eligibility, as
well as other aspects such as benefit allowance rules.
Additionally, policies governing eligibility or benefit allowances change
frequently. For example, in response to the great recession of recent years, some
states have substantially changed their eligibility criteria in an effort to limit
program expenditures. In early 2012, Florida instituted a “skills test” as a
requirement for eligibility, which involves a 45 question quiz on math, reading, and
research skills. Though justified by state politicians as a step towards improving
workforce reemployment success, the test has received attention from media and
labor groups claiming the test significantly limits access to benefits. The
Department of Labor has initiated an investigation into the legality of this exam as
an eligibility requirement. The introduction of such eligibility requirements, as well
as the costs associated with a DOL investigation, may be expected to affect
administrative performance. This is one example of the complications experienced
in the claims determination process.
B.6.1 Payment Promptness
The emphasis of the DOL’s UI Performs Core Measures is on the timeliness
of determinations and payments (US Department of Labor 2016). State workforce
agencies’ performance is judged against the UI Performs Acceptable Levels of
Performance (ALPs), many of which explicitly deal with time lapse performance.
Timeliness or promptness is a straightforward measure of administrative quality
and is less costly to measure than some alternative quality measures.
Figure B.13 demonstrates one timeliness measure from 1997 to the present,
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Figure B.13: National First Payment Promptness
the national average monthly first payment promptness rate, which is the
percentage of first payments made within 21 days of the claim date. These data are
made available through the Employment & Training Administration (2012).
Periods of national economic contraction are indicated by the vertical grey bars (as
determined by Bureau of Economic Analysis 2012). For demonstration, the
national total workload (number of first claims made) is measured on the secondary
vertical axis. The important thing to note from this chart is that the national
average promptness of first payments has declined and fallen below the ALP of 87%
in the period beginning approximately with the most recent recession. The cause of
this decline in timeliness is likely to do in part with the increase in initial claims
made during the same period; increases in claims during previous recessions is
associated with a decline in payment promptness (Vroman 2011).
As a first step in considering the variation in administrative quality across
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Figure B.14: First Payment Promptness, by Region
the U.S. states, Figure B.14 shows the same first payment promptness rate by
geographic region (using data from Employment & Training Administration 2012).
The Northeast tends to rank lower than other states in payment promptness, but
all regions have experienced a downturn in first payment promptness since
approximately 2007. Although the West, Midwest, and South have tended to
cluster together in their promptness rates and trend over the period, it seems that
the South has experienced a greater fall in payment promptness relative to the
other two regions in the recent years of the recession.
There are several potential factors which might explain variation in region or
state promptness. First of all, regional differences in unemployment volumes might
be a factor in variation of promptness levels or changes. It is also important to note
that the stringency or complexity of eligibility rules is certainly a factor in state
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first payment promptness rates. States with more complex or strict rules governing
UI eligibility or benefit allowances should be expected to take longer to make
payments, or determinations simply because it should take claims agents longer to
review the claim. Additionally, Vroman (2011) finds that time lapse performance
tends to be worse in larger states relative to smaller states. Finally, the method of
claims filing plays a roll in promptness, as Vroman (2011) also demonstrates. The
introduction of telephones and internet claims applications, in addition to in-person
claims, has facilitated a significant improvement in payment promptness since 1997.
In addition to the first payment promptness rate considered here, additional
time lapse measures include continued claims payment promptness, non-monetary
determination (separation and non-separation), new employer status determination,
and various other appeals decision promptness. The DOL monitors each of these as
ALPs, in addition to numerous other time lapse measures which are not utilized as
part of the performance core measures. A more in-depth consideration of these
alternative timeliness measures of administrative quality is beyond the scope of this
introductory chapter. First payment promptness is an especially important quality
measure because it affects every claimant in the UI program, whereas other
alternative timeliness measures may not represent aspects of administrative quality
that are relevant to as many individuals.
B.6.2 Payment Accuracy
The second aspect of administrative quality discussed here is that of
payment accuracy, or improper payments. In the case of underpayments or
wrongfully denied claims, the quality of payment accuracy has potentially
significant negative impacts on the wellbeing of Americans and deserves attention
for this reason. Further, payment accuracy is of great interest to public
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administration scholars because it has the potential to identify errors made by
public agency employees.
B.6.2.1 Benefit Accuracy Measurement
The OUI implemented an improper payment detection system beginning in
the 1980s named Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM), this program has since
become the template used by many other public programs seeking to establish such
monitoring systems. Subject to rules set by the DOL, each state administers a
random audit of paid and denied UI claims each week and is required to
reinvestigate each aspect of the claim and determination to establish accuracy of
payment. Each weeks’ results from the BAM Paid Claims Accuracy (PCA) and
Denied Claims Accuracy (DCA) statistical samples are then used by the DOL to
establish estimates for states’ monthly or annual improper payment or integrity
rates. Only claims made for regular state unemployment compensation are audited,
which means that all UCX, UCFE, EB, and EUC claims are excluded from BAM
audits and thus from all improper payment estimates. Though the rules governing
statistical sampling are set by the DOL, each state’s SWA manages the
administration of BAM.
Though it is tempting to use states’ integrity rates, or error rates, to
compare the quality of administrative performance, this is not a strictly valid
comparison to make because states vary widely in their eligibility requirements,
some being more strict, detailed, or technical than others. Also, integrity rates are
a function of the quality of the random audit and investigation process. States with
higher quality performance management investigation programs may report higher
error rates than those states with lower quality audit programs simply because the
program is better at detecting errors made. This means that any comparison of
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states’ program integrity rates must compare trends, rather than absolute values,
and any such analysis must consider the possibility than an increase in reported
errors may be due either to a decline in determination quality or an improvement
in BAM quality. The data on quality and error rates reported by the BQC and
BAM programs is likely of higher quality, longer time-series, and more detailed
than most other social transfer program, and yet it is rife with potential pitfalls for
the unwary researcher.
It should also be made clear that overpayment rates and underpayment
rates are subject to different validity threats. Reported underpayments are
underestimated, first, because they do not include estimates of wrongfully denied
claims. Second, underpayment rates are likely to be extremely underestimated if
the population of insured unemployed is considered. Recipiency rates are never
100%, meaning that the proportion of unemployed who apply for benefits is well
below the proportion of unemployed who are actually eligible for benefits.
Underpayment rates are typically estimated to be about 2% of paid claims
(Employment Training Administration 2015). However, this is figure is
substantially underestimated.
The Annual Report Rate is an estimate of the overall over/underpayment
rate made by a state based on PCA. More specifically, the Annual Report Rate is
an estimate that “includes fraud, nonfraud recoverable overpayments, nonfraud
nonrecoverable overpayments, official action taken to reduce future benefits, and
payments that are technically proper due to finality or other rules” (Office of
Unemployment Insurance 2012). Figure B.15 shows state Annual Report Rates,
averaged by region for the period 1988-2010, using data from Office of
Unemployment Insurance (2012). The average Annual Report Rate for all states
over this period is 9.7%, which means that just under ten percent of payments
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Figure B.15: Annual Report Rate, by Region
made by UI agencies are estimated to be improper. One should be careful in
drawing conclusions based on comparisons made using this chart, however, it is
interesting to note that in recent years, all regions have experienced an increase in
the Annual Report Rate. This may suggest that increases in claims volumes
associated with the great recession of recent years has contributed to a higher
aggregate improper payment rate; the estimated total improper payment rate in
2011 was 12% (Office of Federal Financial Management 2012). The divergent trend
between the Northeast and the rest of the regions beginning in the early 2000s is
also interesting, and deserves greater consideration in future work.
For demonstration purposes, Figure B.16 reports the average state Annual
Report Rate for the entire period 1988-2010. This chart is useful in demonstrating
the variation in report rates across states, and it should not be taken as a direct
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ranking of states by quality. Also note that this report rate considers only accuracy
of paid claims and does not reflect the accuracy of denied claims, which is arguably
of equal interest. Additional estimates of improper payment rates are generated by
the DOL and BAM, but are not fully considered here, brief list of such rate
estimates is included in the Appendix.
B.6.2.2 Improper Payment Information Act
The passage of the 2002 Improper Payment Information Act (IPIA) has
made reporting of estimated improper payments (equivalent to BAM’s PCA
system) a requirement for agencies making claims payments using federal funds.
The IPIA requires improper payment reports across many agencies and programs,
see Figure B.17 for a sample of programs’ reported improper payment rates a
percent of total program outlays (calculated using data from Office of Federal
Financial Management 2012). However, direct comparison of improper payment
rates for the purpose of making inferences about administrative or programmatic
quality is not valid because programs vary in eligibility rules, administrative
structure, and other important factors that can affect error rates.
B.6.3 Reemployment
The last aspect of administrative quality considered here is the rate of
reemployment, which is an indirect measure of the service quality provided by state
UI programs. Facilitation of reemployment is an explicit objective of state UI
programs (US Department of Labor 2016). Quality of public service with regard to
this outcome measure is important for it’s direct bearing on the wellbeing of
Americans. Also, because facilitation of reemployment is a goal of UI programs as
well as other training and employment services performed by SWAs, this particular
quality measure potentially indicates quality of networking across public
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Figure B.17: Improper Payments as a Percent of Total Program Outlays
organizations. It is important to note, however, that this quality measure is
strongly dependent on state economies.
The standard reemployment measure used by the DOL is the percent of UI
claimants who are reemployed within the quarter following the quarter in which
they received their first UI payment (US Department of Labor 2016), and ALPs are
defined according to local state economic conditions. In 2010, state facilitation of
reemployment rates ranged from a low of 35.5% in New Mexico to a high of 77.2%
in Idaho (US Department of Labor 2016). However, directly comparing
reemployment rates without controlling for local unemployment characteristics is
not a valid comparison of program or administrative quality. For this reason, my
analysis refrains from presenting additional descriptive statistics or charts.
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B.7 Conclusion
The nationwide unemployment insurance program budget exceeds $50
billion a year. Ensuring that the quality of service provided by such a program
should be a priority for scholars and policy analysts. A crucial step in this process
is an understanding of the structure of funding, influence, and power relations
within the UI system, and this chapter has served to contribute to such an
understanding. The Department of Labor exerts critical influence on many aspects
of state UI programs because it plays a role in the funding of those aspects, but
states retain sufficient autonomy over their programs to create unique tax, benefit,
and eligibility rules. The resulting 53 unique programs thus have different concerns
and political challenges.
Two important dimensions of unemployment insurance programs are the
generosity of program benefits and the quality of administrative performance.
These aspects of the UI system are important, again, because they affect the lives
of Americans interacting with the program. States, and regions, in the U.S. vary
along the different measures of generosity and performance quality, and this
variation deserves greater attention from academic scholars in order to better
understand the causes.
B.8 Additional Material
B.8.1 Definition of Geographic Regions
As defined by U.S. Census Bureau (2012), the regions referred to in this
chapter consist of the following:
• Northeast: Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode
Island, Vermont, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania
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• South: Delaware, District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North
Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, West Virginia, Alabama, Kentucky,
Mississippi, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas
• Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin, Iowa, Kansas,
Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota
• West: Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah,
Wyoming, Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington
B.8.2 Aggregated Payment Integrity Measures Estimated by BAM
1. Operational Rate - “The BAM operational overpayment rate includes those
overpayments that the states are reasonably expected to detect and establish
for recovery – fraud and nonfraud recoverable overpayments, excluding work
search, employment service (ES) registration, base period wage issues and
miscellaneous causes, such as benefits paid during a period of disqualification,
redeterminations, and back pay awards” (Office of Unemployment Insurance
2012).
2. Annual Report Rate - “The annual report rate includes fraud, nonfraud
recoverable overpayments, nonfraud nonrecoverable overpayments, official
action taken to reduce future benefits, and payments that are technically
proper due to finality or other rules. The rate excludes payments determined
to be ‘technically’ proper due to law/rules requiring formal warnings for
unacceptable work search efforts. All causes and responsible parties are
included in this rate. When overpayments attributed to another SWA are
excluded from individual state results” (Office of Unemployment Insurance
2012).
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3. Agency Responsibility - “This rate includes overpayments for which the
SWA was either solely responsible or shared responsibility with claimants,
employers, or third parties, such as labor unions or private employment
referral agencies. The rate includes fraud, nonfraud recoverable
overpayments, nonfraud nonrecoverable overpayments, official action taken to
reduce future benefits, and payments that are technically proper due to
finality or other rules” (Office of Unemployment Insurance 2012).
4. Fraud - “The definition of unemployment compensation fraud varies from
state to state. Because fraud determination criteria and thresholds vary
throughout the SWAs; the individual state rates reflect these differences. The
rate includes all causes and responsible parties.” (Office of Unemployment
Insurance 2012)
5. Underpayment Rate - “This rate includes payments that the BAM
investigation determines were too small. All causes and responsible parties
are included in this rate. It includes errors where additional payment is made
or those errors that are technically proper due to finality rules or technically
proper due to rules other than finality” (Office of Unemployment Insurance
2012)
6. Improper Denial Rate - “he adjusted improper denial rates for monetary
denials, separation denials, and nonseparation denials” (Office of
Unemployment Insurance 2012).
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